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Abstract
Basel capital requirements have attracted a lot of debate surrounding their adequacy
as the Basel I and II regulations were shortly followed by the 1990-1991 and 2007-2009
crises. This creates an appropriate scene for comparative purposes with respect to the
impact of these requirements: same country of origin (U.S.) and similar outcome (credit
crunches). Hence, after providing a brief overview of these regulations in Chapter 2,
the aim of Chapter 3 is to apply the methodology in Berger and Udell (1994) over the
subprime crisis and investigate any Basel II related impact. We find inconclusive results
with regard to the impact of regulatory capital on the crisis and argue that this could
be due to overshadowing by other factors such as leverage and liquidity.
Chapter 4 looks at changes in co-movement patterns (correlation) between the lever-
age and capital ratios across the aforementioned crises. We find that the change in the
impact of the latter ratio on subsequent crises lies in the changing dynamics between
the two regulatory requirements. Therefore, we argue that changes in risk-weights cat-
egories introduced in the Basel framework can reverse the relationship between both
ratios. This inherently changes the binding constraints on banks between the two crises.
Our reasoning is based on a formula we develop linking the two ratios together which
is derived from the sensitivity of the risk-based capital ratio to a change in one of its
risk-weights.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we shift our attention to European countries in order to explore
the factors that jointly determine returns, spillovers and contagion. While our findings
point out that EU countries might have the incentive to reduce their capital ratios in
order to achieve higher returns, nonetheless having a substantial amount of capital can
shield them from the effects of spillovers. Hence, it is important to maintain sensible
capital ratios to counterweight the aggravating effects of bilateral linkages such as trade
and cross-border finance.
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Chapter I:
Introduction
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is the world’s oldest international financial
organization. Established in 1930 by a consortium of European countries along with
Japan, it soon became known under the name of the city it was headquartered in:
Basel (Switzerland). Initially entrusted with the task of overseeing reparations which
were imposed on Germany after World War I, ever since, the BIS has taken on many
objectives as part of its role of “bank of central banks” for its sixty member countries.
These include overseeing the implementation of the Bretton Woods agreement, managing
cross-border capital flows in the aftermath of the oil and debt crises of the 1970s and
1980s, fostering monetary policy cooperation, as well as providing emergency financing to
countries in need. As part of its functions, the BIS also provides an extensive repository
of statistical data linked to the global financial system in addition to a wide array of
research documentation related to its various areas of policy work.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the BIS took charge of regulating the capital adequacy
of financial institutions in order to put in place a global safety net and maintain a “level
playing field”. This task was assigned to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) which introduced the concept of capital requirements. The latter would then
have to be enforced by all member countries, albeit with some national discretion.
At the heart of these requirements lies the capital ratio which governs the amount of
capital banks are required to hold to cover their unexpected losses1. This breakthrough
was seen as an improvement over the leverage ratio which had already been implemented
1Expected losses having already been accounted for by reserve requirements.
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in other countries. As such, the capital ratio, despite going through many changes, has
always been the centerpiece of all Basel risk-based capital regulations (I, II, III).
Initially, the capital ratio initiative was praised as it re-assured the markets that
banks were taking sufficient precautionary measures in regard to any risky behavior
on their part. However, in light of the credit crises that affected financial markets, in
particular those in the U.S., in the aftermath of the Basel I, the praise surrounding the
impact of regulatory standards soon shifted to controversy (Syron (1991), Bernanke and
Lown (1991) and Hall (1993)).
As a result, the question of whether the BIS objective can in reality be attained
through enforcing capital requirements became a widespread subject of debate and con-
tinues unabated today. However, most of the Basel criticism was focused on the 1990-
1991 credit crunch. Hence, based on the study conducted by Berger and Udell (1994), we
complement the literature by exploring the hypothesis of whether capital cushions have
affected the banks’ lending during the 2007-2009 subprime crisis. Using a bank panel
dataset obtained from the FDIC covering the period 2004-2009, we observe that capital
requirements were indirectly implicated in the crisis while other factors such as leverage
and liquidity played a bigger role by exploiting Basel regulatory loopholes. These results
have direct policy implications with regard to Basel III which sought to capitalize on
the shortcoming of its predecessors.
Still, one notable difference between both credit crunches was that banks were con-
siderably overcapitalized prior to the onset of the 2007-2009 subprime crisis compared
to those which had undergone the 1990-1991 recession (Milne (2002) and Chami and
Cosimano (2010)). This raises the question that, if capital requirements were achieved
prior to the subprime crisis, how could the Basel framework be blamed again for hav-
ing accelerated if not caused another credit crunch? The answer to this puzzle seems
to lie in the relationship between the capital ratio and the leverage ratio which is gov-
erned by risk-weights categories determined by the Basel regulation. However, we show
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that changes to risk-weight categories which affect the correlation pattern between both
ratios are not reflected in the subprime crisis. This refutes the hypothesis that they
were behind the changes to the binding constraint on banks. As a matter of fact, we
demonstrate that these dynamics are governed by a formula linking the two ratios to-
gether which derives from the sensitivity of the risk-based capital ratio to a change in its
risk-weight(s). One implication of our work regarding the Basel III regulation consists
in validating the newly established capital increments in a mathematical rather than
heuristical approach.
Our analysis has so far focused purely on U.S. financial markets. In an attempt
to broaden our perspective on the Basel regulation, we shift the focus towards a more
macroeconomic outlook on crises in Europe. Worldwide shocks such as financial crises
have a direct impact on banking stock returns. One characteristic the more recent crises
have in common is their widespread nature as they propagate from one country to the
other. The latter, known as spillover and contagion effects, has recently attracted a lot
of research by the academic (Baele (2005) and Fratzscher (2012)) and policy (Chan-Lau
et al. (2012a) and Poirson and Schmittman (2012)) research communities without any
focus in relation the Basel II implementation in Europe (CRDIII). Using a panel of
European countries covering the period 2003-2012, we explore the bilateral and regula-
tory factors that jointly determine banking returns and the transmission of external and
internal shocks. This information should allow regulators to decide on adequate macro-
preventive measures to protect countries from the harmful consequences of these shocks.
Beyond trade and financial linkages which are the principal channels investigated by
previous research, we find that bank-specific factors at the heart of the new Basel III
regulation also play a role in channeling global shocks. While this finding is not new
in itself (Berger and Bouwman (2013)), our main contribution is in showing that both
returns and shock transmission are governed by different combinations of the same fac-
tors across various samples of the banking sector. This study therefore complements the
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work of the ECB (2011) and constitutes a forward-looking assessment of enhancements
brought by the new Basel III regulation.
This dissertation is therefore structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we present an
overview of capital requirements. In Chapter 3, we look at the Basel capital credit
crunch hypothesis from a new perspective in light of the subprime crisis. In Chapter 4,
we explore the Basel capital requirement puzzle related to the contrasting effects of these
requirements by undertaking a study of changing interconnections between leverage and
risk-based capital ratios. In Chapter 5, we investigate the determinants of European re-
turns, spillovers and contagion whilst taking into account these ratios as well as bilateral
country linkages. Finally, we conclude with our main contributions and suggestions for
future research.
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Chapter II:
Capital Requirements Overview
1 Risk-Based Capital (RBC) Requirements - Basel
i Basel I
The first Basel initiative was published in 1988 (BCBS (1988)) to set the minimum
threshold for banks in terms of capital ratio requirements. These formed the basis for
Pillar 1 of the regulation1. The components of the Tier 1 (T1CR) and Total (TCR)
capital ratios, also known as the Cooke ratio(s) after their inventor, are capital (K) and
risk-weighted assets2 (RWA). The latter depends on the number of risk-weight categories
(N), individual assets (wi) and their respective risk-weights (wi) as given by the formulae
below.
RWA =
N∑
i=1
wiAi (II.1)
T1CR =
Tier 1 K
RWA
>= 4% (II.2)
TCR =
Tier 1 K + Tier 2 K + Tier 3 K
RWA
>= 8% (II.3)
Capital K is divided into three categories: Tier 1 (mainly equity capital and disclosed
reserves), Tier 2 (loan loss reserves, preferred stock, subordinated debt and hybrid in-
1The other two pillars were Market Discipline and Supervisory Review.
2It is common to add a Credit Risk Equivalent (CRE) component to account for off-balance sheet
items using the concept of a credit conversion factor (CCF) in the RWA summation. However what is
still missing nowadays from that definition is how to correct the CCFs to account for securitization’s
credit enhancement mechanism.
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struments), Tier 3 (unsecured and subordinated assets with a maturity of two years).
According to Van-Roy (2005), “the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital thus
reflects the degree to which capital is explicit or permanent”. In addition, the lower the
Tier level of capital, the better it is at absorbing losses. It is therefore common for some
authors such as Buehler et al. (2010) to use Total Common Equity, a subcomponent of
Tier 1, as the core capital layer for solvency requirements.
Assets on and off banks’ balance sheets are divided into four (credit) risk categories
according to the Standardized Approach as can be seen in Table 1. The least risky assets
(e.g. T-Bills) were allocated a 0% risk-weight while the more risky ones (e.g. commercial
loans) were given a 100% risk-weight. The weighted sum of these assets (RWA) was used
to set the minimum risk-based capital (RBC) threshold according to the formulae below:
Table 1:
Basel I RW categories
This table shows the RW categories attributed to the different assets according to
the Basel Standardized Approach.
RW Asset
0% Cash
Claims on central governments and central banks
Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks
Claims collateralised or guaranteed by OECD central-governments
20% Cash items in process of collection
Claims on banks and loans guaranteed by the OECD
Some non-OECD banks and government deposits and securities
General obligation municipal bonds
Some mortgage-backed securities
50% Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property
100% Claims on the private sector
Claims on banks and governments incorporated outside the OECD
Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector
Real-estate, premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets
Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from capital)
All other assets
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ii Basel II
Initially published in mid-2004 (BCBS (2004)), the second Basel II framework was up-
dated in 2006 (BCBS (2006)). Although it widened the scope for minimum capital
requirements in areas such as Market and Operational Risk, our focus here remains on
Credit Risk. The Standardised Approach as devised above remained almost the same
aside for a few changes in risk-weight allocation. Hence, the Cooke ratio was renamed
as the McDonough ratio. In addition, new methods were configured for computing risk-
weights for banks which relied on credit ratings. These methods became known as the
foundation and advanced internal ratings based approaches (FIRB/AIRB).
In the words of Kupiec (2001), this multiplicity in methods lead to the finding that
“capital requirements for low-quality, high-risk instruments are significantly lower under
the standardised approach than under the foundation internal ratings based approach
(FIRB), which means that banks using the standardised approach have an incentive to
specialise in high-risk credits, therefore increasing the overall risk of the banking system”.
In other words, “the temptation of picking the model that gives the lowest capital charge
is irresistible” according to Moosa (2010).
The notable changes to the RWs were in the area of fully secured residential mort-
gages which saw their RW decrease from 50% to 35% as shown in the figure below taken
from Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010).
Further updates were introduced into the regulation with no notable change for
capital requirements. These changes became known as Basel II.5.
iii Basel III
Midway through the subprime crisis, as capital requirements revealed their incapacity
to absorb the full-weight of the losses in the banking sector, OpRisk and Compliance
revealed that “Basel II is dead, long live Basel III”. This coincided with the BCBS’s
8
Figure 1: Change in RWs between Basel I and II
attempt to derive lessons of the shortcomings from the crisis in order to solidify the
previous framework(s). The new framework, which became known as Basel III, was
phased-in early 2013 but gave banks until 2019 for full implementation. In what con-
cerns capital requirements, the new changes consisted in raising the Tier 1 capital ratio
to 6% (Equation (II.2)). Also, while the minimum Total capital ratio will remain at 8%
(Equation (II.3)), it will be supplemented with a new conservation (2.5%) and counter-
cyclical buffers (0-2.5%), as well as a SIFI buffer (0-2.5%) for TBTF institutions. Tier 3
capital was scratched altogether while Tier 2 instruments (especially hybrids) received
heavy scrutiny.
In addition to increasing risk-based capital ratios, the regulation introduced liquidity
as well as leverage requirements. The latter is described in our next section.
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2 The Leverage Requirement
Albeit outside the spectrum of the Basel regulation until Basel III, one cannot complete
an overview of capital requirements without mentioning leverage. In fact, the three
main U.S. banking regulators (OCC, FDIC and FED) operated a discretionary leverage
ratio requirement based on (undisclosed) CAMEL3 ratings of the banks. Based on
their score, banks were assigned a different threshold. Note that the leverage ratio
is not to be confused with the traditional corporate finance definition of Debt/Equity
as both “capital” measures differ mainly in their denominator: the leverage ratio uses
Unweighted assets (UWA) whereas the capital ratio uses risk-weighted-assets (RWA) in
relation to capital (numerator).
LR =
Tier 1 K
UWA
>= 3, 4, 5% (II.4)
As indicated by Blum (2008), the leverage ratio can sometimes be regarded as an
“old-fashioned, blunt instrument” because it does not discriminate between various risk
profiles. Nonetheless, it gained importance after the subprime crisis as banks reached
critical leverage levels which resulted in a wave of deleveraging after the crisis was over.
As we will show later with regard to the effects of combining the capital ratio with the
leverage ratio, the evidence is mixed. This suggests the need to dissociate the leverage
ratio from the capital ratio in any impact study on solvency issues.
3The latter are used as a method of classifying banks based on their Capital Adequacy, Assets,
Management Capability, Earnings, Liquidity, Sensitivity.
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Chapter III:
The Risk-Based Capital Credit Crunch
Hypothesis, a Dual Perspective
1 Introduction
Credit crunches have hit the U.S. banking sector almost immediately after the BIS
regulatory standards came into existence. More precisely, the Basel I (BCBS (1988)) and
II (BCBS (2004) and BCBS (2006)) regulations were followed, within a few years, by the
1990-1991 recession and the 2007-2009 crisis1. In line with Bernanke and Blinder (1992)’s
observation that some policies take effect on the economy only six months after being
introduced and do not completely adjust until after two years, in these circumstances,
the obvious question to ask is whether there is a causal link between the regulations and
the subsequent economic downturns. In answering that question, we choose to focus on
one common factor behind these regulations: risk-based capital.
Research regarding the effects of capital has been shaped by the dual perspectives
of risk and growth. The study of risk and capital was first pioneered by Koehn and
Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988), followed by Gennotte and Pyle (1991),
Blum (1999) and Montgomery (2005). This stream of literature advocates that banks
become less risk averse when compensating for the utility loss due to increases in capital.
In contrast, Furlong and Keely (1987) and Furlong and Keely (1989) showed that stricter
1The first period was the “second most shallow” recession according to Greenspan et al. (2010). In
contrast, the second period was the worst crisis since the Great Depression; and hence conveniently
dubbed the “Great Recession”.
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capital requirements result in a decrease in total bank risk. This idea was later expanded
by many authors, including Keely and Furlong (1990), Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Calem
and Rob (1999) and Blum (2008). Together, these two literature strands highlight the
lack of consensus regarding the impact of capital requirements which still prevails in
current discussions between regulators and practitioners.
From a growth standpoint, the majority of authors blamed Basel I for being impli-
cated in the 1990-1991 downturn. Syron (1991) was the first to associate the recession,
or “credit crunch”, with a “capital crunch”. Bernanke and Lown (1991) agreed; assert-
ing that, rather than raise capital, banks post-Basel I tried to meet the requirements by
decreasing their assets (lending) in order to reduce the risk-weighted assets component of
their capital ratios. More often than not, the latter is seen as the easier way out in order
to maintain a target capital ratio with minor changes (Hyun and Rhee (2011)). Simi-
larly, Moore (1992) and Baer and McElravey (1993) find that the reduction in lending
arising from the higher proportion of constrained banks as a result of the new capital
requirements was at its highest during the recession. Hall (1993) corroborates these
findings by concluding that the Basel I regulation is inevitably linked to the crunch.
Much less has been said regarding the Basel II relation to the subprime crisis which is
why we focus exclusively on this period. This crisis is more controversial than the 1990-
1991 recession for many reasons. First, the regulation was technically not enforced by the
time the crisis unfolded. To address this matter, we argue that regulatory effects arise
well before full implementation. Second, capital ratios were non-binding in the sense that
over-capitalized banks had no trouble meeting the capital thresholds imposed by the new
regulation. Berger et al. (2008) find that in 2006, average Tier 1 and Total capital ratios
across U.S. bank holding companies was around 11.3% and 12.8%. Similarly, Chami
and Cosimano (2010) find that in the early stages of the crisis, the top 25 banks in the
U.S. had a Tier 1 capital ratio of 8.3% and a Total capital ratio of 11.4%2. In both
2Close estimates of 9.7% and 11.9% were obtained by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010) for each ratio
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cases, the estimates were well beyond the 4% and 8% standards imposed by the Basel
I regulation and maintained as part of Basel II. Hence, the effect of the new regulation
can be thought to have been diluted by excess capital formation (Berger et al. (2008))
or non-existent due to the fixed capital thresholds. However, we argue that a more
tacit regulatory change affecting the risk-weighting of residential loans played a key role
during the subprime crisis.
In line with Peek and Rosengren (1995b)’s view that a shock to capital is not enough,
on its own, to cause a crunch, the literature disregarded any direct Basel effect on the
crisis and turned its attention towards other factors, namely leverage3. As evidenced
by Bernanke and Lown (1991), the use of the leverage ratio began well before that of
the capital ratio and captures the effect of capital attributed to national as opposed to
international regulators4. When studies such as Gilbert (2006) revealed that up until
mid-2005 only the two largest U.S. banks were above the 5% leverage requirement for
well capitalized institutions, the issue of which solvency ratio was the binding capital
constraint on banks became a main concern for policymakers. Comparing the works of
Baer and McElravey (1993) and Peek and Rosengren (1994) with those of Kiema and
Jokivuolle (2010), Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) and our work in Chapter 4,
one can observe that the capital ratio assumed the role of binding requirement following
Basel I while the leverage ratio seems to have taken over after Basel II. This implies that
any study on capital effects should clearly differentiate between capital and leverage
ratios.
Leverage, however, did not single-handedly affect financial markets during the sub-
prime crisis. Liquidity also seems to have played an important role. According to Moosa
(2010), holding a large proportion of illiquid assets can trigger a run on deposits and
using a sample of OECD countries.
3Leverage is not to be confused with the traditional corporate finance definition of Debt/Equity. In
fact both “capital” measures differ mainly in their denominator: the leverage ratio uses Unweighted assets
(UWA) whereas the capital ratio uses risk-weighted-assets (RWA) in relation to capital (numerator).
4The OCC, FDIC and FED are responsible for enforcing leverage rules on a discretionary basis on
U.S. banks.
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force asset sales which can destabilize even a well-capitalized bank. Chiuri et al. (2001)
and Chiuri et al. (2002) focus on developing countries and point out that the reduc-
tion in poor quality lending resulting from a positive effect of capital requirements can
be negated by the drying up of bank liquidity. This is a compelling result because it
highlights a potential link between risk-based capital, liquidity and good quality lending
which was has implications for the 2007-2009 crisis.
Overshadowed by these factors, the Basel capital regulation did not have its due
contribution assessed with respect to the 2007-2009 crisis. More importantly, while the
role of these factors has mostly been ascertained by ex-post bank market reviews, in
this research, we aim to showcase in an empirical setting the combined effect on lending
reduction of these factors alongside capital. This will allow us to pinpoint the factor
that played the more important role during the crisis while uncovering any (residual)
effect related to Basel II.
Our benchmark is the model by Berger and Udell (1994), henceforth B&U, which
uses data from the FDIC Quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income
(Call Reports). Despite its inability to account for quality rather than quantity effects
of capital, one argument in favor of using the B&U model is the distinction it makes
between the risk-based capital and the leverage effects. In its original form, B&U’s
Risk-Based Capital Credit Crunch Hypothesis (RBC CCH) explores whether during a
credit crunch, risky banks, constrained by low capital ratios, tend to reduce lending
more than others. In this paper, we introduce an adaptation of the RBC CCH for banks
with high capital ratios, in order to investigate the relationship between capital ratios
and the subprime crisis. Another argument for choosing B&U’s model is its tractability.
It allows us to introduce new crisis-specific hypotheses alongside leverage, liquidity and
coercive risk-retrenchment. These hypotheses, if valid for the crisis, add support to the
Basel III recommendations5 especially regarding the coexistence of capital, leverage and
5These include a rise in capital ratios supplemented by additional capital protection layers such as a
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liquidity ratios.
Our research features closely-connected aspects with the work of Beatty and Liao
(2011) who looked at the impact of Basel I on the dotcom and subprime crises using
a similar empirical methodology. Focusing on loan loss provisions (the “pro-cyclical
provisioning hypothesis”), they find evidence that well-capitalized banks are more likely
to lend especially during recessions . We argue that while this could have held for
the dotcom crisis, Basel I was too far back to affect the subprime crisis having been
superseded by Basel II. Moreover their results do not differentiate between capital and
leverage ratio effects which we seek to overcome in our study. On the other hand,
Berger and Bouwman (2013) use bank data spanning from 1984-2009 in order to assess
the differential impact of capital during normal times as well as during five different
crises. Two of the latter are the ones alluded to for the purposes of this study. Their
work can be seen as complementary to ours as it focuses on the risk perspective with
regard to capital ratios, abstracting from any growth-related analysis. As such, their
results support the fact that capital improves banks’ survival rates during all crises
regardless of size. However, their work does not emphasize the relationship between the
Basel regulations and financial crises as they incorporate other (unrelated) market and
dummy crises.
This research is thereby structured as follows. In section 2 we provide the justification
for a possible causal link between Basel II and the subprime crisis. In section 3 we present
the main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and empirical framework. We then
run the model and elaborate on its findings in section 5. Section 6 presents the results
of our robustness tests. Finally, we conclude with the main contributions and policy
implications along with possible extensions for future work.
conservation buffer (2.5%), a countercyclical buffer (0-2.5%) and a SIFI buffer (1-2.5%). Tier 3 capital
has been removed while Tier 2 instruments (especially hybrids) have come under heavier scrutiny.
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2 Motivation
i The Basel II regulation and the subprime crisis
In order to support the link between Basel II and the subprime crisis we start by revisiting
the roll-out of Basel I in the U.S: according to various accounts (Woo (2003), Blasko
and Sinkey (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Beatty and Liao (2011)) the first
set of regulations was adopted in 1988, full set by 1989, beginning of phase-in around
1991, yet only fully implemented in 1992 (i.e. post-crunch). In comparison, the Basel II
framework was released in June 2004; but the final guidance which took effect in April
2008 only dealt with advanced features such as the Internal Ratings Based Approach
(FIRB/AIRB). At that time, the G20 full implementation of Basel II was scheduled
for 2011, a year after Basel III was endorsed. Hence, while regulators argue that Basel
II was not fully implemented by the time the subprime crisis took place, the claim we
make here is that one cannot automatically cast out any linkage between Basel II and
the subprime crisis simply based on effective implementation dates. The reasons are:
First, unless there is doubt that guidelines will change or there is some particular
gain from delaying the implementation process, known as regulatory arbitrage (Jones
(2000)), banks have interest in phasing-in the regulations as soon as possible as this
sends a positive signal to the market and creates a competitive advantage. The findings
in support of the speed at which banks respond to new capital regulations are plentiful6.
Hall (1993) explains that banks had already reacted as early as 1987 after gaining in-
sight into the Basel I guidelines with the joint US/UK agreement. This was confirmed by
Hancock and Wilcox (1994) who made the assumption that even before the 1990-1991
6The bi-annual Financial Stability Institute (FSI) survey on the “Implementation of the New Capital
Adequacy Framework” showed that out of the 106 countries that were on course to implement Basel
II prior to 2008, 66 had implemented the Standardized Approach, 46 FIRB, 43 AIRB. On the other
hand, U.S. regulators have assured the BCBS of being on course to implement the more sizeable changes
of Basel III ahead of the 2019 deadline despite delays caused by the simultaneous introduction of the
Dodd-Franck Act.
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crunch, banks behaved as if the 8% threshold for the total capital ratio was already
in place. In parallel, a survey by the Federal Reserve Board showed a shift in lending
patterns had occurred in 1989 according to Shrieves and Dahl (1995); to the extent that,
Montgomery (2005) spotted that even coefficients on the leverage ratio in Japan, which
were insignificant before Basel I, turned significant almost immediately after the regu-
lation was established. Note that this behavior also applies to non-capital constrained
banks as Van Den Heuvel (2009) showed that banks optimally reduce their lending even
if capital requirements are not binding in order not to risk violating the standards in the
future. In sum, the surveyed authors, as well as many others such as Avery and Berger
(1991) and Shrieves and Dahl (1992), are proponents of a causal effect between Basel I
and the subsequent crunch irrespective of the final phasing-in of the regulation.
Second, despite the fact that U.S. regulators mandated the use of Basel II only for
core banks, the non-core ones which had the necessary qualifications were given the
right to switch to the new regulation early on (Herring (2007)). Moreover, because of
the competitive disadvantage that would be caused to U.S. banks from not applying
the risk-weight reduction on residential mortgages, the regulators agreed to implement
a “transition period to the unconstrained use of the Basel II risk-weights” which fell
under the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking7 (FDIC (2005)). As such, Blundell-
Wignall and Atkinson (2009) argue that banks did not wait for the formal application of
Basel II in order to take advantage of the return incentive from the risk-weight reduction.
The same authors (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010)) go a step further to conjecture
a possible link to the crisis which we develop in the next section.
ii The Critical Change in Basel II
In light of the fact that regulatory capital targets remained unchanged between Basel I
and II, one plausible question to ask is which changes could have had an impact on the
7The latter became informally known as Basel 1A.
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subprime crisis.
As noted by Watanabe (2007), Basel I set the risk-weight on residential mortgages
to half the level of other loans with comparable borrower creditworthiness and quality.
The reason stated by Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) is that collateral plays a
big part in deciding the risk-weights for assets which explains why mortgages could be
considered safer than commercial and industrial loans. Hence, under Basel II, the second
round lowering from 50% down to 35% was due to the sense of security provided by the
housing boom as the collateral in mortgages further lowered their perceived risk.
Blasko and Sinkey (2006) find that after Basel I, the sizable increase real-estate
lending banks (64% between 1989-1996) was linked to the banks’ willingness to take
advantage of the risk-weight on these assets. There is no reason to believe that under
the new regulation, a similar change would have caused banks to behave differently;
especially as this placed mortgages in a category closer to T-Bills than risky loans8. As
such, banks could economize on capital and, at the same time, generate high profits in
a bullish housing market. However, when the business cycle reverted after the bubble
burst, the housing collateral became over-valued while the risk-weighting remained un-
changed. As a result, whereas previous rounds of risk-weight lowering were upheld by
the market (Avery and Berger (1991)), this one lead to more criticism of Basel II due
to the static nature of risk-weights.
Another potentially important change was the credit enhancement due to securi-
tization in the form of Residential Mortgage-Backed-Securities (RMBS). This change
effectively set the risk-weight for RMBSs to 20%, lower than that of its individual loan
components. Note that both changes directly impact the users of the Standardized Ap-
proach. However, regardless if they chose to implement the latter or either of the IRB
methods, according to Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010), banks could always be
8Without accounting for differences in interest rate risk as market risk was a totally novel addition
to Basel II that could not be assumed to have been taken into account as fast as changes to risk-weights.
The latter relates to the magnitude of the changes which became clear after the update in 2006.
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relied on to try to game the regulatory system in order to save on capital especially at a
time where the regulation was not fully enforced. In other words, banks will not apply
a different credit risk method unless it outperforms the current one in terms of capital
reduction. As such, any incentive arising from the decrease in risk-weights will have
been factored in one approach or the other.
iii The Basel II Effect on Loan Growth: a Dual Perspective
Having shown which Basel II changes could have had an impact leading to the crisis, we
now present the mechanism through which the effects could have been channeled.
After the advantage stemming from the Basel I risk-weight setting on mortgages had
been consumed, capital ratios then declined towards the end of the 1990s as reported in
Milne (2002), before rising again as per Berger et al. (2008). Meanwhile, an important
change in bank behavior took place as Flannery and Rangan (2008) detected that the
relationship between capital and risk reverted from being negative in the years following
Basel I to positive after 1998. This indicates that over-capitalization was an excuse by
banks to take on additional risk despite the restriction on lending imposed by high capital
buffers according to Berger et al. (2008). This moral hazard leads to a deterioration in
borrower screening on behalf of the banks (Keys et al. (2010)).
Yoshikawa et al. (1994) argue that a credit crunch can be induced by a demand
rather than a supply shift. On that note, Baba (1995) shows that in a disequilibrium
framework, the weaker effect between demand and supply determines the actual size of
lending. More precisely, according to Kishan and Opiela (2000), the credit channel is
formed by the borrower net worth (BNWC or demand) channel and the bank lending
(BLC or supply) channel. Normally during a crisis, the demand-side effect is due to
deposit draining; however, for this crisis we look at a different source. Since the banks
admittedly relaxed the creditworthiness criteria for their loans, they could be seen as
partly if not fully responsible for the loan quality deterioration which eventually caused
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them to cut down on lending. In other words, the supply channel was affected by an
endogenous effect linked to the mortgage buyers which constitute the demand side. As
such, the BNWC would have contributed to the change in loan supply unlike the 1990-
1991 crunch where the reduction in supply was mostly exogenous and independent of
the borrower pool.
Bridging both capital and credit perspectives together, one can regard the 1990-1991
crunch as an example of a decrease in bank (supply) riskiness, owing to a flight to quality
to decrease risk-weighted assets in order to meet capital requirements. This resulted in
a direct adverse effect on growth. We postulate that the impact (if any) of capital ratios
on the subprime crisis happened in two phases as follows. Hiding behind inflated capital
buffers, banks increased their risk-taking (moral hazard) while taking advantage of the
reduction in risk-weight. Then, as loan write-off occurred, this caused a decrease in
capital which lead to a subsequent slowdown in lending growth to maintain the banks as
much above regulatory requirements. In sum, while the main component of the capital
ratio related to the the 1990-1991 crunch was its denominator (risk-weighted assets), the
numerator (capital) seems to have played the key role in the 2007-2009 crunch. In both
cases, however, the effect would be captured by the same instrument, capital ratios.
If the latter is confirmed, this study will have illustrated a dual perspective for the
impact of capital ratios on lending growth between both crises, thereby extending B&U’s
risk-based capital credit crunch hypothesis (RBC CCH) to encompass highly capitalized
banks.
3 Credit Crunch Hypotheses
In this section, we present the hypotheses we investigate as part of our model.
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H1: Risk-Based Capital Credit Crunch Hypothesis (RBC CCH)
According to B&U, the RBC CCH can be stated as follows: when banks are sub-
jected to a regulatory change which increases capital requirements, one should expect
a uniform9 movement by all constituent assets into (out of) the low (high) risk-weight
categories. As credit is normally in the upper risk-weight categories, the RBC CCH, if
true, would predict a fall in lending growth. Note that this hypothesis cannot support
any quality effect of capital and the focus is purely on level (quantity) effects.
Although the RBC CCH tested by B&U focused on the lending behavior of banks
constrained by low capital ratios, the authors foresaw that even if the hypothesis was re-
jected for the 1990-1991 crunch, its importance could become instrumental in the future
with the advent of additional types of risk. This would agree with the creation of the new
risk-weight category for mortgage lending and is in line with the statement by Barajas
et al. (2004) that the enhancement of the risk-weight scheme for credit risk valuation
under Basel II should make loans more sensitive to new risk factors. In accordance with
the dual perspective on capital illustrated in the previous section, these arguments have
fueled our incentive to explore the RBC CCH from a different angle, that of banks which
entered the crisis with high capital ratios.
H2: Leverage Credit Crunch Hypothesis
Assets in the leverage ratio are un-weighted and therefore not adjusted for any of
the bank’s risks in contrast to the capital ratio. It is argued that during the subprime
crisis, risk-based capital requirements had a counter-beneficial effect due to, in some
part, leverage. The latter can arise as the proportion of assets with low-weight (as in
mortgages) increases. At this point, the capital ratio can remain in line with regulatory
targets as the leverage ratio decreases (Chapter 4). This indicates a desire on the part
of banks to maximize profit and a call for excessive risk-taking (Moosa (2010)).
9The validity of the uniformity assumption is debated in Appendix A.
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Arguments in support of this detrimental effect have existed since the 1990-1991
crunch. Hall (1993) warned that higher Tier 1 capital ratios translated into more cu-
mulative losses for dangerously leveraged banks. In that respect, the banks’ preliminary
increase in capital ratios is seen as an excuse in order to obtain a lower “technical” lever-
age ratio requirement from the regulators. This lead the author to assert that a country
and/or sector specific leverage ratio can be harmful to risk-based capital. Moreover,
despite earlier claims by Estrella et al. (2000) that risk-based capital has no predictive
power over downturns, Buehler et al. (2010) affirm that the leverage ratio’s predictive
power for distress becomes non-existent when combined with the capital ratio. Finally,
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) highlight that seeking to achieve a certain imposed
leverage ratio can push banks to arbitrage the weights to ensure their capital ratio barely
goes beyond its specified target. This creates distortionary effects such as shifting banks
towards low risk-weighted assets which materializes in a cutdown on lending.
In contrast, Avery and Berger (1991) downplayed the negative effect of leverage
under the premise that its role is not to focus on off-balance sheet items. Similarly,
Blum (2008) found empirical evidence that the two capital measures have a synergetic
effect when combined together as leverage can compensate for deficiencies in risk-based
capital requirements; thus insuring that banks will hold the first-best level of capital.
In light of the above, we undertake an investigation of the role of leverage in order
to gauge whether the subprime crisis was in some way a repeat of the previous crunch.
Our findings will therefore assess the Basel III advocacy of a combination of both capital
measures in spite of the warnings expressed by some authors in the literature.
H3: Voluntary VS Coercive Risk-Retrenchment Credit Crunch Hypothesis
One of B&U’s non-regulatory supply-driven hypotheses looked at the impact of
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs). According to their Voluntary Risk-Retrenchment CCH,
banks voluntarily reduced their risk-seeking activity leading to a reduction in risky lend-
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ing (supply-side). Testing for such a hypothesis during the subprime crisis would seem
misplaced as it entails that banks did so willingly. However, our argument stemming
from the discussion of the dual perspective on capital would imply that this cut-down
can also be coerced. This arises when banks are obliged to respond to (the induced)
losses coming their way from their borrowers (demand-side). This change in perspective
reflects the shift from a BLC to a BNWC channel as per Kishan and Opiela (2000) which
changes the hypothesis from Voluntary to Coercive.
H4: Liquidity Credit Crunch Hypothesis
Loutskina and Strahan (2009) highlighted the fact that a bank’s willingness to supply
credit can also be driven by funding and asset liquidity conditions. In fact, as stated
in Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010), the liquidity inherent to residential mortgage backed
securities holdings rapidly deteriorated once the crisis unfolded. Our aim is to validate
this hypothesis in order to evaluate in hindsight, the appropriateness of introducing
liquidity requirements to the framework.
4 Methodology
i Data and Sample Selection
Our data is culled primarily from a single source based on required bank filings, the
FDIC Call Reports, over the period 2004Q3-2009Q2. Our final dataset comprises of
almost 10,000 banks and more than 100,000 bank-quarter data points. In comparison,
B&U’s sample size consisted of more than 600,000 observations as they used a much
longer control period than the rest of the literature dating back thirteen years prior to
the 1990-1991 crunch10. However, when they reduce the control period to two years
10One reason is because they use a pre-1985 flag related to data availability which is not related to
our case.
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prior to the crunch, this does not affect their findings. In contrast, Hancock and Wilcox
(1993), Peek and Rosengren (1995a) do not include any control period in their models.
In our setup, we establish the control and crunch periods in the following manner. We
use the the third quarter of 2004, which immediately followed the Basel II declaration,
as the start of the control period. This allows three years (including the second revision
in 2006) for changes in bank behavior to take place11. As for the beginning of the
crunch, our choice of the third quarter of 2007, which coincides with the widening of
the U.S. TED spread, agrees with that of Berger and Bouwman (2013), Moosa (2010)
and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011). Finally, based on U.S. GDP, the second
quarter of 2009 was the last one in which growth was negative. In contrast with the
more conservative approach in Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010)12, this leads us to concur
with King (2012) on the end of the crisis.
ii Variables Definition
Our first set of variables is taken from B&U to form our baseline model13. Additional
variables, which constitute our enhanced model, are separated from the previous ones
by a dashed line as can be seen in Table 2. This table also describes control and crunch
period means for all variables14.
11As argued earlier, actual implementation dates do not matter as B&U ended their control period a
year before the beginning of phasing-in of the Basel I regulation, i.e. mid-way through the crunch.
12These authors chose the first quarter of 2009 as the crunch end.
13We have discarded B&U’s SHARE variable due to multi-collinearity. Similarly, we removed the
CRRAT variable as this was used for testing the loan examination hypothesis which we deem irrelevant
for our analysis. Moreover, one striking feature we observed in B&U’s model is the systematic opposite
and inconsistent signs between T1RAT and TOTRAT in all the regressions. This is a permanent feature
of the model whether the coefficients are significant or not and went unnoticed under B&U. This property,
which arises due to the high correlation with T1RAT, makes it difficult to compare with the effects of
capital reported elsewhere (Beatty and Liao (2011)). For this purpose we remove it from our model.
14Note that despite cleaning the data using B&U’s filtering process (see empirical section), outliers
are still bound to arise due to the size of the sample. Even after removing some of them, the mean
of the variables remained almost unchanged with a noticeable decrease in standard deviation. Given
that we would have to devise an ad hoc cleaning mechanism for each variable which does not appear to
influence our results, we maintain the standard deviations as per our original sample in order to preserve
the comparative aspect of our work with that of B&U.
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Table 2:
Variable Definition and Sample Means
The values listed below are the means of the variables used in both the baseline and enhanced iterations of our model.
Standard errors reported in between brackets correspond to the sample’s standard deviation divided by the square
root of the sample size. The Control period corresponds to 2004Q3-2007Q2 whereas the Crisis period corresponds to
2007Q3-2009Q2. Panel A groups all LHS variables in Equation (III.1) while the rest are the RHS variables. Note
that capital and leverage ratios are preceded by a negative sign in order to interpret them as RISK factors. NPLs
are defined as loans with 90 days or more past due and non-accrual. All RISK factors are also included as square
(1/2RISK2) and interaction (CRUNCH×RISK and 1/2CRUNCH×RISK2) terms as per our model. The squares
of RF3MO, SLOPE+ and SLOPE- are also included. Growth rates are scaled by the GNP deflator and measured in
continuous-time as Y˙it ≡ lnYit − lnYit−1 for bank i at quarter t. Observations in the fourth quarter constitute the
base group for seasonality variables in Panel F while banks with less than $100 million in total assets are in the base
group in Panel H. Finally, banks that are Federal Reserve-regulated form the base group in Panel I.
Symbol Definition Control Crisis
A. Endogenous Asset Growth Rates
CRLN Real quarterly growth rate of commercial real estate loans 0.027 0.031
(0.574) (0.616)
CILN Real quarterly growth rate of commercial and industrial loans 0.020) 0.014
(0.646) (0.681)
INLN Real quarterly growth rate of installment loans -0.008 -0.003
(0.824) (0.342)
RB100 Real quarterly growth rate of assets in RW 100% category (0.019 0.015
(0.082) (0.083)
USTRA Real quarterly growth rate of U.S. Treasuries&Agency obligations -0.011 -0.208
(0.410) (0.294)
RB0 Real quarterly growth rate of assets in RW 0% category -0.021 0.014
(0.215) (0.238)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
USTA Real quarterly growth rate of U.S. Agency obligations 0.089 -0.130
(0.071) (0.279)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2: (continued)
Symbol Definition Control Crisis
USTREAS Real quarterly growth rate of U.S. Treasuries -0.091 -0.071
(0.695) (0.960)
CURR Real quarterly growth rate of currency and coin -0.009 0.008
(0.488) (0.417)
RSLN Real quarterly growth rate of residential real estate loans 0.011 0.028
(0.286) (0.336)
TLRE Real quarterly growth rate of total real estate loans 0.019 0.019
(0.205) (0.234)
TLN Real quarterly growth rate of total loans 0.017 0.016
(0.169) (0.151)
RMBS Real quarterly growth rate of RMBS -0.017 0.075
(0.071) (0.412)
FGNMA Real quarterly growth rate of RMBS guaranteed by FNMA/FHLMC/GNMA -0.020 0.069
(0.162) (0.484)
RB20 Real quarterly growth rate of assets in RW 20% category 0.000 0.002
(0.331) (0.343)
RB50 Real quarterly growth rate of assets in RW 50% category 0.008 0.041
(0.825) (0.398)
B. Credit Crunch Dummy Variable
CRUNCH Dummy variable equals one for crunch periods 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
C. Bank Perceived Risk Variables (RISK)
(Each averaged over the four previous quarters)
T1RAT Negative of the ratio of Tier 1 capital to RWA -0.216 -0.207
(0.951) (0.887)
TOTRAT Negative of the ratio of Total capital to RWA -0.227 -0.218
(0.951) (0.886)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2: (continued)
Symbol Definition Control Crisis
LEVRAT Negative of the ratio of Tier 1 capital to UWA -0.118 -0.118
(0.096) (0.097)
NPFRAT1 Ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to UWA 0.005 0.012
(0.008) (0.019)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LIQRAT Negative of the ratio of liquid assets to UWA -0.116 -0.098
(0.067) (0.066)
T2RAT Negative of the ratio of Tier 2 capital to total RWA -0.011 -0.011
(0.006) (0.005)
NPFRAT2 Ratio of nonperforming residential loans to UWA 0.005 0.013
(0.008) (0.023)
NPFRAT3 Ratio of nonperforming assets to UWA 0.007 0.015
(0.009) (0.024)
D. Macroeconomic and Regional Variables
(Each lagged one quarter)
GNPGROW Real growth rate of GNP (%) 1.403 0.188
(0.432) (1.421)
UNEMP National unemployment rate (%) 4.967 5.675
(0.386) (1.208)
STGROW Real state income growth (%) 0.007 -0.001
(0.010) (0.017)
STUNEMP State unemployment rate (%) 4.760 5.914
(0.912) (0.935)
NE Dummy variable, equals 1 for New England states 0.042 0.038
(0.200) (0.191)
BAAAAA Difference in yields between Moody’s BAA and AAA rated LT bonds 0.853 1.706
(0.097) (0.877)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2: (continued)
Symbol Definition Control Crisis
RF3MO Interest rate on three-month Treasury securities 3.815 1.730
(1.231) (1.466)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SW Dummy variable, equals 1 for South-West states 0.040 0.045
(0.197) (0.206)
E. Time and Seasonal Variables
TIME Time trend, starts at 1 in 2004:Q3 and incremented by 1 each quarter 6.500 16.500
(3.450) (2.291)
SEAS1 Dummy, equals 1 for the first quarter of the year 0.250 0.250
(0.433) (0.433)
SEAS2 Dummy, equals 1 for the second quarter of the year 0.250 0.250
(0.433) (0.433)
SEAS3 Dummy, equals 1 for the third quarter of the year 0.250 0.250
(0.433) (0.433)
F. Term Structure Slope Variables
(Each lagged one quarter)
SLOPE+
Slope of the term structure if it is (+). Calculated as the 20YR
Treasury rate less RF3MO, divided by the duration of a 20YR
Treasury (x10 to adjust units). Set to 0 if the slope is (−).
0.923 2.066
(0.984) (0.853)
SLOPE- Same as SLOPE+ except that is set to 0 if the slope is
is positive rather than negative.
-0.029 -0.000
(0.065) (0.000)
G. Bank Size and Competition Variables
MEDIUM Dummy variable, equals 1 if $100 million ≤ UWA < $1 billion 0.499 0.535
(0.500) (0.499)
LARGE1 Dummy variable, equals 1 if $1 billion ≤ UWA < $10 billion 0.056 0.063
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 2: (continued)
Symbol Definition Control Crisis
(0.230) (0.243)
LARGE2 Dummy variable, equals 1 if UWA ≥ $10 billion 0.012 0.012
(0.108) (0.107)
HERF Herfindahl index of local market concentration 0.125 0.127
(0.138) (0.144)
H. Primary Federal Regulator Identity Variables
OCC Dummy, equals 1 if bank is OCC-regulated 0.215 0.197
(0.411) (0.398)
FDIC Dummy, equals 1 if bank is FDIC-regulated 0.582 0.601
(0.493) (0.490)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OTS Dummy, equals 1 if bank is OTS-regulated 0.099 0.098
(0.299) (0.297)
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a Dependent Variables
Panel A focuses on our dependent variable, growth, in each of the four risk-weight
classes (RB0, RB20, RB50 and RB100). Note that banks still reported mortgage assets
in either RB20 or RB50 according to credit risk15. In fact, both categories grew during
the crisis; as did the safest risk-weight category RB0. This re-enforces the perception
that compared to RB100, the latter categories were considered “safe”. However, the
notable difference is that RB20, which contains mortgages guaranteed by GSEs, grew
at a slower pace than the others. We attribute this to the heterogeneity of the array of
assets in RB20 which brings out the possibility that there could be an imbalance in these
assets’ risk assessment. We suffice with exposing some characteristics of this imbalance
since measuring it would require a different analysis similar to that in Avery and Berger
(1991) to check if the risk-weights are truly aligned with the inherent risk of each asset
belonging to that category.
We also explore the behavior of individual loan types which fall into these categories
in order to monitor loan-specific movements. For instance, commercial and industrial
loans (CILN) and installment/consumer loans (INLN) are placed under RB100 but be-
have in opposite ways. This supports our critique of B&U’s uniformity assumption
(Appendix A). In line with Hall (1993), the decrease in CILN loans can be indicative of
a credit crunch; however the increase in commercial real-estate loans (CRLN) despite
the related market turmoil is ambiguous16.
Underlining the impact of securitization, RMBS grew at two and a half times the
pace of RSLN. Together, these two categories accelerated far beyond the aggregate loan
categories, TLRE and TLN17. This unexpected result in light of the crunch could be
15It appeared from our discussions with FDIC that the regulators did not setup a new 35% risk-weight
category in their Call Reports before the Basel II regulations were formally in place in the U.S.
16B&U have tried to make sense of this upward trend on the basis of a change in accounting standards.
Although this hypothesis could have been true at the time, there is no evidence of such changes taking
place during the subprime crisis.
17Note that our estimate of growth in total lending (TLN) during the crisis is identical to that of
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explained by banks continuing to take advantage of the favorable risk-weight treatment
of such assets while lending only to creditworthy borrowers. Another reason could be
a delay with regard to our choice of crunch period which might not be in line with the
phase of removing toxic assets off banks’ balance sheets (forebearance).
Nevertheless, Bernanke and Lown (1991) confirm that a similar incident had taken
place as 1-4 family residential mortgages also grew rapidly during the 1990-1991 re-
cession. Hall (1993) points to the first change in mortgage risk-weight under Basel I
claiming that the 50% risk-weight attributed to these assets at the time was responsible
for their 30% growth between 1988 and 1992. Our findings therefore validate a similar
hypothesis, alluded to by Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010), in that a 30% dip in
risk-weight (down to 35%) was matched by a 150% increase in growth rate in RSLN.
This is the first time such a finding is put forward as there has never been, to our knowl-
edge, a similar two-phase real decrease in any other instrument category on which to
calculate a similar measure. Hence, this underlines the convexity of the function relat-
ing the risk-weight of an asset to its growth rate and illustrates the impact a potential
risk-weight mis-calculation can have on the growth rate of an asset type.
Finally, while RB0 increased during the market’s flight to quality, US Treasuries and
Agency Obligations (USTA) fell by an order of magnitude between both periods. This
was despite the fact that treasuries account for the largest proportion of this category18.
We take a look at this puzzle later in our analysis.
b Independent Variables
In Panel C, our RISK factors allow for the testing of our hypotheses. Compared with
B&U’s estimates, both Tier 1 and Total capital ratios (RBC CCH - H1), along with the
leverage ratio (H2), increased from the levels they were at two decades ago. However,
Beatty and Liao (2011). However, their control period is much longer than ours and therefore we are
unlikely to obtain similar pre-crisis results.
18Close to 40% during the first crisis according to B&U.
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eroded by losses during the recent crisis, capital ratios fell19 while leverage seems quite
resilient to any change. The latter’s less obvious behavior was also recognized by Hall
(1993)20 during the 1990-1991 crunch21. Nonetheless, the risk indicator in support of
the coercive risk-retrenchment hypothesis (H3), the NPL ratio (NPFRAT1) went up22
by almost the same amount as RSLN reflecting the impact of the mediocre screening of
borrowers.
In order to test for the liquidity hypothesis (H4) we define LIQRAT as the ratio of
Total Quality Liquid Assets (incorporated as a standalone variable in the FDIC database)
to Unweighted Assets, pre-multiplied by a negative sign to mimic the logic behind the
RISK variables. The fall in this variable during the crisis is evident as per 2. Note
that this variable measures the asset liquidity component as opposed to the Basel III
advocated measures, LCR and NSFR, which measure funding liquidity23.
c Control Variables
In this section we complete our presentation by introducing our control variables.
Most macroeconomic indicators in Panel D reflect the negative repercussions of the
crisis on the economy at both national and state levels. These were felt through a dip
in GNP24 (GNPGROW, Datastream) and income growth (STGROW, US Bureau of
19Our stimates are almost identical to those in Beatty and Liao (2011).
20Between 1990 and 1992, the average leverage ratio increased by less than a third of the growth in
capital ratio.
21Note that our central estimates conceal the fact that leveraging and deleveraging occurred respec-
tively within very small spans of time prior to and during the crunch; which is probably why no change
is observed here. This also explains why deleveraging efforts continued years after the crunch.
22The ratio is in absolute terms smaller compared to the earlier crunch. The reason is because the
asset base of banks in terms of unweighted assets increased on average by an order of magnitude between
the two crises. This can also be seen in the changes in the number of MEDIUM and LARGE banks,
mirrored to a certain extent by the increases in FDIC-regulated banks and the decrease in OCC-regulated
banks. These changes reflect on our competition estimates, HHI which do not account for survivorship
bias owing to the large amount of takeovers and failures that took place between these two periods.
23Since the first measure relies on a given bank’s stress scenario while the second requires a highly
granular categorization of assets which is not characteristic of the FDIC database, we are unable to
factor these variables in our analysis.
24Although it is more common nowadays to use GDP, our choice of GNP is strictly in line with B&U.
In our framework, both variables yield similar results.
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Economic Analysis) alongside an increase in unemployment (STUNEMP, US Bureau of
Labor Statistics) which spilled over to the corporate sector as signaled by the widen-
ing of the credit spread (BAA-AAA, FED). An interesting difference is that national
unemployment fell during the 1990-1991 crunch according to B&U’s estimates. How-
ever, according to Hancock and Wilcox (1994), such an outcome should not always be
regarded as a sign of economic strength, as this might also be because of other factors
such as the “discouraged worker” effect. In addition, we capture the level of nominal
interest rates by (RF3MO, FED) which was slashed as a result of short-term aggressive
monetary policy.
We also introduce a South West (SW) variable in Panel D to control for the demand
component originating from the states of California, Nevada and Arizona. This should
mimic B&U’s New England dummy variable that accounted for the worse affected re-
gional states during the 1990-1991 crunch. Similar controls were also used by Peek and
Rosengren (1992, 1994, 1995a) and more recently Ghosh (2008)25. For details on how
this variable was constructed see Appendix B.
Moreover, we include time and seasonal variables26 in Panel E. These are supple-
mented in Panel F with interest rate variables such as SLOPE (bond durations are
obtained from CRSP). Note that 30YR Treasuries were still discontinued at the start of
our control period (Andelman (2005)). Therefore, duration and interest rates were not
available for this maturity in order to calculate SLOPE variables. Instead of extrapo-
lating from past or future values, we take a more solid approach by using the second
closest maturity posted by the FED, the 20YR bond. We do the same for 10YR and
5YR Treasuries and our results are not sensitive to either specification. Note that, since
bonds come in multiple issues, we compute duration as the average over all bonds issued
in a certain year with a given maturity. The separation between positive and negative
25Mian and Sufi (2009) only look at ZIP code differences which does not capture regional effects.
26All seasonal variables are equal because by construction it happens that we have the same number
of quarters belonging to each seasonal group.
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slopes is designed to control for added demand and supply effects according to B&U.
However, the interpretation of the SLOPE parameters is not straightforward. What
matters during downturns with regards to the characteristic shape of the inverted term
structure of interest rates is the negative slope which increases in absolute value as shown
in Table 2.
Furthermore, we control for bank size and competition27 in Panel G. Our state-level
Herfindahl index, HHI, confirms the result in Wright and Quadrini (2009) that shows an
increase in the index level at national level. This can also be understood as a decrease
in competition or increase in market power over time.
Finally, the addition of the OTS variable in Panel H to the two regulatory dummy
variables, OCC and FDIC, is designed to uncover any thrift-related effect as OTS-
regulated banks, believed to have had an important role during the crunch. The vari-
able does not show any drastic change probably due to the smaller proportion of these
banks in the overall sample. Nonetheless, this compelled us to use an aggregate variable
of U.S. Treasuries and Agency Obligations (USTRA) which comprises U.S. Treasuries
(USTREAS) and Agency Obligations (USTA) instead of a standalone U.S. Treasuries
variable. The reason, as stated by the FDIC, is that after the second quarter of 1996
these banks no longer reported Treasuries on a separate basis from other government
obligations. As such, using the variable accounting for Treasuries only (USTREAS),
which other banks submit as part of their Call Reports, would have resulted in missing
values for all thrift filers.
iii Empirical Model
In this section, we elaborate on the RISK-factor methodology applied by B&U which
constitutes our baseline model. Later, we rerun the baseline model adding our newly-
introduced variables which we label as our enhanced model. Both models use Newey-
27HHI is computed from the in-sample dataset.
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White robust estimators to account for serial correlation. As can be seen in equation
(III.1) below, the log growth rate in each asset category (CILN, CRLN, INLN, RSLN,
TLRE, TLN, RMBS, USTRA) and risk-weight-class (RB100, RB50, RB20, RB0), Y˙ , is
regressed on a CRUNCH dummy variable, various RISK factors (Panel C), interaction
terms denoted as CR RISK, marginal contributions denoted as RISK2 and CR RISK2,
and a vector of macroeconomic and control variables X listed in Panels D through H in
Table 2. The interaction terms are used to single out the effect of these RISK factors
during the course of the crunch as opposed to the full length of the study period; while
marginal terms bring out any non-linear effects.
Note that a negative sign is appended to the capital RISK categories in order to make
them increasing in risk. In other words, a higher (in absolute value) capital ratio/leverage
ratio is, in principal, less risky. Moreover, all RISK variables were computed as the lagged
quarterly average over the previous year going back from the current date in order to
remove any endogeneity.
Y˙it = α+ βCRUNCHt +
5∑
j=1
δjRISKijt +
1
2
5∑
j=1
φjRISK
2
ijt (III.1)
+
5∑
j=1
γjCR RISKijt +
1
2
5∑
j=1
θjCR RISK
2
ijt
+
∑
k
λkXikt + it
While the normal selection process would be to conduct a Hausman test28, having
included quasi-time-independent variables such as SIZE and REGULATOR, we con-
jecture that a random-effects model would be more amenable than a fixed-effects one.
Otherwise, the explanatory power in those variables would be absorbed by the intercept
and would not have shown up as significant in both our model and in B&U’s (Gam-
28The result in our case does not strongly favor one effects model over the other.
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bacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011)). In fact, Ediz et al. (1998) confirm having used a
random-effects specification in similar cicumumstances while Nichols et al. (2011) opt
for a fixed-effects regression which does not include any time-invariant regressors. Based
on the latter, our choice of random-effects seems justified.
Finally, before running the models we cleanse the data in order to account for merg-
ers, failures as well as data and estimation errors. Hence, we exclude observations for
a particular bank when either the growth rate in total assets went beyond 25%29 or
that in the riskiest and/or safest risk-weight-category (RB100/RB0) exceeded 75% in
absolute value for a designated quarter. This method also excludes non-“mature” banks
as argued by Peek and Rosengren (1994).
5 Results and Discussion
i Baseline Model
Table 3 shows the results from running the baseline model on B&U’s original set of
variables. Due to the lower magnitude R2s we obtain, we suspect that the dependent
variables might not bare the same relationship to this crisis as they did during the 1990-
1991 crunch. Our suspicion is accentuated by the fact that the CRUNCH variable is not
relevant for any loan category. This requires the adjustments which we showcase in our
enhanced model.
We find almost no impact of capital ratios on any of the loans both before and after
the crisis. While this could be due to model mis-specification, bearing in mind that our
sample consists in majority of small and medium banks30, Beatty and Liao (2011) admit
to the fact that any positive association between capital and lending disappears for this
type of banks.
29Beatty and Liao (2011) use a less conservative estimate of 10%.
30LARGE banks take up 5% of the dataset with 66% of total assets. This is comparable with B&U’s
2% estimate for LARGE banks.
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In contrast, leverage had a significant impact on the riskiest risk-weight category
(RB100), reflecting the cut-down in risky assets for banks with low leverage ratios.
The weaker significance for individual loan categories can be explained by the fact that
RB100 is larger than all individual risky loans and therefore holds a larger proportion
of unweighted assets in the construction of the leverage ratio.
NPFRAT1 is highly negatively significant before the crisis. While this result is ex-
pected at all times, the lack of significance during the crisis despite the sizable increase
in NPLs as reported in Table 2 could indicate that these categories were not the ones
which formed the bulk of non-performing loans and therefore did not witness a contrac-
tion during the crisis. Note that by definition NPLs are only registered after 90 days
which can undermine the effect of bad loans during the early stages of the crunch period.
As expected, we note a positive effect on USTRA as the latter benefits from negative
loan performance through flight to quality. As USTRA belongs to the category RB0,
we would normally have expected the same positive effect on both. However, this is not
the case as we provide further explanation in the following section.
In most cases, macroeconomic variables have the expected sign and are particularly
significant for the safest categories USTR and RB0. Note that the signs on these cate-
gories normally contrast with those on RB100 reflecting a shift from risky to safe assets
as expected during crisis times. Indeed, decreases in GNPGROW and STGROW encour-
age a flight to quality in opposite manner to unemployment UMEMP and STUNEMP as
well as the risk aversion implied by the widening of the corporate spread BAAAAA. This
agrees with similar results in Beatty and Liao (2011). Bearing in mind that risk-weight
categories are not expected to cover for interest rate (market) risk, RF3MO is normally
expected to be positively significant as an indicator of the return on these instruments
as well as the cornerstone of monetary policy transmission. However, in line with the
results in B&U this is not the case. This is perhaps because initial cuts to the interest
rate where not endorsed by the market which only responded after further economic
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Table 3:
Baseline RISK-factor model
The Table presents the results obtained from running the baseline version of the model on the LHS variables listed in the first row which are defined
in Table 2. All RISK variables are lagged and averaged over the previous four quarters. Risk factors pre-multiplied by the CRUNCH dummy variable
are denoted as CR RISK while marginal contributions computed as the square of RISK variables are denoted as SQ RISK. The combination of both
is refered to as SQ CR RISK. Statistical significance is set as follows: * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
CILN CRLN INLN RB100 USTRA RB0
Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat
INTERCEPT 0.046 0.506 -0.037 -0.453 -0.095 -0.930 0.010 0.973 -0.426 -1.521 -0.220*** -6.702
CRUNCH -0.036 -1.225 -0.041* -1.680 -0.011 -0.339 -0.002 -0.430 -0.163** -2.433 0.014* 1.768
T1RAT 0.476 0.356 -0.230 -0.587 -0.640 -1.546 -0.051 -0.563 0.266 0.294 -0.023 -0.151
TOTRAT -0.467 -0.350 0.234 0.597 0.643 1.554 0.047 0.518 -0.262 -0.289 0.029 0.183
LEVRAT -0.131 -0.913 0.010 0.136 -0.182* -1.897 -0.106*** -5.617 -0.048 -0.247 -0.019 -0.763
NPFRAT1 -0.935** -2.421 -1.254*** -3.651 -0.736* -1.881 -1.180*** -12.628 1.771* 1.848 -0.275** -2.064
CRRAT -0.251*** -2.600 -0.324*** -6.141 -0.013 -0.219 0.069*** 9.067 -0.041 -0.396 0.076*** 5.425
SQ T1RAT 3.244 0.864 0.046 0.087 0.577 0.637 0.055 0.224 0.309 0.263 0.260 0.737
SQ TOTRAT -3.244 -0.864 -0.046 -0.086 -0.577 -0.637 -0.055 -0.224 -0.309 -0.263 -0.259 -0.736
SQ LEVRAT -0.302 -1.155 -0.079 -0.593 -0.362** -2.055 -0.229*** -5.429 0.081 0.205 0.065 1.253
SQ NPFRAT1 6.477 0.607 16.943* 1.828 15.257 1.031 13.785*** 2.860 -12.793 -0.513 8.409* 1.714
SQ CRRAT 1.246*** 2.672 0.884*** 5.415 -0.182 -0.645 -0.174*** -5.793 0.696 1.605 -0.145*** -2.653
CR T1RAT -0.531 -0.359 1.430** 2.197 1.057* 1.682 -0.280* -1.761 4.581** 1.997 0.022 0.078
CR TOTRAT 0.523 0.354 -1.426** -2.196 -1.060* -1.687 0.285* 1.767 -4.579** -1.993 -0.014 -0.048
CR LEVRAT -0.077 -0.401 -0.102 -0.698 -0.034 -0.209 -0.053* -1.821 -1.185*** -3.070 0.126*** 3.121
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Table 3: (continued)
CR NPFRAT1 0.356 0.736 0.300 0.628 -0.888 -1.556 0.304*** 2.720 -1.796 -1.113 0.125 0.663
CR CRRAT 0.206* 1.872 -0.050 -0.544 0.041 0.339 -0.041*** -4.112 -0.119 -0.475 0.018 0.769
SQ CR T1RAT -4.021 -1.156 1.992 1.218 0.705 0.450 -0.085 -0.148 0.734 0.245 -0.233 -0.416
SQ CR TOTRAT 4.021 1.156 -1.992 -1.218 -0.705 -0.450 0.086 0.149 -0.734 -0.245 0.234 0.416
SQ CR LEVRAT -0.097 -0.261 -0.160 -0.579 -0.091 -0.318 -0.066 -0.844 -1.967** -2.553 0.201** 2.437
SQ CR NPFRAT1 -6.709 -0.600 -11.947 -1.158 -1.175 -0.072 -10.374* -1.928 2.313 0.066 -7.908 -1.354
SQ CR CRRAT -0.834 -1.612 0.137 0.494 0.057 0.095 0.100*** 2.642 -1.144 -1.032 -0.120 -1.352
GNPGROW 0.016** 2.159 0.001 0.144 0.009 0.927 -0.000 -0.073 -0.106*** -5.085 -0.006** -2.356
UNEMP -0.012 -1.479 0.005 0.651 -0.001 -0.060 -0.000 -0.098 0.136*** 4.859 0.028*** 9.367
STGROW 0.016 0.116 -0.032 -0.176 -0.079 -0.384 -0.038* -1.747 -1.833*** -3.581 -0.668*** -10.320
STUNEMP -0.002* -1.796 -0.000 -0.168 0.001 0.976 -0.001*** -5.897 0.008* 1.681 0.001 1.297
NE 0.018* 1.651 -0.019 -1.530 0.005 0.921 -0.006*** -4.394 -0.005 -0.252 -0.009*** -3.307
BAA-AAA 0.025 1.358 -0.001 -0.095 0.011 0.550 -0.001 -0.302 -0.230*** -4.543 -0.062*** -9.889
RF3MO -0.008 -0.421 0.014 0.739 0.002 0.084 -0.003 -1.508 -0.055 -0.863 -0.033*** -4.277
SQ RF3MO 0.004 0.676 -0.002 -0.393 0.004 0.467 0.001 1.504 0.038** 2.127 0.020*** 8.784
TIME -0.000 -0.012 0.003* 1.921 0.001 0.334 -0.000 -0.678 -0.010** -2.081 0.005*** 7.885
SEAS1 -0.001 -0.134 0.001 0.154 -0.010 -1.105 -0.005*** -6.394 -0.094*** -4.849 0.006** 2.055
SEAS2 0.015** 2.113 -0.002 -0.303 0.012 1.628 0.014*** 16.726 -0.012 -0.717 -0.005** -1.984
SEAS3 -0.009 -1.326 -0.007 -1.403 0.008 1.030 0.008*** 10.488 0.004 0.240 -0.012*** -5.055
SLOPE+ 0.011 0.263 0.019 0.602 0.019 0.453 0.003 0.738 0.099 1.088 0.101*** 8.232
SLOPE- -1.568 -1.626 0.701 0.965 1.547 1.079 0.738*** 8.168 13.421*** 6.037 -2.152*** -7.103
SQ SLOPE+ 0.001 0.052 -0.003 -0.252 -0.004 -0.197 -0.002 -1.049 -0.087** -2.156 -0.044*** -8.231
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Table 3: (continued)
SQ SLOPE- -17.703 -1.621 6.718 0.808 16.814 1.030 8.079*** 7.885 147.248*** 5.842 -25.448*** -7.412
MEDIUM 0.005 1.452 0.019*** 6.977 -0.001 -0.362 0.005*** 9.003 0.015* 1.649 0.000 0.433
LARGE 1 0.009 1.140 0.026*** 3.673 -0.011* -1.703 0.008*** 6.981 -0.024 -1.063 -0.000 -0.123
LARGE 2 0.051 1.223 -0.078** -2.234 -0.008 -0.743 0.014*** 3.545 0.023 0.400 0.018*** 2.940
HHI 0.040 0.980 0.033 0.765 -0.061** -2.148 -0.005 -1.067 0.059 0.703 -0.004 -0.377
OCC -0.021*** -4.533 -0.005 -1.000 -0.003 -0.756 -0.004*** -4.530 0.038*** 3.194 0.002 1.329
FDIC -0.014*** -2.966 0.006* 1.795 -0.001 -0.401 0.001* 1.945 0.033*** 3.142 0.001 0.579
R2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.024 0.006 0.013
Num Obs 119679 119679 119679 119679 119679 119679
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Table 4:
Baseline RISK-factor model (RB0/RB20 Breakdown)
The Table presents the results obtained from running the baseline version of the model on the LHS variables
listed in the first row which are defined in Table 2. For the purpose of understanding the individual asset
classes behavior within each risk-weight category, the first three dependent variables relate to RB0 while
the last one is part of RB20. All RISK variables are lagged and averaged over the previous four quarters.
Risk factors pre-multiplied by the CRUNCH dummy variable are denoted as CR RISK while marginal
contributions computed as the square of RISK variables are denoted as SQ RISK. The combination of both
is refered to as SQ CR RISK. Statistical significance is set as follows: * p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
USTA USTREAS CURR FGNMA
Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat
INTERCEPT 0.354 0.911 -0.807*** -2.810 -0.513*** -4.786 -0.140 -0.813
CRUNCH -0.023 -0.308 -0.124** -2.242 0.008 0.269 -0.018 -0.460
T1RAT 0.010 0.955 0.014** 2.177 0.155*** 3.002 0.007 1.219
LEVRAT -0.037 -0.153 -0.092 -0.511 -0.236 -1.264 -0.136 -0.830
NPFRAT1 1.919 1.274 -0.513 -0.414 1.815 0.711 -2.206** -2.420
SQ T1RAT 0.000 0.929 0.000** 2.039 0.037* 1.942 0.000 1.338
SQ LEVRAT -0.115 -0.237 0.109 0.303 0.124 0.251 -0.268 -0.768
SQ NPFRAT1 -8.559 -0.156 0.995 0.021 -143.018 -1.268 62.491* 1.937
CR T1RAT -0.018 -0.544 -0.033 -1.402 0.014 0.191 -0.023 -1.032
CR LEVRAT -1.272*** -2.668 0.010 0.031 -0.066 -0.267 -0.180 -0.663
CR NPFRAT1 -4.411** -1.992 2.178 1.341 -2.500 -0.903 1.127 0.876
SQ CR T1RAT -0.001 -0.547 -0.001 -1.359 0.016 0.548 -0.001 -1.030
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Table 4: (continued)
SQ CR LEVRAT -2.137** -2.073 -0.365 -0.532 -0.343 -0.739 -0.752 -1.206
SQ CR NPFRAT1 38.853 0.603 -27.462 -0.521 147.087 1.299 -68.346* -1.957
GNPGROW -0.027 -0.959 -0.083*** -3.849 0.012 1.104 0.009 0.656
UNEMP 0.077** 2.093 0.059** 2.236 0.061*** 7.522 -0.062*** -3.836
STGROW -2.273*** -3.355 0.788 1.590 -1.888*** -8.229 1.071*** 2.623
STUNEMP -0.014** -2.338 0.021*** 4.611 0.000 0.177 -0.000 -0.012
NE -0.050* -1.765 0.057** 2.432 -0.012* -1.861 -0.040** -2.259
BAAAAA -0.125* -1.796 -0.115** -2.226 -0.089*** -3.612 0.042 1.348
RF3MO -0.147* -1.709 0.083 1.322 0.036* 1.729 0.085** 2.054
SQ RF3MO 0.046* 1.822 0.001 0.049 0.010 1.433 -0.016 -1.278
TIME -0.021*** -3.063 0.011** 2.204 0.008*** 4.035 0.010*** 3.081
SEAS1 -0.085*** -3.205 0.000 0.001 -0.066*** -4.562 0.039*** 2.878
SEAS2 0.014 0.550 -0.025 -1.266 -0.061*** -5.352 -0.018 -1.472
SEAS3 0.004 0.194 -0.002 -0.088 -0.100*** -9.011 -0.032*** -2.853
SLOPE+ -0.064 -0.459 0.218** 1.980 0.105** 2.055 0.097 1.457
SLOPE- 7.475** 2.305 5.671** 2.268 -6.740*** -7.236 -3.517* -1.881
SQ SLOPE+ -0.028 -0.476 -0.080* -1.698 -0.023 -0.971 -0.009 -0.321
SQ SLOPE- 82.354** 2.251 61.292** 2.177 -79.801*** -7.445 -41.532** -1.963
MEDIUM 0.045*** 3.971 -0.037*** -4.500 -0.021 -0.438 0.013* 1.654
LARGE 1 0.077** 2.441 -0.124*** -4.462 -0.029 -0.596 -0.004 -0.291
LARGE 2 0.180** 1.967 -0.094 -1.080 -0.033 -0.663 -0.001 -0.046
HHIA -0.090** -2.081 0.062** 2.032 -0.005 -0.239 0.017 0.668
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Table 4: (continued)
OCC 0.007 0.353 0.013 0.774 -0.004 -0.591 0.024** 2.222
FDIC -0.035** -1.976 0.048*** 3.346 0.008 1.461 0.023** 2.433
R2 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.003
Num Obs 107404 107404 25424 119679
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stimulus (SQ RF3MO). Also, as shown during the 1990 recession, all categories exhibit at
least one sign reversal in seasonality indicating that lending patterns are not consistent
throughout the year. It is, however, more difficult to assess the impact of the slope
coefficients which remain inconsistent as per B&U.
Finally, MEDIUM, LARGE 1 and LARGE 2 were more inclined toward riskier lend-
ing (RB100) although competition (HHI) remained subdued probably because most
banks engaged in similar risk-taking. Differences were still observed depending on reg-
ulator type (OCC/FDIC).
ii Granularity of the Risk-Weight Categories
In this section, we try to clarify a few “puzzles” in our previous results. For example,
the sign on NE for the most significantly affected categories, RB100 and RB0, was
the same despite their radically different risk profiles. TIME, on the other hand was
mostly significant for USTRA and RB0 but with unexpectedly opposite signs, despite
the similarity in risk profiles. Moreover, we highlighted earlier one clear anomaly related
to the sign difference between USTRA and RB0 regarding NPFRAT1.
In order to shed light on this matter, we do a granular analysis on the underlying
components of RB0. Our estimates in Table 2 show that the two largest elements of
RB0, Treasuries (USTREAS) and Currency (CURR), did increase during the crisis due
to a flight to quality. By deduction, aside from CDO tranches31, the only remaining com-
ponent responsible for decreasing the aggregate variable USTRA are the non-mortgage
obligations issued by GSEs, USTA.
Thus, we run our baseline model on the main constituent elements of RBO with a
breakdown of USTRA into USTA and USTREAS. The results are shown in Table 4.
During the crisis, the leverage impact on USTRA stems uniquely from USTA. Similarly,
the reported negative sign of the interest rates variable (RF3MO) and NE on RB0 in
31Unfortunately these cannot be isolated from the Call Reports.
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Table 4 is due to USTA rather than USTREAS. In conclusion, it seems that USTA
are distorting the results in RB0 and USTRA by behaving more like risky assets than
would be expected from their low risk-weight allocation. We presume this is due to the
change in market perception for these instruments following the stigma that enveloped
the GSEs regarding their mortgage originations.
iii Enchanced Model
Our enhanced model applies to mortgage-related dependent variables and includes new
explanatory variables particular to the crisis. Results are summarized in Table 5.
Despite their idiosyncratic nature, the new dependent variables in our model allow us
to match B&U in terms of explanatory power32. We note the reversal in most coefficients
between RB50 and RB20 in similar fashion to what was observed earlier for RB100
and RB0. However, given that RSLN behaved more like RB50, this is an indicator
of where the true market perception of riskiness lied with regard to RSLN which the
Basel regulators considered to be at an equal distance from the two middle risk-weight
categories (35%).
As predicted by Beatty and Liao (2011), the CRUNCH term is negatively significant
for individual loan categories and RB50 and to a lesser extent on RMBS and RB20.
However the positive sign on CR T1RAT and SQ CR T1RAT for RSLN and TLN indi-
cates that banks with higher capital ratios were lending less during during crunch time.
Notwithstanding this evidence, the fact that we do not observe a significantly opposite
result before the crisis sheds some doubt on the RBC CCH.
We find the opposite significance for leverage during the crunch period (CR L LEVRAT)
meaning that banks with low leverage ratios were lending less then their less risky peers.
This result is line with Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010). Note that this same negative effect
32The R2 magnitude suggest that the B&U model is not adequate in terms of forecasting power due
to some extent to the large number of observations. Despite the number of variables used, this implies
the need to incorporate additional factors to account for cross-sectional differences between banks. The
latter fall outside the realm of the Basel regulation and hence of this research.
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Table 5:
Enhanced RISK-factor model
The Table presents the results obtained from running the enhanced version of the model on the LHS variables listed in the first row which are defined
in Table 2. All RISK variables are lagged and averaged over the previous four quarters. Risk factors pre-multiplied by the CRUNCH dummy variable
are denoted as CR RISK while marginal contributions computed as the square of RISK variables are denoted as SQ RISK. The combination of both is
refered to as SQ CR RISK. Statistical significance is set as follows: * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
RSLN TLRE TLN RMBS RB20 RB50
Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat
INTERCEPT 0.044 1.535 -0.014 -0.523 0.036*** 2.712 -0.232 -1.404 0.106** 2.138 -0.185* -1.741
CRUNCH -0.027*** -3.525 -0.023*** -2.877 -0.017*** -3.375 -0.004 -0.098 -0.002 -0.146 -0.045* -1.812
T1RAT 0.004 1.611 -0.007 -0.670 0.003* 1.785 0.011 1.472 -0.012 -0.528 0.003 0.699
LEVRAT -0.033 -0.659 -0.048 -1.106 -0.022 -0.870 -0.123 -0.732 0.000 0.006 0.141 1.468
NPFRAT1 -1.193*** -5.405 -1.321*** -6.175 -1.181*** -14.203 -1.719* -1.914 0.343** 2.266 -1.422*** -3.268
LIQRAT -0.019 -0.740 -0.079*** -4.333 -0.045*** -3.595 -0.190 -0.831 0.149*** 4.393 -0.080 -1.385
SQ T1RAT 0.000 1.373 -0.000 -0.683 0.000* 1.690 0.000 1.491 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.865
SQ LEVRAT -0.068 -0.621 -0.185 -1.410 -0.082 -1.644 -0.218 -0.597 0.036 0.381 0.201 1.192
SQ NPFRAT1 28.398** 2.207 26.866* 1.882 16.177*** 4.860 56.211* 1.757 -3.887 -0.863 6.785 0.525
SQ LIQRAT -0.202 -0.722 -0.656*** -3.276 -0.301* -1.762 2.536 1.241 -0.160 -0.522 -0.431 -0.687
CR T1RAT 0.010** 2.019 0.016 1.025 0.008* 1.878 0.003 0.225 0.010 0.258 0.055** 2.295
CR LEVRAT -0.165* -1.826 -0.163* -1.666 -0.112*** -3.993 0.144 0.555 -0.109 -0.713 -0.415** -2.300
CR NPFRAT1 0.708*** 2.834 0.120 0.533 0.182** 2.014 1.264 0.993 -0.307 -1.415 -0.052 -0.084
CR LIQRAT -0.019 -0.381 -0.001 -0.020 -0.041** -2.416 0.122 0.274 0.179** 2.209 -0.033 -0.232
SQ CR T1RAT 0.000** 2.112 0.000 1.024 0.000* 1.753 0.000 0.230 -0.000 -0.150 0.002** 2.292
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SQ CR LEVRAT -0.272* -1.732 -0.209 -1.115 -0.116 -1.176 0.028 0.054 -0.124 -0.233 -0.342 -0.935
SQ CR NPFRAT1 -24.645* -1.936 -20.237 -1.431 -11.761*** -3.322 -66.048* -1.908 4.850 0.830 7.025 0.490
SQ CR LIQRAT 0.121 0.257 0.500 1.629 -0.220 -1.165 6.006 1.494 0.874 1.356 -0.834 -0.601
GNPGROW 0.001 0.371 0.001 0.949 0.002* 1.690 0.022* 1.682 0.012** 2.546 -0.001 -0.091
UNEMP -0.009*** -3.108 0.000 0.023 -0.002 -1.332 -0.065*** -4.167 -0.011** -2.500 0.005 0.449
STGROW -0.094 -1.197 -0.163 -1.629 -0.135*** -4.013 1.199*** 3.092 0.937*** 10.116 -0.135 -0.412
STUNEMP -0.001 -1.465 -0.002*** -3.405 -0.001*** -7.224 0.004 0.993 0.002*** 2.746 -0.000 -0.058
NE -0.002 -1.078 -0.011** -2.570 -0.005*** -4.571 -0.026* -1.662 -0.009*** -3.170 -0.006 -1.536
SW 0.015** 2.133 0.008 1.537 0.009*** 5.555 0.008 0.376 -0.001 -0.294 0.009 0.500
BAAAAA 0.004 0.536 0.003 1.088 0.001 0.332 0.071** 2.447 0.048*** 4.350 -0.002 -0.098
RF3MO -0.011 -1.369 0.006 0.763 -0.003 -1.047 0.085** 2.199 -0.046*** -4.296 0.016 0.570
SQ RF3MO 0.004 1.464 -0.001 -0.530 0.000 0.087 -0.016 -1.315 0.011*** 3.654 0.004 0.458
TIME 0.001** 2.143 0.000 0.944 0.000 0.320 0.008*** 2.733 -0.002** -2.397 0.004* 1.692
SEAS1 0.001 0.314 -0.001 -0.400 -0.004*** -4.729 0.051*** 4.018 0.008* 1.900 -0.001 -0.101
SEAS2 0.008*** 3.838 0.006*** 3.121 0.014*** 11.435 -0.016 -1.354 -0.050*** -13.206 0.001 0.212
SEAS3 0.009*** 4.377 0.008*** 5.193 0.008*** 8.873 -0.027*** -2.614 -0.014*** -3.999 0.009 1.149
SLOPE+ 0.026** 2.029 0.010 1.336 -0.004 -0.767 0.097 1.574 0.028 1.571 0.081* 1.900
SLOPE1 -0.075 -0.340 0.267 1.535 0.581*** 7.105 -4.599*** -2.787 -2.909*** -6.383 -2.218** -2.223
SQ SLOPE+ -0.010 -1.616 -0.001 -0.512 0.002 0.637 -0.007 -0.264 -0.029*** -4.068 -0.024 -1.182
SQ SLOPE- -1.227 -0.492 2.746 1.438 6.185*** 6.954 -53.731*** -2.876 -31.655*** -6.213 -26.521** -2.365
MEDIUM 0.005*** 3.255 0.007*** 4.877 0.007*** 8.806 0.040*** 4.592 0.001 0.611 0.007* 1.920
LARGE 1 0.001 0.239 0.005* 1.895 0.008*** 7.576 0.039*** 2.701 -0.000 -0.103 -0.003 -0.462
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LARGE 2 -0.013 -1.327 -0.027 -1.565 0.006* 1.869 0.031 1.302 0.008 1.018 -0.006 -0.559
HHIA -0.012 -1.293 -0.006 -0.783 0.005*** 2.735 0.037 1.382 0.000 0.076 0.022 1.583
OCC -0.007** -2.100 -0.005** -2.207 -0.003*** -4.038 -0.004 -0.352 0.003 1.440 0.003 0.633
FDIC -0.000 -0.068 0.003 1.558 0.002** 1.981 0.001 0.085 0.003 1.452 0.012*** 3.301
OTS -0.010*** -3.041 -0.008*** -3.292 -0.004*** -3.503 -0.016 -0.975 -0.010*** -3.438 -0.001 -0.337
R2 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.000
Num Obs 119679 119679 119679 119679 119679 119679
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which was also present for RB100 in our baseline model (Table 3) is observed as well for
RB50. Note that the leverage CCH has no explanatory power for RMBS as we recall
from our previous discussion that a large proportion of those assets was off-balance-sheet.
While the negative effect of NPFRAT1 prior to the crisis is still observed for the new
loan categories, the positive sign during the crisis indicates that banks with more NPLs
were those which were lending more. This acute sign of risk-taking (predatory lending)
is in stark contrast to the negative effect witnessed by B&U during the 1990 recession.
Nonetheless, the negative sign on the marginal term (SQ CR NPFRAT1) is proof that
upon reaching a certain level of NPLs, banks were eventually induced by a demand, or
borrower-related, effect to cut down on their lending and RMBS holdings. This is the
basis for our coercive risk-retrenchment CCH.
Liquidity has a strong negative effect on RSLN and TLN prior to the crisis but to a
lesser extent during the crisis. This could seem surprising at first given that liquidity was
recognized as the main concern until 2008Q3. However, given that the FDIC definition
of liquid assets includes other types of RMBS securities which are found under RB20,
the reverse effect was observed for this risk-weight category during the crisis. In other
words, banks with lower liquidity levels were more likely to invest in RB20 instruments
which relate mostly to securitized assets as a way to build up liquidity.
Macro and seasonality variables still play an important role in our enhanced model.
Our new SW variable has the opposite sign compared to NE indicating that banks in
the former region were lending more aggressively than their counterparts in NE which
eventually translated into higher losses. Note that the sign on SW for this crisis is in
line with what was obtained by B&U for NE during the 1990-1991 crunch. Moreover,
MEDIUM banks seem to have benefited during the whole period. This is confirmed
by the negative sign on OCC-regulated banks which are normally the larger ones. As
expected, OTS-regulated banks also had to cut down on lending which underlines the
additional role played by thrifts in the subprime crisis.
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In sum, abstracting from any quality of capital effects, the results on the RBC
CCH remain inconclusive. This could be due to overshadowing by other factors which
exploited some of the weaknesses of capital ratios. First, the moral hazard or having
strong capital ratios lead banks to take on more risk (leverage). Second, solvency is
not the sole indicator of a bank’s viability (liquidity). Together with the banks’ own
incentives to take advantage of matters which were outside of pillar 1 of the regulation
(predatory behavior), these factors culminated in a coerced behavior by banks to cut
down on lending.
6 Robustness
In order to validate the results we found above, we run a series of robustness tests on
our enhanced model.
First, we ascertain whether the introduction of the FED’s emergency programs and
aggressive monetary policy to curb the impact of the crisis had any impact on our results.
We rerun our model but taking into account only the quarters until 2008Q3, date of the
TARP introduction. Our main findings remain unchanged as can be seen in Table 6.
Nonetheless, we note the apparent significance of the CRUNCH variable on RMBS as
well as the intensification of the liquidity effect (LIQRAT) on TLN as our crisis period
is now in phase with the peek of the liquidity drought. However, we observe that the
impact of interest rates (RF3MO) has decreased, highlighting the fact that the rescue
program was only effective later during the crisis.
Second, our main results pointed out that RB20 behaved quite differently to RMBS.
We assume this is again because of heterogeneity in the RB20 risk-weight class. To
validate this assumption, we rerun the model only on the proportion of loans related to
GSEs, FGNMA (Table 4). We see that the sign of NPFRAT1 on this sub-component
of RB20 is indeed negative. To find the asset responsible for the unexpected sign, we
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would need a similar breakdown as we did before with RB0. Unfortunately, the assets in
RB20 are too heterogeneous and the FDIC database is not granular enough to support
such a breakdown. The discrepancy amongst various risk categories stresses again the
subject of non-homogeneous behavior within risk-weight categories. This is at odds with
the strict monotonicity assumption in the risk-weight scheme and has been referred to
as one “regulatory loophole”33 by Kamada and Nasu (2000).
Third, we test the dependence of our hypotheses on our choice of variables in Table
7. While our model does not account for the quality effect of capital ratios, we test
to see if our results in relation to the RBC CCH would change depending on which
layer of capital we investigate. Indeed, following the subprime crisis, due to the role
played by hybrid securities, much more has been said about the impact of Tier 2 rather
Tier 1 capital. Hence, we substitute T1RAT with T2RAT and TOTRAT and find that
both add no quantity effect to the model. Similarly, with regards to the coercive risk-
retrenchment hypothesis, since loans affecting NPFRAT1 can be sandwiched between
non-performing assets and non-performing real-estate loans, we substitute this variable
in our regression by NPFRAT2 and NPFRAT3 and reproduce the same highly significant
pre-crisis effect as in our original model. This was expected as the growth rates in Table
2 are very similar; reflecting again the fact that real-estate loans were the dominant
non-performing asset.
Fourth, we test that our results have not been diluted by the number of small banks
in Table 8. Hence, we remove these banks from our sample and confirm that our most
of the effects found relate to the larger banks. Indeed, the latter were reported as being
the key players of the recent crisis unlike the 1990-1991 period where the smaller banks
founded more difficult to meet the new regulatory constraints.
33This term is attributed to items which were considered missing from the Basel framework. These
include the supervisory role of Credit Rating Agencies and Special Purpose Vehicles which were not
formally bound by any jurisdiction under the Basel II agreement.
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Table 6:
Enhanced RISK-factor model (Pre-TARP)
The Table presents the results obtained from running the enhanced version of the model on the LHS variables listed in the first row which are defined
in Table 2. Data includes only goes until 2008Q3, with the launch of the TARP program. All RISK variables are lagged and averaged over the previous
four quarters. Risk factors pre-multiplied by the CRUNCH dummy variable are denoted as CR RISK while marginal contributions computed as the
square of RISK variables are denoted as SQ RISK. The combination of both is refered to as SQ CR RISK. Statistical significance is set as follows: *
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
RSLN TLRE TLN RMBS RB20 RB50
Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat
INTERCEPT -0.153 -0.671 -0.260 -1.456 0.055 0.387 -0.561 -0.525 0.817** 2.493 -2.344*** -2.884
CRUNCH -0.024* -1.757 -0.035*** -3.280 -0.010 -1.447 -0.196*** -2.884 -0.017 -0.717 -0.135*** -3.158
T1RAT 0.006 1.503 -0.010 -0.765 0.003* 1.749 0.010 1.321 -0.022 -0.696 0.004 0.838
LEVRAT -0.177** -2.487 0.037 0.889 -0.032 -1.148 0.003 0.021 0.002 0.016 0.059 0.530
NPFRAT1 -1.404*** -3.521 -0.841*** -9.326 -1.153*** -13.209 -1.499* -1.878 0.455** 2.495 -1.685*** -3.305
LIQRAT -0.025 -0.668 -0.074*** -4.782 -0.047*** -3.658 -0.195 -1.119 0.361*** 7.092 -0.068 -0.971
SQ T1RAT 0.000 1.320 -0.000 -0.744 0.000* 1.704 0.000 1.408 -0.000 -0.089 0.000 0.909
SQ LEVRAT -0.329** -2.150 -0.037 -0.270 -0.104* -1.891 0.036 0.120 0.041 0.154 0.046 0.232
SQ NPFRAT1 41.990 1.632 9.019*** 2.610 15.535*** 4.503 63.169** 2.112 -6.360 -1.255 16.850 1.063
SQ LIQRAT 0.037 0.102 -0.853*** -4.758 -0.264 -1.443 0.971 0.609 0.206 0.470 -0.096 -0.131
CR T1RAT 0.018** 2.279 0.012 0.695 0.011* 1.705 0.013 0.753 0.030 0.474 0.034** 2.490
CR LEVRAT -0.198** -2.185 -0.274*** -2.669 -0.087** -2.474 -0.041 -0.118 -0.174 -0.800 -0.456** -2.310
CR NPFRAT1 0.785** 1.970 -0.336 -1.500 0.125 1.142 0.792 0.479 -0.383 -1.335 -0.203 -0.259
CR LIQRAT 0.048 0.458 -0.047 -1.082 -0.050*** -2.756 0.006 0.010 0.469*** 3.795 0.025 0.136
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SQ CR T1RAT 0.001** 2.335 0.000 0.649 0.000 1.506 0.000 0.621 0.000 0.177 0.001** 2.526
SQ CR LEVRAT -0.265* -1.744 -0.443* -1.811 -0.010 -0.062 -0.365 -0.551 -0.089 -0.103 -0.660* -1.875
SQ CR NPFRAT1 -39.445* -1.646 -3.682 -0.778 -11.947*** -2.610 -59.829* -1.665 15.851* 1.946 -1.894 -0.103
SQ CR LIQRAT 0.452 0.537 -0.087 -0.217 -0.272 -1.309 6.686 1.257 3.304*** 3.451 -0.313 -0.169
GNPGROW -0.003 -0.707 0.001 0.241 -0.002 -0.811 0.070*** 3.577 0.014** 2.057 0.021 1.503
UNEMP 0.013 0.455 0.029 1.208 -0.005 -0.252 -0.016 -0.119 -0.117*** -2.896 0.260** 2.473
STGROW 0.110 1.016 -0.031 -0.214 -0.061* -1.655 0.984** 2.143 0.784*** 6.642 0.134 0.287
STUNEMP -0.000 -0.064 -0.002*** -2.722 -0.002*** -4.666 0.010*** 2.774 0.003*** 3.433 -0.001 -0.635
NE 0.000 0.141 -0.010** -2.518 -0.005*** -4.008 -0.027* -1.788 -0.010** -2.485 -0.006 -1.616
SW 0.006 0.840 0.010 1.459 0.010*** 5.474 -0.007 -0.341 -0.003 -0.653 -0.019 -1.146
BAAAAA -0.017 -1.401 0.002 0.235 -0.010** -2.423 0.038 0.629 0.012 0.640 0.021 0.451
RF3MO 0.019 0.636 0.036* 1.685 0.005 0.328 0.018 0.150 -0.048 -1.202 0.202** 2.186
SQ RF3MO -0.001 -0.161 -0.005 -1.020 -0.002 -0.600 0.001 0.025 -0.001 -0.102 -0.016 -0.748
TIME 0.002 0.896 0.002 1.115 -0.000 -0.276 0.030** 2.550 -0.004 -0.994 0.026*** 2.906
SEAS1 0.000 0.090 -0.001 -0.380 -0.005*** -4.034 0.050*** 3.152 0.014*** 2.729 -0.004 -0.368
SEAS2 0.011*** 3.343 0.007*** 2.627 0.016*** 8.577 -0.055*** -3.159 -0.046*** -7.491 -0.013 -0.867
SEAS3 0.009* 1.710 0.010** 2.531 0.006** 2.073 0.020 0.966 -0.010* -1.747 0.042*** 2.645
SLOPE+ 0.034* 1.687 0.028* 1.852 -0.010 -0.881 0.180* 1.707 -0.027 -0.776 0.252*** 3.009
SLOPE- 0.108 0.374 0.380* 1.805 0.677*** 7.146 -6.926*** -3.565 -3.992*** -7.391 -2.054* -1.646
SQ SLOPE+ -0.007 -0.824 -0.003 -0.454 0.006 1.183 -0.052 -1.331 -0.006 -0.565 -0.055* -1.744
SQ SLOPE- 1.021 0.315 4.362* 1.892 7.220*** 6.597 -79.662*** -3.595 -44.755*** -7.348 -21.891 -1.561
MEDIUM 0.005*** 2.640 0.007*** 7.848 0.008*** 8.417 0.030*** 3.876 0.000 0.239 0.015*** 3.202
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Table 6: (continued)
LARGE 1 0.003 0.514 0.006*** 2.594 0.009*** 7.329 0.021 1.516 -0.001 -0.155 0.006 0.590
LARGE 2 -0.012 -1.041 -0.032 -1.499 0.008** 2.351 0.009 0.302 0.007 0.675 0.012 1.061
HHIA -0.020 -1.498 -0.005 -0.699 0.003 1.630 0.030 1.257 0.003 0.483 0.003 0.231
OCC -0.012* -1.896 -0.005* -1.756 -0.004*** -3.903 -0.008 -0.698 0.004 1.393 -0.001 -0.135
FDIC -0.004 -0.693 0.001 0.362 0.002* 1.848 -0.007 -0.708 0.001 0.444 0.009** 2.202
OTS -0.011* -1.895 -0.008*** -2.982 -0.003*** -2.910 -0.021 -1.517 -0.021*** -4.426 0.000 0.074
R2 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.005 0.015 0.001
Num Obs 99755 99755 99755 99755 99755 99755
54
Table 7:
Enhanced RISK-factor model (Robustness)
The Table presents the results obtained from running the enhanced version of the model on the LHS variables listed in the first row which are defined in
Table 2. We replace T1RAT and NPFRAT1 by TOTRAT and NPFRAT2, respectively. All RISK variables are lagged and averaged over the previous
four quarters. Risk factors pre-multiplied by the CRUNCH dummy variable are denoted as CR RISK while marginal contributions computed as the
square of RISK variables are denoted as SQ RISK. The combination of both is refered to as SQ CR RISK. Statistical significance is set as follows: *
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
RSLN TLRE TLN RMBS RB20 RB50
Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat
INTERCEPT 0.043 1.518 -0.016 -0.571 0.035*** 2.678 -0.233 -1.407 0.106** 2.132 -0.185* -1.740
CRUNCH -0.027*** -3.577 -0.022*** -2.875 -0.018*** -3.460 -0.006 -0.155 -0.001 -0.096 -0.046* -1.824
TOTRAT 0.004 1.581 -0.007 -0.683 0.002* 1.756 0.011 1.468 -0.012 -0.518 0.003 0.643
LEVRAT -0.030 -0.589 -0.044 -1.024 -0.017 -0.656 -0.118 -0.702 -0.001 -0.019 0.150 1.561
NPFRAT2 -0.935*** -7.485 -1.093*** -12.395 -1.056*** -14.090 -1.136 -1.294 0.300** 2.251 -1.016** -2.175
LIQRAT -0.017 -0.650 -0.076*** -4.153 -0.041*** -3.289 -0.186 -0.813 0.148*** 4.353 -0.070 -1.220
SQ TOTRAT 0.000 1.333 -0.000 -0.697 0.000* 1.665 0.000 1.492 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.811
SQ LEVRAT -0.059 -0.538 -0.174 -1.337 -0.070 -1.381 -0.201 -0.552 0.033 0.355 0.225 1.332
SQ NPFRAT2 9.685*** 3.282 10.211*** 4.217 10.673*** 4.106 39.670 1.297 -1.368 -0.442 10.100 1.211
SQ LIQRAT -0.188 -0.669 -0.630*** -3.136 -0.273 -1.592 2.573 1.261 -0.164 -0.535 -0.341 -0.542
CR TOTRAT 0.011** 2.060 0.016 1.047 0.007* 1.870 0.002 0.116 0.010 0.256 0.054** 2.286
CR LEVRAT -0.166* -1.847 -0.159 -1.630 -0.112*** -3.945 0.140 0.539 -0.106 -0.700 -0.421** -2.333
CR NPFRAT2 0.506*** 2.959 -0.029 -0.248 0.229*** 2.834 1.478 1.238 -0.389** -1.978 0.010 0.017
CR LIQRAT -0.020 -0.412 -0.002 -0.085 -0.042** -2.479 0.122 0.274 0.179** 2.209 -0.033 -0.238
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Table 7: (continued)
SQ CR TOTRAT 0.000** 2.149 0.000 1.047 0.000* 1.740 0.000 0.116 -0.000 -0.153 0.002** 2.281
SQ CR LEVRAT -0.273* -1.751 -0.201 -1.074 -0.115 -1.159 0.015 0.029 -0.122 -0.230 -0.357 -0.975
SQ CR NPFRAT2 -6.284* -1.838 -3.932 -1.506 -6.997*** -2.581 -56.363* -1.714 3.863 0.995 0.627 0.068
SQ CR LIQRAT 0.116 0.249 0.462 1.524 -0.226 -1.196 6.109 1.519 0.848 1.322 -0.807 -0.582
GNPGROW 0.001 0.373 0.002 0.963 0.002* 1.693 0.022* 1.678 0.012** 2.550 -0.001 -0.091
UNEMP -0.009*** -3.146 -0.000 -0.096 -0.002 -1.453 -0.065*** -4.167 -0.011** -2.488 0.004 0.419
STGROW -0.093 -1.176 -0.162 -1.619 -0.134*** -3.991 1.204*** 3.104 0.936*** 10.109 -0.130 -0.398
STUNEMP -0.001 -1.230 -0.002*** -2.818 -0.001*** -5.954 0.003 0.879 0.002*** 2.707 0.000 0.037
NE -0.002 -0.901 -0.010** -2.497 -0.005*** -4.304 -0.025 -1.571 -0.009*** -3.215 -0.005 -1.195
SW 0.015** 2.178 0.008 1.510 0.009*** 5.316 0.009 0.417 -0.001 -0.296 0.009 0.507
BAAAAA 0.004 0.529 0.003 1.061 0.001 0.278 0.071** 2.444 0.048*** 4.354 -0.002 -0.108
RF3MO -0.011 -1.385 0.006 0.736 -0.003 -1.099 0.085** 2.194 -0.046*** -4.299 0.016 0.557
SQ RF3MO 0.004 1.472 -0.001 -0.519 0.000 0.100 -0.016 -1.308 0.011*** 3.653 0.004 0.466
TIME 0.001** 2.196 0.000 1.025 0.000 0.363 0.008*** 2.705 -0.002** -2.379 0.004* 1.680
SEAS1 0.001 0.321 -0.000 -0.368 -0.004*** -4.685 0.051*** 4.013 0.008* 1.900 -0.001 -0.095
SEAS2 0.008*** 3.854 0.006*** 3.147 0.014*** 11.468 -0.016 -1.356 -0.050*** -13.209 0.002 0.216
SEAS3 0.009*** 4.379 0.008*** 5.210 0.008*** 8.870 -0.027*** -2.613 -0.014*** -3.997 0.009 1.150
SLOPE20P 0.026** 2.020 0.010 1.302 -0.004 -0.809 0.098 1.578 0.028 1.570 0.081* 1.894
SLOPE20M -0.077 -0.349 0.263 1.509 0.577*** 7.054 -4.596*** -2.784 -2.909*** -6.385 -2.229** -2.233
SQ SLOPE20P -0.010 -1.617 -0.001 -0.494 0.002 0.647 -0.008 -0.275 -0.029*** -4.064 -0.024 -1.188
SQ SLOPE20M -1.248 -0.499 2.701 1.413 6.143*** 6.902 -53.685*** -2.873 -31.658*** -6.214 -26.640** -2.375
MEDIUM 0.005*** 3.524 0.007*** 5.263 0.007*** 9.462 0.041*** 4.698 0.001 0.506 0.008** 2.265
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Table 7: (continued)
LARGE 1 0.001 0.228 0.005* 1.868 0.008*** 7.699 0.039*** 2.755 -0.000 -0.122 -0.002 -0.349
LARGE 2 -0.014 -1.394 -0.028* -1.647 0.004 1.399 0.030 1.287 0.008 1.032 -0.007 -0.642
HHIA -0.012 -1.293 -0.006 -0.746 0.005*** 2.807 0.036 1.368 0.000 0.089 0.022 1.559
OCC -0.007** -2.146 -0.005** -2.337 -0.004*** -4.333 -0.005 -0.363 0.003 1.458 0.002 0.514
FDIC -0.000 -0.103 0.002 1.457 0.001* 1.717 0.001 0.065 0.003 1.478 0.012*** 3.158
OTS -0.010*** -2.818 -0.007*** -2.872 -0.003*** -2.701 -0.015 -0.941 -0.010*** -3.512 -0.001 -0.152
R2 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.000
Num Obs 119679 119679 119679 119679 119679 119679
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Table 8:
Enhanced RISK-factor model (NoSmall)
The Table presents the results obtained from running the enhanced version of the model on the LHS variables listed in the first row which are defined in
Table 2. We remove the small banks from our sample in order to check if there is any size effect. All RISK variables are lagged and averaged over the
previous four quarters. Risk factors pre-multiplied by the CRUNCH dummy variable are denoted as CR RISK while marginal contributions computed
as the square of RISK variables are denoted as SQ RISK. The combination of both is refered to as SQ CR RISK. Statistical significance is set as follows:
* p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
RSLN TLRE TLN RMBS RB20 RB50
Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat
INTERCEPT 0.070** 2.055 0.058*** 4.366 0.057*** 3.834 -0.033 -0.159 0.127** 2.503 -0.241** -2.238
CRUNCH -0.026*** -3.626 -0.022** -2.493 -0.023** -2.051 -0.010 -0.200 -0.006 -0.523 -0.041 -1.501
T1RAT 0.023 1.365 0.066*** 3.512 0.044 1.025 0.275*** 2.594 0.172*** 5.709 0.084 0.887
LEVRAT 0.055 1.014 -0.074 -1.074 -0.011 -0.079 -0.208 -0.622 -0.397*** -4.728 -0.222 -0.770
NPFRAT1 -1.075*** -6.934 -1.354*** -10.746 -1.647*** -15.230 -1.463 -1.079 0.374** 1.968 -1.459* -1.851
LIQRAT -0.024 -1.038 -0.055** -2.191 -0.013 -0.737 -0.122 -0.487 0.304*** 6.500 0.127 1.256
SQ T1RAT 0.008 1.537 0.023*** 3.367 0.010 0.612 0.084** 2.281 0.057*** 6.019 0.060 1.636
SQ LEVRAT 0.083 0.820 -0.168 -1.065 0.018 0.050 0.251 0.346 -0.321* -1.757 -1.404 -0.876
SQ NPFRAT1 14.421*** 3.342 14.788*** 4.641 21.929*** 4.577 72.152 1.231 -2.085 -0.429 15.476 1.047
SQ LIQRAT -0.344 -1.261 -0.595* -1.832 0.170 0.568 3.612 1.460 1.213*** 2.860 1.564 1.404
CR T1RAT 0.128*** 3.311 0.039 0.597 0.026 0.547 -0.168 -1.099 0.053 0.524 0.259** 2.368
CR LEVRAT -0.378*** -3.614 -0.289 -1.376 -0.224 -1.394 0.457 0.941 -0.216 -1.101 -0.551 -1.362
CR NPFRAT1 0.694** 2.051 -0.118 -0.535 0.400*** 3.515 1.199 0.657 -0.456 -1.551 0.325 0.392
CR LIQRAT 0.047 0.787 0.012 0.318 -0.035 -1.275 0.036 0.059 0.191* 1.738 0.087 0.546
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Table 8: (continued)
SQ CR T1RAT 0.041*** 2.950 0.007 0.357 0.008 0.424 -0.053 -1.010 -0.015 -0.638 0.042 0.823
SQ CR LEVRAT -0.477** -2.124 -0.344 -1.308 -0.668 -1.373 0.259 0.258 0.459 0.477 0.608 0.411
SQ CR NPFRAT1 -9.696* -1.716 -4.347 -1.044 -13.803*** -2.772 -86.813 -1.393 4.802 0.667 -4.484 -0.279
SQ CR LIQRAT 0.929* 1.689 0.632* 1.676 -0.181 -0.524 3.585 0.610 0.223 0.238 2.277 1.258
GNPGROW 0.001 0.527 0.003** 2.137 0.002 1.444 0.047*** 2.811 0.013*** 3.225 0.007 0.851
UNEMP -0.011** -2.542 -0.002* -1.790 -0.002 -1.644 -0.081*** -4.300 -0.009 -1.626 0.012 1.221
STGROW -0.050 -0.379 -0.073 -0.884 -0.070 -1.574 0.968* 1.828 0.625*** 5.911 -0.801 -1.439
STUNEMP -0.002** -2.012 -0.001** -2.550 -0.001*** -5.541 0.006 1.238 0.002** 2.541 0.001 0.339
NE -0.001 -0.709 -0.011** -2.291 -0.005*** -3.571 -0.013 -0.788 -0.006** -2.253 -0.009** -2.022
SW 0.009** 2.041 0.007 1.571 0.005*** 3.386 -0.009 -0.425 -0.008* -1.812 0.004 0.143
BAAAAA 0.006 0.801 0.001 0.539 0.001 0.280 0.111*** 3.041 0.042*** 4.346 -0.003 -0.142
RF3MO -0.016** -2.404 -0.012*** -2.682 -0.005 -1.142 0.070 1.404 -0.041*** -3.615 0.042 1.317
SQ RF3MO 0.006* 1.905 0.003* 1.801 0.000 0.278 -0.020 -1.284 0.006* 1.884 -0.006 -0.624
TIME 0.001 1.159 -0.001 -1.392 0.000 0.137 0.008** 2.159 -0.002*** -2.730 0.004* 1.952
SEAS1 -0.001 -0.279 -0.001 -0.365 -0.002** -2.486 0.046*** 2.772 0.020*** 4.989 0.012 1.318
SEAS2 0.005* 1.803 0.006*** 3.112 0.010*** 7.111 -0.015 -1.008 -0.029*** -8.188 0.002 0.323
SEAS3 0.006*** 3.152 0.008*** 4.253 0.006*** 5.620 -0.023* -1.691 0.001 0.364 0.011 1.367
SLOPE20P 0.033* 1.695 0.003 0.255 -0.005 -0.861 0.041 0.510 -0.007 -0.423 0.041 0.979
SLOPE20M -0.031 -0.103 0.334* 1.786 0.326*** 2.941 -7.250*** -3.352 -2.707*** -5.997 -1.934* -1.933
SQ SLOPE20P -0.014 -1.475 -0.003 -0.638 0.002 0.577 0.010 0.294 -0.015** -2.077 -0.004 -0.205
SQ SLOPE20M -0.736 -0.216 3.404 1.617 3.252*** 2.780 -84.035*** -3.437 -29.589*** -5.765 -23.427** -2.068
HHIA -0.011 -1.337 -0.004 -0.657 0.003 1.495 0.039 1.189 -0.003 -0.582 0.022 0.924
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Table 8: (continued)
OCC -0.003* -1.687 -0.001 -0.327 -0.003*** -2.658 -0.013 -0.929 0.002 0.710 0.007 1.173
FDIC 0.002 1.363 0.004 1.602 0.002** 2.210 -0.003 -0.196 0.002 0.891 0.017*** 2.747
OTS -0.005*** -3.274 -0.003 -1.297 -0.002 -1.095 -0.017 -0.869 0.000 0.005 0.010 1.076
R2 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.016 0.001
Num Obs 66334 66334 66334 66334 66334 66334
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Table 9:
Enhanced RISK-factor model (NoFilter)
The Table presents the results obtained from running the enhanced version of the model on the LHS variables listed in the first row which are defined
in Table 2. We remove the filtering procedure from our empirical setup to include all banks in our sample. All RISK variables are lagged and averaged
over the previous four quarters. Risk factors pre-multiplied by the CRUNCH dummy variable are denoted as CR RISK while marginal contributions
computed as the square of RISK variables are denoted as SQ RISK. The combination of both is refered to as SQ CR RISK. Statistical significance is set
as follows: * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
RSLN TLRE TLN RMBS RB20 RB50
Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat Parms t-stat
INTERCEPT 0.021 0.580 -0.035 -0.983 0.025 0.935 -0.061 -0.386 0.059 0.782 -0.047 -0.340
CRUNCH -0.044*** -3.964 -0.036*** -4.569 -0.029*** -3.529 -0.075** -2.040 -0.003 -0.249 -0.091*** -2.929
T1RAT -0.002 -0.466 -0.003 -0.558 0.003 0.328 0.017 1.395 -0.001 -0.037 -0.011 -0.649
LEVRAT -0.127*** -4.561 -0.132*** -5.581 -0.123*** -4.458 -0.209*** -3.694 -0.063 -1.517 -0.079 -0.563
NPFRAT1 -1.172*** -5.109 -1.371*** -6.032 -1.836*** -10.402 -0.969 -1.090 0.180 0.758 -1.631*** -3.175
LIQRAT -0.052 -0.866 -0.138** -2.505 -0.154*** -2.750 -0.135 -0.789 0.135** 2.316 -0.106 -1.111
SQ T1RAT -0.000 -0.738 -0.000 -0.792 0.000 0.233 0.000 1.255 0.001 0.667 -0.000 -0.729
SQ LEVRAT -0.005*** -4.615 -0.005*** -5.709 -0.005*** -4.552 -0.008*** -3.769 -0.003** -2.021 -0.003 -0.579
SQ NPFRAT1 19.242*** 3.594 19.745*** 3.546 19.226*** 3.958 33.685 1.216 -0.990 -0.184 15.694 1.193
SQ LIQRAT 0.281 0.527 -0.316 -0.692 0.388 0.853 2.149 1.387 -0.554 -1.107 0.394 0.422
CR T1RAT 0.019 0.749 0.016** 2.077 0.010 0.683 0.075*** 3.011 0.003 0.145 0.044 1.495
CR LEVRAT -0.260*** -2.749 -0.177*** -4.252 -0.200*** -3.393 -0.345** -2.536 -0.086 -1.172 -0.669*** -3.080
CR NPFRAT1 0.437 1.454 -0.121 -0.401 0.378 1.562 -0.033 -0.029 -0.637** -2.135 -0.430 -0.658
CR LIQRAT -0.159* -1.958 -0.060 -1.058 -0.064 -1.204 -0.019 -0.050 0.211** 2.106 -0.159 -0.924
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Table 9: (continued)
SQ CR T1RAT 0.001 0.644 0.000* 1.859 0.000 0.594 0.003*** 3.091 -0.000 -0.443 0.001 1.394
SQ CR LEVRAT -0.108*** -3.098 -0.107*** -5.498 -0.108*** -4.910 -0.294*** -4.289 -0.067** -2.530 -0.572** -2.047
SQ CR NPFRAT1 -19.776*** -2.965 -16.237** -2.361 -15.831*** -3.526 -26.442 -0.897 -5.068 -0.767 -3.348 -0.249
SQ CR LIQRAT -1.365* -1.783 -0.052 -0.092 -0.710 -1.375 5.421 1.536 0.439 0.509 -1.056 -0.614
GNPGROW 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.320 0.006** 2.138 0.031** 2.266 0.011* 1.796 0.006 0.528
UNEMP -0.008** -2.424 0.002 1.135 -0.003 -1.508 -0.061*** -4.308 -0.010* -1.735 -0.012 -0.975
STGROW -0.013 -0.150 -0.038 -0.419 -0.089 -1.416 1.195*** 3.147 1.132*** 7.174 -0.011 -0.031
STUNEMP -0.002** -2.077 -0.002** -2.575 -0.002*** -3.446 0.004 1.185 -0.001 -0.763 0.001 0.543
NE -0.011*** -2.999 -0.013*** -3.493 -0.010** -2.177 -0.044*** -3.217 -0.016*** -6.006 -0.026*** -4.369
SW 0.015** 2.056 0.004 0.689 -0.009 -0.916 0.035** 1.992 -0.002 -0.410 0.056*** 3.006
BAAAAA 0.002 0.256 -0.004 -0.792 0.007 1.318 0.022 0.740 0.050*** 3.841 0.016 0.611
RF3MO -0.007 -0.590 0.003 0.291 -0.007 -0.809 -0.000 -0.005 -0.033* -1.896 -0.006 -0.194
SQ RF3MO 0.002 0.472 -0.001 -0.313 -0.001 -0.452 0.004 0.322 0.009* 1.820 0.004 0.387
TIME 0.001* 1.675 0.001* 1.675 0.000 0.077 0.013*** 4.191 -0.001 -0.925 0.003 1.353
SEAS1 0.005 1.250 0.003 1.043 0.000 0.147 0.046*** 3.647 0.013** 2.233 0.010 0.957
SEAS2 0.007** 2.005 0.003 1.217 0.014*** 5.532 -0.038*** -3.397 -0.048*** -8.177 0.006 0.636
SEAS3 0.008*** 2.746 0.009*** 4.234 0.013*** 6.288 -0.029*** -2.641 -0.008* -1.659 0.011 1.249
SLOPE+ 0.013 0.851 0.008 0.615 -0.016 -1.249 0.098 1.546 0.039 1.337 0.036 0.656
SLOPE- -0.178 -0.297 -0.125 -0.252 0.274 0.747 -5.427*** -3.351 -3.301*** -5.928 -2.161* -1.648
SQ SLOPE+ -0.003 -0.449 -0.001 -0.164 0.005 0.893 -0.021 -0.746 -0.031*** -2.604 -0.011 -0.447
SQ SLOPE- -2.808 -0.414 -1.711 -0.309 3.040 0.730 -63.549*** -3.465 -36.561*** -5.827 -26.915* -1.811
MEDIUM 0.017*** 5.754 0.020*** 6.913 0.025*** 5.673 0.052*** 7.435 0.002 1.057 0.016** 2.479
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Table 9: (continued)
LARGE 1 0.044*** 4.752 0.046*** 4.361 0.066*** 4.567 0.063*** 5.242 0.004 1.157 0.037*** 3.192
LARGE 2 0.027 1.172 0.046** 2.172 0.042** 2.312 0.033 1.319 0.024** 2.271 -0.006 -0.249
HHIA -0.005 -0.487 0.001 0.119 0.005 0.566 0.030 1.461 0.004 0.601 0.026 1.483
OCC -0.009*** -2.604 -0.012*** -3.362 -0.009* -1.899 -0.012 -1.240 0.005** 2.051 -0.012* -1.883
FDIC 0.006* 1.774 0.005 1.434 0.006 1.098 0.004 0.484 0.005** 2.128 0.011* 1.922
OTS -0.016*** -3.083 -0.016*** -2.921 -0.008 -1.081 -0.020* -1.779 -0.011*** -2.961 -0.011 -1.437
R2 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001
Num Obs 170668 170668 170668 170668 170668 170668
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Fifth, we remove the cleansing filter from our empirical setup and rerun our model
on the new dataset which includes all possible banks which includes some with peculiar
ratios. Results in Table 9 show that even before the crisis there was a strengthening of
the liquidity, coercive risk-retrenchment and particularly the leverage hypothesis through
an increase in significance of the related variables up to the 1% level. Similarly, the
CRUNCH effect becomes more obvious for the RMBS category as the filtering procedure
adopted by B&U was seemingly too conservative.
7 Conclusion
Regardless if one agrees with the blame directed at the Basel regulation for failing to
achieve its safety goal, what can factually be stated is that, in retrospect, the regulation
certainly did not prevent any crises, at least in the U.S. While the 1990-1991 recession
was established as a “capital crunch”, our research question asks whether this could
have also been the case for the 2007-2009 subprime crisis. Given that the Basel II
capital requirements did relatively little to alleviate the heavy losses that ensued during
the recent crisis, the broader question becomes how adequate was the “capital adequacy”
requirement - pillar one of the three Basel pillars - in light of the subprime crisis?
Based on B&U’s model for the 1990-1991 crunch, we argue that under Basel II, the
lowering of the risk-weight on residential mortgages could have pushed banks toward
further lending in this asset category in order to maintain high capital ratios. The latter
became an incentive for banks to increase their risk-taking (moral hazard). Combined
with dangerous levels of leverage and a dry-up in liquidity, this meant that banks could
not measure up to the resulting wave of defaults. Hence, having reached excessive levels
of non-performing loans, this coerced banks to cut down on their lending. While our
results only reveal the validity of our RBC CCH during the crisis, leverage appears to
have been the dominant factor with liquidity in second position.
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As such, the inclusion of the leverage and liquidity ratios as part of the Basel III
framework provided an implicit answer as to the effect of the regulation on the crisis by
pointing out the related factors as “regulatory loopholes”. We find that a plain asset
liquidity measure such as liquid assets to total assets (LIQRAT) variable would be a
good complement to the recently advocated funding liquidity measures, LCR and NSFR.
However, the hindsight of having worked with a proven-to-be-faulty tandem of capital
and leverage ratios, as in the case of the U.S., should push the regulators to rethink
their Basel III strategy of implementing the second ratio as a “backstop” measure as
this could repudiate the value of having simple risk-based capital guidelines. Finally,
while we do not measure the effect of quality of capital, increasing the quantity levels
of capital could deter banks from building comfortable capital cushions which induced
them into moral hazard.
Note that some seemingly odd features of the risk-weighting scheme which were
revealed by our analysis, such as the opposite signs on USTR/USTRA, allowed us to
unveil further characteristics of the crunch such as the role of GSEs. In particular,
we witness certain differences in growth-related behavior between an instrument (e.g.
USTREAS/USTA/FGNMA) and its corresponding risk-weight class (RB0/RB20). This
hints to the breakdown of strict monotonicity in the risk-weighting scheme as the riskiness
of a particular instrument and its belonging to a certain risk-weight class appear to be
dependent on the business cycle. Potentially, this could lead towards the concept of
having dynamic versus static risk-weights. Also, by definition, capital ratios are sensitive
to changes in risk-weight. Unfortunately, aside from two historical data points where
changes have occurred to a single asset class (residential mortgages), the characteristics of
this sensitivity remain virtually unknown. This matter is addressed from a mathematical
viewpoint in Chapter 4.
In sum, our findings agree with B&U’s claim on the effectiveness of the Basel regula-
tion(s) in changing the banks’ behavior in one way or another. No matter how the sce-
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nario differs between credit crunches in terms of supply/demand triggers, direct/indirect
effects, regions NE/SW and players FDIC/OTS, the essence of capital adequacy will al-
ways be to delay rather than completely absorb shocks; that is, if used properly in
conjunction with the remaining pillars 2 and 3 guidelines. So far, the Basel regulations
have preceded, if not lead to, these credit crunches. Nowadays, this logic has been re-
versed as we observe the impact of the subprime crisis on regulatory guidelines such
as Basel II.5 and III. Except for the combination of capital and leverage ratios which
could be distortionary, our overall assessment is that the measures taken are heading in
the right direction. However, noting that the basis for computing the required capital
ratios in all four regulatory frameworks still hinges on static risk-weights, it is time for
the Basel regulators to re-evaluate their perception that “the benefits of a risk-sensitive
capital framework outweigh [any] potential concern”.
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Chapter IV:
The Basel Capital Requirement Puzzle:
A Study of Changing Interconnections be-
tween Leverage and Risk-Based Capital
Ratios
1 Introduction
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has been widely criticized for not
meeting its bank safety objective after the U.S. witnessed two credit crunches in a span
of less than twenty years. Indeed, after the introduction of Basel I (BCBS (1988)), banks
struggled to meet the newly established risk-based capital requirements and hence shifted
their portfolio composition towards safer assets to boost their capital ratios (CRs). This
resulted in a lending contraction during the 1990-1991 recession, hereafter referred to as
the first crunch.
In contrast, since the Basel II framework was released (BCBS (2004) and BCBS
(2006)), it seems that banks willingly increased their CRs beyond the target thresholds.
Indeed, according to Chami and Cosimano (2010), in the early stages of the subprime
crisis, the top 25 banks in the U.S. and Europe had a Tier 1 capital ratio of 8.3%
and 8.1% while the Total capital ratio was 11.4% and 11.6%, respectively. Due to the
distortionary incentives created by holding such high capital buffers (or moral hazard as
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indicated by Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995)), banks reached dangerous leverage ratios1
(LR) judging by the standards set by the main U.S. regulators (OCC, FDIC and FED)
for well-capitalized institutions. Indeed, Gilbert (2006) states that up until mid-2005
only the two largest U.S. banks did not fall below the 5% leverage requirement.
Once defaults began their domino effect which triggered the second credit crunch in
2007-2009, the blame was directed at the regulators for having incentivized banks to take
on excessive risk prior to the crisis. Aside from new capital definitions, if the regulatory
target thresholds were maintained at the pre-established 4% and 8% levels for Tier 1 and
Total CR, the only regulatory change that could have affected these ratios exogenously
would have been the introduction of new risk-weight categories. The latter is reported
to have shifted the portfolio risk appetite of banks between asset classes, namely with
regard to residential mortgages (Blasko and Sinkey (2006) and Cathcart et al. (2013)).
Since their introduction under the Basel framework, the effects of capital require-
ments have been investigated from two different perspectives. The first is related to the
impact on lending growth (Bernanke and Lown (1991); Peek and Rosengren (1992, 1994,
1995a,b); Barajas et al. (2004); Cathcart et al. (2013)) whereas the second focuses on
risk incentives (Koehn and Santomero (1980); Furlong and Keely (1987); Kim and San-
tomero (1988); Furlong and Keely (1989); Keely and Furlong (1990); Gennotte and Pyle
(1991); Shrieves and Dahl (1992); Calem and Rob (1999); Blum (1999); Montgomery
(2005); Berger and Bouwman (2013))2. Opinions remain mixed as to the effect capital
can have in each case3. Moreover, due to the partial implementation of Basel II in the
U.S. prior to the second crunch, this makes the puzzle of finding a relationship between
1Leverage is not to be confused with the traditional corporate finance definition as the ratio of debt
to equity. In the regulatory context it is defined as the ratio of equity to assets (see section 2). In that
sense, high leverage is considered to be a good sign.
2Note that all but the last citations in each literature perspective relate to the first crunch which
underlines the greater attention attributed to the Basel regulation following this period.
3Though some studies have shown that capital can relate to other bank-specific features such as size.
In this case, the perception seems to be that larger banks have smaller CRs (Hall (1993), Estrella et al.
(2000), Gilbert (2006) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010)). Still, this finding can depend on the choice of
capital measure: Tier 1 VS Total (Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010)).
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the regulation and the crisis more difficult.
Resolving this puzzle could potentially benefit from a different approach. In fact,
our literature survey revealed that authors alternate between the use of the CR or LR
in their studies. However, the two ratios are not entirely independent as the interaction
between both can lead to some interesting findings and a new perspective on relating
the abovementioned crunches to the effects of capital requirements. In this paper, we
complement the existing literature by exploring a three-step procedure whereby a bank’s
binding constraint can be affected by changes in the correlation pattern of LR and CR,
which in turn is explained by the sensitivity of the latter to alterations in its risk-weights.
Firstly, in order to showcase the shifts in banks’ binding constraints between the two
crunches, we conduct a bank failure analysis in relation to the CR and LR requirements.
While one might consider bank failure as being the adverse consequence of excessive
risk-taking, not all failures can be attributed to banks’ risky behavior with regard to
capital adequacy4. Since the existing literature investigated the causal linkages to the
subprime crisis outside the realm of risk-based capital requirements (leverage, liquidity,
securitization), our study re-emphasizes the effects of these requirements on failures in
an aim to fill the gap.
Secondly, we investigate reversals in correlation patterns between LR and CR. We
show that these patterns are related to economic fundamentals such as lending and GDP
which allows us to pinpoint the loan category mostly correlated with the second crunch.
Also, in this context, it is common for some authors to confuse correlation for causality,
an opinion shared with Furfine (2000). We therefore assess any implied causality using
Granger tests.
Thirdly, we derive a partial differential equation (PDE) related to the sensitivity of
the CR which combines the two capital requirements. The closed-form solution of this
equation can assist policy-makers in setting adequate rather than heuristic targets for the
4Operational risk, for instance, has been at the helm of many investigations: fraud (Daiwa, Sumit-
omo), rogue trading (Barings Bank).
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CR and LR. This can also shed light on the controversy highlighted by various authors
(Hall (1993); Thakor (1996); Blum (2008); Buehler et al. (2010); Blundell-Wignall and
Atkinson (2010); Kiema and Jokivuolle (2010)) regarding the effects of combining the
two capital measures together under a single framework. In turn, this has implications
on the Basel III regulation which seeks to incorporate the LR as a “backstop” measure
alongside the CR.
In order to validate our three-step procedure we proceed as follows. In section 2,
we describe our dataset. In section 3, we illustrate the impact of the CR and LR
requirements on bank failures for the second crunch period. In section 4, we explore the
changes in correlation patterns between the two ratios. Finally, in section 5, we explain
the correlation reversals between the two crunches from a theoretical and empirical
standpoint. In section 6, we conclude with our main results and policy implications.
2 Data
Our dataset is based on FDIC Call Reports5 for the periods 1990Q1-1991Q2 and 2004Q3-
2009Q2. The latter period covers the second crunch but also contains a control period
to allow for some delay before some of the Basel II regulatory changes took place6. This
is not possible for the first crunch as risk-weight data is unavailable prior to 1990.
After discarding all negative CR values, we construct various sub-samples of the
dataset based on the distribution of the CR. The latter range from the 90th to the 50th
percentiles. Our choice of cutoff values related to removing the effect of outliers mostly
located in the upper percentiles of the data, while the limit of 50% is used to maintain a
reasonable amount of observations. Descriptive statistics for the upper and lower bounds
of the sub-samples are shown in Table 10 below.
5Also known as Reports of Condition and Income taken from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC).
6See Chapter 3 for more detail.
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Table 10:
Summary Statistics
The data in this table relates to the beginning of each designated crunch period, 1990Q1 and
2004Q3. Values are shown after cleansing the data with respect to the CR at the 90th and 50th
percentiles. Risk-weighted assets (RWA), Total Assets (TA) and Mortgage Assets (A) are in USD.
Panel A: 1990Q1
Pct 90% 50%
Var Obs Mean Std Dev Skew Kurt Obs Mean Std Dev Skew Kurt
CR 12069 12.5 4.3 0.5 3.0 6714 9.5 2.1 -1.2 4.7
LR 12069 8.0 2.5 1.8 33.1 6714 6.7 2.0 5.2 155.2
RWA 12069 2.58 2.69 45.8 2903.8 6714 3.98 3.49 34.5 1636.1
TA 12069 3.18 2.59 34.9 1731.8 6714 4.88 3.39 26.6 997.0
A 12069 1.08 7.78 30.3 1198.2 6714 1.68 1.09 23.3 697.5
Panel B: 2004Q3
Pct 90% 50%
Var Obs Mean Std Dev Skew Kurt Obs Mean Std Dev Skew Kurt
CR 8440 14.4 4.7 0.5 3.3 4077 10.7 1.3 -0.5 4.4
LR 8440 9.5 2.6 2.1 15.6 4077 8.1 1.2 2.2 40.2
RWA 8440 7.58 1.010 34.6 1408.7 4077 1.39 1.510 24.4 697.0
TA 8440 9.98 1.310 36.1 1528.0 4077 1.79 1.910 25.6 759.5
A 8440 3.38 3.99 33.5 1421.2 4077 6.18 5.59 24.4 742.8
These statistics allow us to re-assert the finding in Chami and Cosimano (2010) that
banks were indeed better capitalized before the second crunch compared to the first by
around two percentage points as indicated by both capital ratios. Moreover, had the
regulators linked the CR and LR together by any linear association (for instance, CR -
LR > Constant), we would expect similar distributions for each ratio. However, this is
not the case as can be seen at the 90th percentile7 with the quasi-normal distribution
of the CR (Skewness ≈ 0, Kurtosis ≈ 3) versus a positively skewed and leptokurtotic
distribution for the LR (Skewness ≈ 2, Kurtosis varies according to the period). This
indicates that there might be a non-linear linkage between the two ratios which we
develop in our last section.
The survivorship bias is apparent in our study as can be seen from the one-third
reduction in the number of banks between both periods8. Furthermore, we witness
7Clearly, the sample distribution is no longer normal at the 50th percentile.
8We do not account for this bias in order to preserve the data at our disposal as the higher moments
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an order of magnitude increase in the value of assets due to balance-sheet expansions,
mergers and acquisitions.
3 The Change in Binding Capital Constraint
i Capital, the Common Numerator
The CR and LR are the most popular measures of capital adequacy. Since the two ratios
are proportional to Tier 1 capital by definition9, we can investigate changes to capital
from the perspective of either ratio.
Greenspan et al. (2010) have shown that by the year 2000 the LR of the commercial
banking sector had fallen to almost a fifth of its value two centuries ago10. This was
followed by a period in which the market-valued LR was almost double its book value.
However, the second crunch witnessed a full reversal of this trend. Since one can cast out
the possibility of an increase in the market value of assets during crisis times, the only
explanation for the fall in market-valued LR, must relate to a depreciation in the value
of capital. That is mainly because of the failure of some capital components to play
their role as loss absorption layers. As a matter of fact, this gave Basel III regulators the
incentive to scrap the Tier 3 capital layer altogether and remove all elements in Tier 2
that cannot fulfill their purpose11. Consequently, this gave more importance to the role
of Tier 1 capital.
of the data do not vary between the two periods.
9With reasonable approximation based on the risk-based capital definitions for Prompt Corrective
Action (PCA) as posted by the FDIC, CR = K/RWA; LR = K/A where K is Tier 1 Capital. See section
4 for more details.
10This corresponds to an increase in the conventional sense of Debt/Equity.
11Mainly some types of preferred stock categorized under hybrid instruments.
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ii The Capital Ratio (CR) versus the Leverage Ratio (LR): The Bind-
ing Constraint
In view of the common capital feature embedded in both ratios, any changes between the
two can be attributed to changes in their denominators, risk-weighted versus unweighted
assets. However, each of the CR and LR can have very different effects on a bank’s
behavior depending on which of the two is the binding constraint (Berger and Udell
(1994), Hancock and Wilcox (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1994), Chiuri et al. (2002),
Barajas et al. (2004), Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010)). Before pointing out which
of the two ratios was primarily responsible for destabilizing the banks during the second
crunch, we start with a review of the first crunch which attracted most of the attention
in terms of bank failure analysis with regard to capital regulation.
First, it is important to recognize that the substitution of the 1980s flat rate for risk-
based capital (RBC) under Basel I meant that banks accounting for a quarter of total
assets failed the newly imposed regulation according to Avery and Berger (1991). Based
on Berger and Udell (1994), this amounted to a 20% increase in banks not abiding by the
regulation. Moreover, Peek and Rosengren (1994) emphasized that, towards mid-1991,
from the 20 largest First District commercial and savings banks, the numbers violating
the targets on Tier 1 and Total capital were zero and seven, respectively.
Unlike the fixed CR targets, the choice of which LR is chosen to compare between
banks is at each author’s discretion. This is because CAMEL ratings, which guide na-
tional regulators in their discretionary LR requirement for each bank, are not disclosed12.
This point is emphasized by Hall (1993) who demonstrated that if the average LR were
assumed at 3%, the CR becomes the more likely first crunch culprit since most banks
are able to fulfill the LR requirement. However, if the LR were established at a level of
12Under this rating scheme, the safest banks, attributed the best rating of 1, are given a leverage
target of 3%. Depending on their condition, all other banks are set a target of either 1 to 2 percentage
points higher. Even if it were known, the function underlying the “CAMEL-to-Leverage” specification
is arguably not bijective.
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5% then at least 18% of these would fail the leverage target.
Two studies which investigated the impact of the CR and LR on bank failures during
the first crunch are Avery and Berger (1991) and Estrella et al. (2000). Although the
latter study came at a much later time than the former, it only pointed out the critical
regions at which banks were affected by one ratio or the other. Hence, no consideration
was given to the combined effect of the two ratios. However, one important observation
we make from the authors’ results is that at least one year prior to its failure, a bank can
have the same LR in the critical region as one which eventually survived. This supports
the fact that the LR has no predictive power regarding bank failures in contrast to the
CR, in line with the authors’ conclusion. However, it is important to make sure this
statement remains valid during the second crunch.
Avery and Berger (1991) make a similar assessment by which they calculate the
number of banks that went bankrupt just before the start of the first crunch given that
these banks had earlier failed to meet one or more of the CR and/or LR regulations. For
example, almost a third of the 6% of banks which could not meet the targets for Tier 1
capital, Total capital or leverage failed over the next 2 years13. More importantly, 50%
of all banks failing the Tier 1 target eventually went bankrupt, putting this requirement
at pole position in terms of forecasting power.
Following the same line of thought as the previous authors we analyze the relationship
between these capital standards and bank failures for the second crunch. This comple-
ments findings such as Berger and Bouwman (2013) who observed that a one standard
deviation decrease in capital more than doubles the probability of bankruptcy. However,
their result shows this trend as being linear even though authors which differed on their
assessment of risk and capital (Koehn and Santomero (1980); Furlong and Keely (1987);
Kim and Santomero (1988); Furlong and Keely (1989); Keely and Furlong (1990)) still
agreed that capital shortfalls weigh more on a bank’s survival rate than surpluses.
13Note that in the Basel framework, if a bank fails Tier 1 it automatically fails the Total requirement
as the regulators impose that Tier 2 cannot exceed 50% of Tier 1.
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Notwithstanding some components might have changed, the CR thresholds were not
altered between the two Basel frameworks. This allows for a better comparison with
Avery and Berger (1991). However, instead of exploring changes before and after the
Basel II capital standards were brought in, our study uses three intervals (pre, mid and
end of the crisis), in order to gauge the evolution in meeting these standards along with
the leverage requirement as the crisis unfolded. As per Avery and Berger (1991) and
Hall (1993), we also look at a range of leverage targets 3%, 4% and 5%. Finally, we look
at how combinations of both standards impact on bankruptcies.
Table 11 shows a number of compelling findings. First, with respect to the 4%
(median) leverage requirement, Avery and Berger (1991) had obtained a 94% estimate
of the proportion of banks that passed all three requirements prior to the first crunch.
This is still well below the corresponding 99% proportion at the onset of the second
crunch which confirms the same result obtained by Greenspan et al. (2010). What’s
more is that the percentage of banks failing any of the standards was at least an order
of magnitude less than those in Avery and Berger (1991)’s first crunch estimates. This
confirms that, in quantitative terms, banks were holding capital well in excess of the
targets (overcapitalization) prior to the second crunch.
Nevertheless, failing any of the standards in the last crunch had more serious reper-
cussions since a much greater proportion of the pre-crunch bank pool (> 50%) ended up
bankrupt. Ultimately, all banks failing either the Tier 1 CR or a 3% LR went bankrupt.
Therefore, since meeting either of the requirements did not make up for falling short of
meeting the other, this brings back into question the purpose of imposing dual require-
ments. Moreover, we point out the increase in the failure to meet any of the requirements
over time. This contrasts with a simultaneous decrease in bankruptcy rate, specifically
between the start and end of the period under observation. The first finding stresses
the weakened capital position of banks eroded by losses throughout the crunch period.
The second finding relates to corporate finance theory in that survival rates increase for
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banks which can endure more phases of a crunch (Klapper and Richmond (2011)).
A striking feature is that during all three phases of the crunch, all banks that failed
Tier 1, and obviously Total, capital also failed the average leverage requirement of 4%.
This has crucial implications on Basel III as it suggests that the choice of imposing a
backstop 3% requirement could be overly conservative. More importantly, increasing
the leverage standard by 1% always resulted in an average doubling of the failure to
meet the requirement across all periods. These reasons are why leverage would appear
to be the binding constraint for this crunch; thus statistically corroborating the state-
ments in Gilbert (2006)14 and Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010). This is in contrast
with the first crunch where banks were mostly struggling to meet their CR requirements.
Table 11:
Bankruptcy Predictions from Banks Failing to Meet Various Capital Standards
Our results for the period 2004Q3-2009Q2 are broken down into three consecutive dates (pre,
mid, end of crisis). With regard to the overall sample, we account for the bank percentage
in terms of number (%B) and assets (%A). Each row consists of a different regulatory target.
Numbers in brackets are for use in the last rows as combinations of the previous single stan-
dards where ‖ denotes the logical OR and & is the logical AND. The last row is for banks
which passed all standards (with a 4% LR). In that case, the following identity can be applied:
Prob[Pass] = 1 - Prob[(1)‖(2)‖(4)].
Pre-crisis (2007Q2) Mid-crisis (2008Q2) End-crisis (2009Q2)
Standard %B %A %Bkrpt %B %A %Bkrpt %B %A %Bkrpt
Tier1-CR(1) 0.02 0.00 100.00 0.10 0.25 88.89 0.49 0.37 30.23
Total-CR(2) 0.10 0.12 55.56 0.25 0.11 63.64 0.94 0.37 12.20
3%-LR(3) 0.03 0.02 100.00 0.09 0.01 62.50 0.47 0.31 31.71
4%-LR(4) 0.07 0.05 66.67 0.15 0.25 46.92 0.89 0.45 27.27
5%-LR(5) 0.14 0.15 69.23 0.39 0.34 42.86 1.42 0.85 17.89
(1)‖(2)‖(4) 0.14 0.15 61.54 0.37 0.35 66.67 1.45 0.74 18.25
(1)&(2)&(4) 0.02 0.00 100.00 0.10 0.25 88.89 0.49 0.37 30.23
Pass 99.86 99.85 7.02 99.63 99.65 3.38 98.55 99.26 0.49
14Though the author uses a different definition for the binding capital requirement based on surpluses
rather than the actual number of banks that achieved the given target.
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iii Assessing the Basel III Changes from the Perspective of Capital
Shortfall
When quantifying the magnitude of failing a specific standard one must relate it to
surpluses, or alternatively shortfalls15. As a matter of fact, Brinkmann and Horvitz
(1995) emphasize that regulators should not only look at how many banks are likely to
fail a newly introduced standard but also by how much their (excess) capital cushion
would vary. Hence, one motivation for performing the following study is to assess the
adequacy of the new Basel III standards.
Focusing on shortfall is arguably a better choice then surplus. Firstly because, as was
evoked earlier, the fact that banks were overly capitalized prior to the crunch did not
fare well for some of them during the crunch. In other words, while size does matter for
the regulators, it does not reflect quality of capital. This means that surplus could be a
biased signal for the health of the banking sector. Secondly, shortfall is more amenable to
the idea of setting minimum capital requirements. Hence, in the same spirit as Hancock
and Wilcox (1994), we calculate the average shortfall as the difference between the target
ratio and the actual ratio of banks which failed to meet any of the CRs. This turned
out to be equal to 1.5% for Tier 1 and 1.4% for Total Capital16 (conditional on having
met Tier 1).
The Tier 1 shortfall is actually in line with the current steps taken by the Basel III
Committee to increase the Tier 1 requirement by 2%. While the Total CR is set to
remain at the existing 8% target level, this ratio is being supplemented by other capital
buffers17 bringing the overall requirement well above the shortfall of the recent crunch.
Finally, if the Basel III regulators had decided to abide by the median 4% leverage
15Regulators classify institutions into four main capital surplus/shortfall categories: Ade-
quately/Under capitalized and Significantly/Critically undercapitalized.
16Note that the average shortage also decreased towards the end of the crunch due to the increase in
number of failed banks.
17This will raise the target to between 10.5% and 15% via the conservation, countercyclical and TBTF
systemic buffers.
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requirement implemented in the U.S., this could end up short of expectations as our
estimates for the second crunch revealed a close to 1% LR shortfall. This could explain
why the regulators chose the absolute difference, 3%, as a conservative target for mini-
mum compliance of all banks. Moreover, our finding suggests that the CAMEL ratings
system should be revised upward by the same shortfall amount to reflect the median
bank’s actual leverage position. Note that this is only until the U.S. becomes fully com-
pliant with Basel III as the introduction of the new framework is bound to render the
regulators’ rating system obsolete.
4 The Change in CR and LR Correlation Patterns
i Pattern Reversals and Economic Fundamentals
Having illustrated one crucial change between the two crunches with respect to the shift
in binding capital constraint from CR to LR, we now move on to another differentiating
aspect. To find out if there is any pattern in the co-movements of banks’ LR and CR
we plot the correlation between both ratios over each crunch period in Figures 2 and 3.
Various authors have measured this correlation over specific periods without men-
tioning if the obtained pattern is likely to be persistent over time. For instance, Estrella
et al. (2000) perform their calculations for the first crunch only. Their yearly values
coincide to a large extent with the ones we obtain for the first quarter of each year in
Figure 2. To our knowledge, they are the first to have observed an imperfect correlation
between the two capital measures which hints to the fact that each ratio can provide
independent information on capital adequacy for a given bank.
As such, the keypoint of our analysis is with regard to changes in the correlation
patterns for each of the crises. Excluding the reversals in the first and last quarters of
each period, during the first crunch (Figure 2), the trend would seem to be monotonously
decreasing with an apparent fall in 1990Q1. In contrast, the second trend appears to be
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Figure 2: Correlation Pattern between LR and CR during the 1990-1991
crunch
Figure 3: Correlation Pattern between LR and CR during the 2007-2009
crunch
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Figure 4: Relation between LR/CR Correlation Pattern (ρ) and Loan
Growth for different loan categories during the 1990-1991 crunch
Figure 5: Relation between LR/CR Correlation Pattern (ρ) and Loan
Growth for different loan categories during the 2007-2009 crunch
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Figure 6: Relation between LR/CR Correlation Pattern and GDP for dif-
ferent loan categories during the 1990-1991 crunch
Figure 7: Relation between LR/CR Correlation Pattern and GDP for dif-
ferent loan categories during the 2007-2009 crunch
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monotonously increasing with no noticeable changes (Figure 3). Note that the presence
of a fall during the first period is hinted to by the size of the fluctuations whereby during
the first (and shorter) crunch, the difference in correlation between peak and trough is
double that in the second.
In addition, it seems as though each crunch period’s correlation pattern between LR
and CR, (hereafter referred to as ρ), is itself correlated with various economic funda-
mentals, starting with loan growth. As in Berger and Udell (1994) and Shrieves and
Dahl (1995), we categorize lending growth into three major groups: real estate (LNRE),
commercial and industrial (LNCIUSD) and consumer (LNCONOTH) loans. We also
include the aggregate (LNSGR) which accounts for the loan categories we just stated
as well as other types of loans. As is apparent during the first crunch, the correlation
between ρ and the overall18 loan growth pattern is positive (Figure 4). The opposite is
true during the second crunch where the two are negatively correlated (Figure 5). This
hints to a change in the dynamics between the two ratios and lending during the two
crunch periods.
Our next step is to capture the loan category mostly linked to each of the crises
by computing the correlation of each category with the LR/CR correlation pattern (ρ),
denoted as “Correl”. The results for each category are shown in Table 12. Total loans
and consumer lending alternate in first place (in absolute value) in each crunch, followed
by real-estate and commercial lending. Note as well that the correlation between ρ and
the real estate category is relatively closer to that with the overall loan portfolio during
the second crunch (-0.49 and -0.61, respectively) compared with that of the first (0.44
and 0.75, respectively). This illustrates the critical role this asset class played during
each crunch.
Finally, the reversals witnessed earlier in the correlation patterns can be shown to be
18Although one cannot infer from observing these figures which of the loan growth categories is mostly
correlated with ρ, the lending contraction is obvious in both figures. We look at the individual categories
next.
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an artifact of the data which could relate to our choice of the exact start and end dates
of each crunch. In order to do so, we introduce a macroeconomic variable, GDP growth,
to represent the state of the economy. However, one could argue that in a financial
crisis, macro take longer to appear in the economy than at the micro-bank level. For
this reason, we use a one-quarter lagged LR/CR pattern (ρ) instead of the concurrent
one and plot it alongside GDP in Figures 6 and 7. Again, despite the exceptional GDP
improvements in 2008Q2 (before the Lehman crash) and 2009Q1 (before an improve-
ment in lending had been recorded), the correlation patterns between the lagged ρ and
GDP match in both the first (Correl = 0.83) and second (Correl = -0.47) crunches. In
sum, this highlights the fact that the correlation between CR and LR (ρ) is associated
with lending and the economic cycle.
Table 12:
Correlation between ρ and Loan Asset Growth
The results in this table refer to the correlation be-
tween various loan asset classes and the observed
LR/CR pattern (ρ) for each designated crunch pe-
riod.
Loan Asset Crunch 1 Crunch 2
Class (1990Q1-1991Q2) (2007Q3-2009Q2)
LNRE 0.44 -0.49
LNCIUSD 0.28 -0.32
LNCONOTH 0.80 -0.54
LNSGR 0.75 -0.61
ii Establishing the Line of “Causality”: Granger Tests
To determine whether the LR/CR process influences the loan growth pattern or vice
versa, we look at the components of the CR. Denoting K as Tier 1 capital, it is apparent
from equation (IV.1), that the more the bank invests in assets (Ai) with high risk-weight
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(wi = 1), the more the CR tends towards the LR:
lim
wi→1
CR = lim
wi→1
K∑N
i=1wiAi
=
K∑N
i=1Ai
= LR (IV.1)
Hence, as indicated in equation (IV.2), the higher the risk-weights, the more positive
correlation (“Correl”) between the LR/CR correlation pattern (ρ) and lending growth.
This allows us to infer that loan growth is more likely to influence the LR/CR correlation
pattern, the higher the level of the risk-weight.
↗ ∆L
L
=⇒ CR→ LR =⇒↗ ρ =⇒↗ Correl (IV.2)
We verify the postulates above via Granger causality tests19.. We run a basic VAR20
model between loan growth and ρ. The results in Table 13 show the causal effect between
the two factors depending on which is chosen as the dependent/independent variable.
The sign of “Correl” will effectively be given by the sign of the slope between the two
variables21. The loan growth category mostly correlated with the LR/CR pattern (ρ) is
determined via the Akaiki Criterion. We perform this analysis for each crunch.
We observe that for the first crunch the line of causality goes from the loan growth
categories towards ρ. This can be seen through the p-values (and R2) which are signifi-
cantly lower (higher) than those of the reverse causal relation which can be interpreted
as a rejection of the Granger hypothesis of non-causality. Note that the AIC and β
coefficient are the highest in magnitude in the case of the LNRE category due to the
impact on mortgage lending. More importantly, the positive sign given by β is a clear
indicator of the pattern we observe in Figure 4.
19Note that we could have done the same correlation using lagged GDP instead of loan growth.
However, the relationship between the ρ and GDP is not that straightforward.
20Using only 1 lag to limit the time effect of any variable on the next since they are expected to vary
simultaneously. In spite of the small number of observations, the results we obtain are consistent with
our reasoning.
21This comes from the basic econometric relation β = Correl(x, y) × σy
σx
where the variances σi are
positive.
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The picture is not as clear during the second crunch as for some loan categories,
the causal relation seems to have been reversed. Yet, with regard to mortgage lending
(LNRE) which is the best-fit AIC model, the first crunch direction of causality is pre-
served. More importantly, the β sign becomes negative which points to the opposite
correlation pattern we observe in Figure 5. Hence it appears that this transformation in
correlation patterns was not random and could therefore have been caused by a differ-
entiating aspect between both crises.
Table 13:
Causal link between Loan Growth and LR/CR Correlation (ρ)
The first two columns in this table refer to the variables in the VAR
model. β is the slope coefficient, AIC gives the overall goodness of fit.
Panel A: Crunch 1 (1990Q1-1991Q2)
Dependent Indepent β t-stat p-val R2 AIC
ρ LNRE 33.86 12.93 0.000 0.97 -9.56
LNRE ρ -0.02 -1.81 0.070 0.47 -9.56
ρ LNCIUSD 29.49 12.87 0.000 0.82 -9.16
LNCIUSD ρ -0.00 -0.13 0.094 0.42 -9.16
ρ LNCONOT 31.45 19.08 0.000 0.99 -9.20
LNCONOT ρ -0.08 -2.55 0.011 0.66 -9.20
ρ LNSGR 31.54 11.27 0.000 0.97 -9.53
LNSGR ρ -0.03 -1.65 0.098 0.50 -9.53
Panel B: Crunch 2 (2007Q3-2009Q2)
Dependent Independent β t-stat p-val R2 AIC
ρ LNRE -12.84 -4.13 0.000 0.74 -10.40
LNRE ρ -0.00 -0.13 0.893 0.70 -10.40
ρ LNCIUSD 3.16 2.12 0.034 0.47 -6.62
LNCIUSD ρ -0.30 -3.64 0.000 0.84 -6.62
ρ LNCONOT -2.74 -1.35 0.176 0.33 -7.05
LNCONOT ρ -0.207 -3.01 0.003 0.56 -7.05
ρ LNLSGR -2.25 -0.48 0.634 0.20 -7.74
LNSGR ρ -0.05 -0.80 0.422 0.81 -7.74
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5 Explaining the Changes using the CR sensitivity to Risk-
Weights
In order to explain the correlation reversals we highlighted in the previous section, we
assess whether the two ratios LR and CR have any influence on each other. Furfine
(2000) claims that the same magnitude change in either ratios can lead to drastically
opposite effects in terms of portfolio risk. Similarly, Gilbert (2006) states that changing
the risk-weights in the CR would impact the number of banks bound by the LR despite
the fact that the latter is insensitive to risk-weights by definition. More specifically,
using the exact scenario that occurred prior to the subprime crunch, in other words a
reduction in the risk-weight attributed to first-lien residential mortgages22, the author
shows that a risk-weight lowering lead to an increase in the number of banks bound by
the LR. This is a clear illustration of how the interaction between the two ratios can lead
to a change in the binding constraint. In what follows, we undertake a mathematical
approach in order to explain the LR/CR correlation pattern reversals.
i Deriving the relationship between CR and LR
The ratio of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) to Total Unweighted Assets (TA) in equation
(IV.3) is commonly used as a measure of risk as it is bound between 0 and 1 in increasing
order of credit risk. This is because RWA tends towards TA as the proportion of risky
assets (high risk-weight) increases (see Equation (IV.1)). Note that this tendency drives
the CR toward the LR, which explains how the two ratios can move together. Based on
that, what is not noted in most of the recent literature which uses this credit risk proxy
(Van-Roy (2005), Hassan and Hussain (2006), Berger and Bouwman (2013)) is that it
22Although the author’s specification changes the original value of 50% to half its value, rather than
the one chosen by Basel of 35%.
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is equivalent to an interaction between the CR and LR, irrespective of capital K23, as
shown in equation (IV.3). This will be useful in deriving the formulae presented next.
RWA
TA
=
K
CR
K
LR
=
LR
CR
(IV.3)
In the next step, the change in CR is derived with respect to a change in risk-weight,
wi, affecting a certain asset category i out of a pool of N categories
24. As can be seen from
Equation (IV.5), this change is negatively related to the product of the CR and a second
term which is dubbed “asset proportion” (APi). This term refers to the “proportion”
(in currency amount) held by the asset whose risk-weight is being changed vis-a-vis the
total amount of risk-weighted assets.
δCR
δwi
=
δ
δwi
(
K∑N
j=1wjAj
)
= K × δ
δwi
(
1∑N
j=1wjAj
)
= −K ×
(
Ai
(
∑N
j=1wjAj)
2
)
= − K∑N
j=1Aj
×
∑N
j=1Aj∑N
j=1wjAj
× Ai∑N
j=1wjAj
= −LR× 1
RWA
TA
× Ai
RWA
(IV.4)
= −LR× 1
LR
CR
×APi = −CR×APi (IV.5)
The formula has intuitive appeal as the product of terms is always positive and
hence the change in CR resulting from a positive change in wi is always negative since
an increase in risk-weight means more risky assets which implies a negative (positive)
shock to the CR numerator (denominator) resulting in an overall decrease. Hence, in
anticipation of such an artificial increase, regulators should not have maintained the
same CRs after lowering the risk-weight on residential real-estate loans under Basel II.
Instead, they should have increased the CR targets even further to maintain adequate
23Kamada and Nasu (2000) are the closest to reach this result as they use Total capital in the definition
of the CR versus Tier 1 capital for the LR. This leads to a different but related concept: the asset quality
index.
24Prior to Basel II, N=4 for i∈[0, 20, 50, 100].
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capital buffers. While some might argue that this strategy could have exacerbated the
crunch by increasing the contraction in lending, it might have proven worthwhile in
weathering it by having forced banks to hold higher loss-absorption layers. Arguably,
this has been taken into consideration under Basel III in the setting of the new CRs.
Note that the breakdown of the CR sensitivity into multiple product variables is in
the same spirit as Van-Roy (2005) and Hassan and Hussain (2006)25. One interesting
feature which is apparent from equation (IV.4) is that the sensitivity of the CR to a
change in risk-weight is higher in absolute terms the higher the LR, the safer the bank
in terms of credit risk (low RWA/TA), and the larger the affected asset proportion
(APi). Hence, equation (IV.4) provides the mathematical framework to highlight the
importance of the credit risk ratio and asset proportion in dampening or intensifying the
sensitivity of the CR. The reason why the safest banks are the most sensitive to changes
in CR can be understood in the context of an extreme scenario where the risk-weights are
at zero. In that case, the CR is immune to changes in any amount of assets. However,
any deviation in risk-weight away from zero is likely to perturb it significantly.
So far, our derivations highlight the dependence of the CR on the LR, affected by
a negative sign for the case of a change with respect to a single risk-weight category,
wi. It is easy to show that the relationship between the CR and LR can be extended
to all N categories which yields the following formulae in equations (IV.6) and (IV.7).
We notice that most terms were adapted from the previous single risk-weight case, with
the last factor being the product of asset proportions. Our focus, however, is on the
preceding negative sign, which now changes to a sinusoidal pattern of positive/negative
signs depending on the number of risk-weight categories. This captures, along with the
25However, the authors’ derivations are with respect to CR itself, i.e. CR growth rather than with
respect to a change in risk-weight.
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factorial term26, the interactions between different changes in risk-weights.
δCR
δw1...δwN
= (−1)N ×N !× LR× 1
RWA
TA
×
N∏
i=1
APi (IV.6)
= (−1)N ×N !× CR×
N∏
i=1
APi (IV.7)
Note that while the correlation between LR and CR (ρ) is always positive, the sen-
sitivity of the CR, as captured by its derivative(s), could change which explains the
variations in slope found in Figures 2 and 3. In sum, our finding depends on the total
number and sign (positive/negative) of all possible changes affecting the risk-weight cat-
egories. We note as well that the behavior of the function in the CR sensitivity equations
is undetermined as N tends to infinity. However, this is not an issue for a few number
of risk-weight categories as is normally the case. Hence, short of adopting a continuous
method, our method will prove helpful if regulators decide to improve the granularity of
the risk-weight scheme.
To make sens of the previous formulae, we conjecture that the introduction of the
risk-weight categories under Basel I took N from one to four, this triggers a change in
the sign of the sensitivity of the CR. As such, the average risk-weight would have fallen
from one to an arbitrary W¯ . This makes the change in wi negative, resulting in a fall
in CR for a positive change in LR. Thus the two ratios would vary in opposite ways,
bringing down the correlation between them. This explains the sharp fall witnessed
in Figure 2. In contrast, the four new risk-weights introduced under Basel II27 which
would have taken N to eight would not have altered the sign on the sensitivity of the
CR even if they had been fully implemented. This clears the Basel framework from any
responsibilty with respect to the crisis. We validate these statments empirically in the
following section.
26This term arises from the successive derivations with respect to the risk-weights.
27Those were 35%, 75%, 150% and 300%.
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ii Model Verification and Policy Implications
a The CR 3-Factor Model
In this section, we set out to test whether the 3-factor relation in equation (IV.4) can
empirically explain the sensitivity of the CR to a change in a single risk-weight. Using
the derivative decomposition rule we can write:
δCR
δwi
=
δCR
δt
× δt
δwi
⇒ δCR
δt
= −δwi
δt
× LR× 1
RWA
TA
× Ai
RWA
(IV.8)
To disentangle the effect of each factor in the equation we take logarithms at both
ends. This translates into the following empirical model where the intercept α should
equal the logarithm of the change in risk-weight which is constant for all banks in a
given period:
ln (∆CR)j = α+ β1ln(LR)j + β2ln(InvCrRatio)j + β3ln(AP )j + j (IV.9)
Using Newey-White robust estimators, we verify the findings of this model by com-
paring the cross-sectional estimates from the two periods in Table 10 which differ by the
timing of one crucial event. The 1990Q1-1992Q2 period was marked by the phasing-in
of Basel I with the shifting of the risk-weight on residential real estate mortgages from
100% to 50%. However, although the Basel II change from 50% down to 35% began to be
factored in by U.S. banks between 2004Q3-2009Q2, the actual deadline for enforcing it
would come later on28. For our empirical setup to function properly, any change in risk-
weight would have to occur on a specific date and enforced by all banks simultaneously.
If this assumption is verified, the first crunch should exhibit a noticeable difference at
phase-in date compared to the second.
28The worldwide full implementation of Basel II was scheduled for 2011 (Berger et al. (1995)) which
came a year after Basel III was endorsed.
90
Running the model at various sample percentiles as per Table 10 shows remarkably no
difference for any periods. We therefore suffice with the results from the 90th percentile
which are displayed in Figures 8 and 9 below29. These figures show the ability of the
theoretical model to explain on average around 12% of the changes in CR. This suggests
that in practice these changes are also governed by other exogenous factors or frictions
which can arise from the fact that the LR and CR do not move in total freedom due to
the constraint imposed by regulators on minimum thresholds.
Moreover, both crises show persistent coefficients for the inverse of the credit ratio
while asset proportion barely has any effect in both periods. Despite the fact that both
variables are a function of RWA, we base our finding on the fact that this component
might have been factored in only by the credit ratio as a well-known determinant of the
CR, while the importance of asset proportion, highlighted by equation (IV.4), was so far
not recognized.
Nevertheless, the crucial finding is how the coefficient on LR (β1), Alpha UC (α)
and R2 rise in the same way at exactly the point in time where the regulation was
phased-in during the first period: after the end of 1990 (or beginning 1991) according to
Woo (2003). While this pattern almost perfectly matches with the reverse correlation
pattern in Figure 2, there is no such perceivable change for the second crunch as seen
from Figure 3. We also note that, during the first period, the β1 coefficient adjusts to
around its expected value of 1 at the phase-in point.
Empirically, we observe a (1%) significant value of 4.3 for the unconstrained α (Al-
pha UC) in 1991Q1 which is almost twice as high as the ones obtained throughout the
corresponding period. However, despite also being significant, our value of 4.6 changes
relatively little during the second period and does not exhibit the same noticeable change
as in the first period. This refutes our assumption in that banks either did not change
their risk-weight or rather did so continuously or not at all over the second period. Our
29Note that since the regulatory variables were introduced in 1990Q1 and we are looking at changes
in capital ratios, this implies that we would lose one observation in this designated period.
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Figure 8: Three Factor Model for the CR sensitivity to a change in Risk-
Weight during 1990Q2-1992Q2
Figure 9: Three Factor Model for the CR sensitivity to a change in Risk-
Weight during 2004Q3-2009Q2
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model derivation in equation (IV.9) implies that we should detect an α of 3.9 (2.7) for
the first (second) period30. However, these values did not prevail owing to the fact that
our formula is not enforced by the banking industry. Nonetheless, this comparison be-
tween both periods confirms that banks ratios still account for instantaneous changes in
risk-weight which our model is sensitive to.
Note that our empirical findings are only valid for changes in a single risk-weight
which could not always be the case. Our results could have therefore been affected
by disturbances from unaccounted changes. Hence, we force the theoretical constraint
that all coefficients be equal to 1 in equation (IV.9). On one hand, the constrained α
(Alpha C) in the first period still undergoes a perceivable change in 1991Q1, falling to
around 1.8. This indicates that our constrained model remains sensitive to the single
change in risk-weight. On the other hand, while the constrained α in the second period
is almost the same as its expected value at around 2.4, the fact that it remains almost
constant over time suggests again that banks did not undertake a specified change in
risk-weight during this period.
b Linking the CR to the LR: Policy Implications
In this section, we derive a framework for explicitely setting the CR with respect to
the LR. Our starting point is equation (IV.7) which is a simple homogeneous partial
differential equation (PDE) that can be solved in closed form. The derivations are stated
in Appendix C. In the case of a single risk-weight change, the relationship becomes:
CR = LR× e
∑N
i [APi(1−wi)] (IV.10)
As the exponential power term is always positive, the CR should always be greater
than the LR. Indeed, the formula implies that banks should at least meet a lower thresh-
30These values are equivalent to ln(-(50-100)/1) and ln(-(35 - 50)/1).
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old of CR at least equal to LR; afterwards, they should increment their respective risk-
based capital positions by a weighted average of their asset proportions as captured by
the exponential term in equation (IV.10). For example, with a 3% LR, the old Tier 1
CR of 4% is reasonable but for the less conservative LR of 5% it is not. Indeed, such
distortions to the above identity could induce wrongful behavior on the part of banks
as was reported earlier in Gilbert (2006). Hence, as the CR is set to increase to 6%
under Basel III, this is in line with both LR targets of 3-5%, assuming appropriate asset
proportions.
In the following, we test to what extent equation (IV.10) holds empirically using the
following panel regression. Our results are shown in Table 14.
ln
(
CR
LR
)
jt
= α+ β
N∑
i
[APi(1− wi)]jt + jt (IV.11)
We report that across the two sample periods all estimates are significant at the 1%
level. As can be seen from panels A and B, at the 90th percentile, the R2 increases
to 93% (74%) for the first (second) periods. The relationship then weakens the smaller
our sample becomes as this makes it more specific to a particular type of banks. This
confirms that the above relationship holds for the banking sector taken as a whole.
Moreover, we notice that the α converges to 0 (1 in anti-logarithmic terms) as suggested
by our theoretical model. This confirms the lower threshold of CR being at least equal
to LR31 before any increments linked to asset proportions take effect.
Furthermore, we run a Chow test on the second period to verify that the coefficients
are stable between pre-crisis and crisis periods with the delimiter date set to 2007Q332.
The results shown in Panel C illustrate that in most cases, the hypothesis of stability
cannot be rejected which means that our model is valid independently of the period
31This can be seen by taking the Taylor series approximation for small numbers. For example, using
the 50th percentile in Panel A: exp(0.086) ≈ 1+0.086 = 1.086 ≈ 1.
32Choosing a different date such as 2006Q3 in relation to the Basel II implementation does not change
our results.
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under consideration33. Nevertheless, even at its peak of 0.4, the value of β is noticeably
below 1. In other words, a good proportion of banks are operating below the theoretical
CR requirement. This leaves policy-makers with the task of driving them upwards to
ensure the compatibility between the two ratios is maintained.
Note that according to equation (IV.3), CR/LR is equivalent to TA/RWA; hence our
results should hold whether we use either ratio as the LHS variable in equation (IV.11).
Indeed, we rerun our robustness test version of our model in Table 15 and find that we
reproduce to a large extent the results in Table 14.
Finally, our results showed that the Basel III guidelines with respect to CR incre-
ments are in line with the theoretical implications of our model. They also highlight
that there is room to improve on the choice of capital targets by making them more
adequate using a dataset of representative banks to calibrate a generalized model for the
banking sector. Alternatively, this could create the possibility for having endogenous
bank-specific requirements rather than a one-size fits-all guideline; a change called for
by some critics since the birth of the Basel regulation. Notably, this would help European
regulators especially in the context of establishing homogeneous capital requirements for
all EU countries (see Chapter 5).
Table 14:
Testing the CR formula stability (CR/LR)
The results in this table are obtained after running the original version of the re-
gression model in Equation IV.11: ln
(
CR
LR
)
jt
= α+ β
∑N
i [APi(1−wi)]jt + jt. Pct
denotes the percentage remaining from the original sample after removal of outliers.
Chow tests are based on the delimitor date 2007Q3.
Panel A: 1990Q1-1992Q2
Pct 100% 99.9% 99% 95% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
α 0.445 0.445 0.195 0.136 0.119 0.109 0.100 0.095 0.086
β 0.108 0.108 0.420 0.497 0.521 0.533 0.543 0.547 0.557
R2 0.458 0.458 0.898 0.924 0.928 0.917 0.906 0.893 0.885
33At the 90th percentile where the hypothesis is rejected, the coefficients are still equal up to one
decimal place.
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Panel B: 2004Q3-2009Q2
Sample 100% 99.9% 99% 95% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
α 0.368 0.376 0.371 0.345 0.131 0.116 0.115 0.116 0.107
β 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.056 0.438 0.452 0.437 0.411 0.411
R2 0.175 0.111 0.075 0.370 0.742 0.674 0.600 0.509 0.546
Panel C: Chow Tests
Sample 100% 99.9% 99% 95% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
β1 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.056 0.439 0.454 0.441 0.416 0.418
β2 0.040 0.043 0.040 0.051 0.424 0.438 0.423 0.399 0.398
p-val 0.585 0.002 0.005 0.151 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
χ2 0.3 9.19 7.8 2.06 12.7 10.3 9.59 8.4 8.48
Table 15:
Testing the CR formula stability (TA/RWA)
The results in this table are obtained after running a parallel version of the regression
model in Equation IV.11: ln
(
TA
RWA
)
jt
= α+β
∑N
i [APi(1−wi)]jt+jt. Pct denotes
the percentage remaining from the original sample after removal of outliers. Chow
tests are based on the delimitor date 2007Q3.
Panel A: 1990Q1-1992Q2
Pct 100% 99.9% 99% 95% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
α 0.442 0.442 0.192 0.133 0.116 0.106 0.097 0.092 0.083
β 0.105 0.105 0.416 0.494 0.517 0.529 0.538 0.542 0.553
R2 0.457 0.457 0.897 0.924 0.928 0.917 0.906 0.894 0.8866
Panel B: 2004Q3-2009Q2
Sample 100% 99.9% 99% 95% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
α 0.367 0.374 0.351 0.343 0.129 0.114 0.113 0.115 0.105
β 0.038 0.037 0.059 0.056 0.437 0.451 0.436 0.411 0.412
R2 0.177 0.111 0.421 0.371 0.743 0.674 0.601 0.510 0.547
Panel C: Chow Tests
Sample 100% 99.9% 99% 95% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
β1 0.038 0.038 0.060 0.056 0.438 0.454 0.440 0.416 0.418
β2 0.040 0.043 0.053 0.051 0.424 0.437 0.423 0.399 0.398
p-val 0.694 0.002 0.059 0.171 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
χ2 0.15 9.14 3.56 1.87 12.48 10.34 9.75 8.69 8.83
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact a change in risk-weight can have on the behavior
of banks towards adjusting their CRs and LRs. We first assess which of these latter two
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ratios was the binding constraint on banks prior to the 1990-1991 and 2007-2009 credit
crunches. Our results indicate that unlike the first crunch, the LR was more to blame for
triggering the subprime crisis. Our work complements the analysis of Avery and Berger
(1991) and reveals the impact of crises on bank capital cushions, and vice versa. More
specifically, we illustrate the erosion in capital ratios caused by the subprime crisis while
establishing the beneficial impact of capital on survival rates.
Furthermore, we study the changes in correlation patterns between the two ratios
with respect to the changes in binding constraint. The correlation patterns are seemingly
related to loan growth (microeconomic) and GDP (macroeconomic with appropriate lag)
market signals. We show that this reversal has its roots set in a mathematical relation
emerging from the sensitivity of the CR to a change in its risk-weight(s). While the
correlation patterns may have changed during different the crises, we show that the
impact on the binding constraints could not have been caused by changes in risk-weights
attributed to Basel II.
Finally, we provide a formula that relates the sensitivity of the CR to the LR, the
inverse of the credit risk ratio, and a new factor conveniently dubbed “asset proportion”.
As the formula was not applicable as part of the Basel framework, its empirical testing
reveals limited explanatory power and explains the multiplicity of other factors provided
by the literature to study the behavior of capital ratios. While we welcome these addi-
tions, we emphasize that any model which does not account for the factors in our formula
would inherently suffer from omitted variable bias. Note that an extension of our formula
gives way to a first-order homogeneous partial differential equation (PDE) governing the
behavior of the CR. We solve for single and multiple changes in risk-weights which fit
into a generic closed form solution. This allows for setting adequate CRs which reflect
changes in risk-weights while taking into consideration its counterpart capital measure,
the LR. In fact, this can be done in a straightforward and rigorous manner with not
much added complexity compared to enforcing arbitrary Basel ratios. Hence, this allows
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us to move away form the use of heuristics with regard to capital target selection.
In sum, the results of our research are helpful in assessing the improvements brought
by the new Basel III regulation with respect to capital requirements. Considering the
ongoing efforts of improving the granularity of the risk-weight scheme by introducing new
risk-weight buckets, our framework will facilitate the setting of adequate CRs. Hence,
doing so in a mechanical rather than heuristic way could eliminate the Basel capital
ratio puzzle related to the diverse impact of regulatory capital on banks.
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Chapter V:
European Bank Returns, Spillovers and
Contagion: An Empirical Investigation
1 Introduction
Finance and economic researchers base their understanding of the interaction between
countries on a scientific concept from the field of communications. In that respect, a
financial shock acting as a signal is assumed to cross international borders using as its
“media” the “linkages” between countries while being “amplified/reduced” by country-
specific factors at the “sending/receiving” end. In this setting, the recipient country has
almost no control over the initial shock, hence it can only regulate the strength of the
transmission and the tuning at the receiving end.
The importance of understanding the forces that govern this interaction can be seen
in the following two examples. When the United States (US) was hit by the subprime
crisis in 2007, the Euro-Area (EA) suffered the aftermath. Similarly, the EA sovereign
crisis that followed in late 20091 delayed the US recovery. In fact, the turmoil in the EA
brought back into question the purpose of a unified Europe2 as it revealed the downside
of having safer countries put at risk from their riskier neighbors.
As these examples illustrate, the study of how one economy is affected by another
1According to Claessens et al. (2011), the euro crisis began on October 16, 2009, with the words of
Greek prime minister “We have large hidden debts and spending”.
2The birth of the Euro in 1999 was based on a series of economic treaties that brought the member
countries within closer dependency of each other (single currency, free movement of population, removal
of trade barriers).
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is more than a matter of exchange rate fluctuations; especially in the case of the EA
where the issue does not arise. Krugman (2008) first developed the concept of an “in-
ternational finance multiplier” to help understand interconnections (linkages) between
financial markets. Combined with financial vulnerabilities, this concept was later formal-
ized in general equilibrium by Devereux and Yetman (2010). Many empirical works have
lent themselves in one way or another to the same concept. Nonetheless, the empirical
testing of related frameworks began much earlier in order to evaluate the cross-border
impact on returns as well as the transmission mechanism by which returns are affected.
This was based on acquired knowledge from pre-established models such as the CAPM,
supplemented with a variety of explanatory variables including bilateral and country-
specific factors (Dungey et al. (2004), Bekaert et al. (2005) and Poirson and Schmittman
(2012) amongst others). As per Calvo et al. (1993), the latter are also known as push
and pull factors, respectively.
In this research we contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the differential
role played by these factors in jointly determining bank returns and shock transmission
using a 2003-2012 dataset of eight EA countries and the UK. To our knowledge, this is
the first paper to do so as Bekaert et al. (2009) conceded that different approaches could
lead to different conclusions. This allows us to compare some of the contrasting results
found in the literature under a unified framework while distinguishing between two types
of shock transmission, spillovers and contagion. The separation we make relates to the
role of fundamentals in explaining the first transmission effect as opposed to the residual
transmission captured by the second effect. As such, our paper is closest to the work
of Baele (2005) who focused on stock market volatility instead of bank returns and
Fratzscher (2012) who examined portfolio equity flows on an international rather than
European scale.
Whereas there is a restricted set of bilateral push factors to choose from that includes
cross-border lending, investment and trade, there is an extensive list available for the
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set of country-specific pull factors which encompass various risk indicators. We select
capitalization as our main country-risk variable and a proxy for credit risk in order to
reflect on the impact of the Basel II capital regulation on Europe. Implemented as part
of the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD (2000) and CAD (2006)), this regulation was
enforced by all EU member countries including the UK (FSA (2006)) by 2007. The
reason the EU signed the agreement faster than other advanced countries, notably the
U.S., was because legislators recognized that European banks became experienced at
gaming the initial Basel I Accord, according to Shin (2012). Hence, one purpose of our
work will be in assessing the Basel II regulation thereby determining the need for the
new Basel III regulation.
Over the last two decades, capital has received mixed reviews in terms of how it
can affect stock performance (see Chapter 3). While not referring to equity returns in
particular, Berger and Bouwman (2013) examined the effects of capital on a different
measure of profitability, ROA, for US banks between 1984 and 2009. Their view is that
capital has a positive effect depending on the type of crisis and the size of the banks.
Note that their study does not account for “Too-Big-To-Fail” banks (TBTF), otherwise
known as Systematically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), in order not to bias
the results towards banks with strong capital bases as highlighted by Chan-Lau et al.
(2012a). Another contribution of our work will be to factor those banks into the analysis
separately and in conjunction with other banks to gauge any differential impact.
Note that the effect of capital ratios can be dented by other factors which, until Basel
III, were not part of the international regulation. One such factor is leverage, which is set
by national regulators, and was found to be strongly associated with balance-sheet risk
(Adrian and Shin (2010)). Looking jointly at both ratios, Chan-Lau et al. (2012a) find
that banks’ equity returns are boosted by high equity-to-asset i.e. leverage3 ratios. This
3Leverage is not to be confused with the traditional corporate finance definition of Debt/Equity. In
fact both “capital” measures differ mainly in their denominator: the leverage ratio uses Unweighted assets
(UWA) whereas the capital ratio uses risk-weighted-assets (RWA) in relation to capital (numerator).
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finding agrees with Devereux and Yetman (2010) and could be based on the inability of
Basel’s risk-based capital ratio to reflect risks adequately. Notably, a zero risk-weight
was attributed to some EA countries’ domestic government debt during the crisis despite
the fact that their sovereign’s creditworthiness had deteriorated.
With regards to international shock transmission, the study of cross-country effects
of capital ratios goes back as early as Peek and Rosengren (1997) who examine the
effects of these ratios for Japanese parent banks and how they influence the lending
behavior of their branches in the US. The study showed how capital can act as a channel
propagating a shock from parent to subsidiary. More importantly, the purpose behind
the Basel regulation was to increase banks’ resilience against such shocks, in other words,
decrease the banks’ sensitivity resulting from international exposure. A small exercise
by the ECB (2011) showed that this is indeed the case. While this result is re-asserted
in Poirson and Schmittman (2012), the authors are surprised to find occurrences of the
opposite effect. This could either be due to their particular setup or their use of leverage
instead of risk-based capital requirements as a proxy for the banks’ capital level. We
revisit this finding in our results.
Whereas similar variations in sample and time have lead previous authors to remain
inconclusive regarding their results (Poirson and Weber (2011)), another contribution
of our work is to test our findings across a spectrum of samples going from the largest
national banks (SIFIs/TBTF) to the entire countries’ banking sector. Also, in line with
Berger and Bouwman (2013)’s suggestion of assessing the differential role of capital
between crisis and normal times, we divide our sample into pre and post 2007. This
would point out changes in the effect of capital during these two periods especially for
those banks which were understood to be well-capitalised prior to the crisis (Chami and
Cosimano (2010)). Note that Poirson and Schmittman (2012) made a similar split but
did not account for the possibility that their results could be biased by the synchronous
introduction of the new Basel rules with the unfolding of the crisis.
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We find a set of consistent results across both time and banking samples. In par-
ticular, although Basel capital requirements reflect negatively on EU banking returns,
they help prevent shock transmission. Note that while most of the literature focuses on
individual banks, in our model, we use aggregate country measures in order to evalu-
ate the broader macro implications of our findings, in agreement with the emphasis on
macroprudential policy advocated by Basel III.
The paper is hence structured as follows. In section 2 we present an overview of
the literature on shock transmission. In section 3, we introduce our methodology. This
is followed by a discussion of our results and robustness tests in sections 4 and 5. We
conclude with our contributions, policy recommendations and possible extensions.
2 Shock Transmission: Spillovers or Contagion?
During the EA crisis, country risk indicators, such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and
bond spreads, displayed unprecedented high levels of co-movement across (peripheral)
European countries compared to normal times (IMF (2011)). This suggests that, in
times of economic turmoil, country indicators tend to behave similarly, meaning that the
potential “spillover” between the countries is high which might lead to further failures
(Cheung et al. (2010)).
Essentially, spillovers are transmissions that occur due to the interconnectedness
between countries (Dungey et al. (2004)). The transmissions usually relate to returns
but can equally apply to volatility (Baele (2005)), growth (Poirson and Weber (2011))
and even fiscal aspects (Ivanova and Weber (2011)). Methods to capture them vary
from a standard VAR model as in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) to more complex SVAR
models as in Ehrmann et al. (2004)4. While these models are able to integrate many
components, they remain overly dependent on the sometimes unverifiable assumptions
4For a full list of applied VAR methods refer to Poirson and Weber (2011)
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underlying the identification matrix. As a result, GARCH methods have also been used;
however, the problem of selecting the model parameters arises and is subject to the
choice of sample and information criteria (Dungey and Martin (2007)). Other methods
have also been proposed which use the Conditional Probability of Distress (CoPoD) as
in Sergoviano (2006).
A more tractable method of studying spillovers involves a two-stage regression, the
first stage being a return model that includes at least a global factor (common to all
stocks) and country-specific5 factors belonging to the region, sector and industry. Before
running the model, the standard regression constraint on the coefficients being constant
is relaxed. This can be done through repeatedly estimating the model at various time
periods (rolling window) or through using more elaborate time-varying coefficient mod-
els. The coefficients then become the dependent variable of a second-stage model where
the explanatory variables are arbitrarily chosen.
For instance, Brooks and DelNegro (2006) use a latent factor model for emerging
markets between 1985 and 2002. Their second stage factors include international sales
and income ratios. Nonetheless, the more common practice evolves around bilateral link-
ages, specifically trade and finance, as these are well-known for varying across time and
markets (Blanchard et al. (2010)). The first factor relates to how countries channel their
excess demand (supply) through imported (exported) goods and are thus potentially
affected, ceteris paribus, by changes to these economic forces (Kose and Yi (2006)). As
a result, banks are also impacted by lower trade as they deal with most of the guarantees
such as letters of credit (Claessens et al. (2011)). The second factor arises because of
international capital flows such as lending (Foreign Claims-FC) and investment (Foreign
Direct Investment-FDI). Similarly, if one country becomes reluctant to lend, its partner
will experience tighter credit conditions resulting in a squeeze on banks and the economy.
With the creation of the Euro, these bilateral linkages were intensified thus creating
5The important difference with the country-specific factors mentioned earlier is that these are sys-
tematic whereas the previous ones were idiosyncratic.
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“by far the biggest export market [and] largest single banking sector exposure” in the
world according to Poirson and Weber (2011). However, there is a lack of consensus as
to which linkage is more relevant. Clearly, this depends on other variables mainly: the
prevailing circumstances, time period, sample and model specifications which greatly
differ between authors thus leading them to different conclusions. For instance, Forbes
and Chinn (2004) find that between 1986-1995, bilateral linkages are insignificant but
from 1996-2000 they do play a role. Moreover, despite growth in international capital
flows, they also observe that trade linkages are the most important channel in determin-
ing spillovers from the world’s largest economies to the rest of the globe. In contrast,
while using the same methodology, Balakrishnan et al. (2009) find that financial link-
ages prevail during the period 1997-2009. The latter finding agrees with Blanchard et al.
(2010) who investigated the post-subprime period, highlighting an intensification of the
financial channel over time.
It is common in the literature to mix the spillover effect with contagion6. In fact,
a survey of almost a dozen definitions of contagion is listed in Forbes (2012)7. The
most popular are “excess co-movement” above what would be expected from economic
fundamentals (Kaminsky et al. (2003), Bekaert et al. (2005) and Fratzscher (2012)).
Other approaches include the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) used by Savva
et al. (2009) and Yiu et al. (2010)8 as well as the residual transmission (Masson (1999))
after accounting for other sources of transmission (Dungey and Martin (2007)). In
our study, the choice of the latter definition seems sensible given our dual purpose of
analysing spillovers and contagion. In other words, contagion refers to the co-movement
after factoring out spillover effects.
6Dungey and Martin (2007) see the difference between spillovers and contagion in the timing of the
initial impact of the shock. “Spillovers are the transmission at time t or later, of shocks which occurred at
time t - 1 [...]. Contagion, however, is the contemporaneous or later transmission of unexpected shocks”.
7Some definitions of contagion such as that in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) which relies on unconditional
correlation coefficients has lead the authors to reject the existence of contagion in many crises episodes
(1987, 1994, 1997). We restrict ourselves to definitions that found some evidence of contagion.
8Refer to Dungey et al. (2004) for an exhaustive list of methods.
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Determinants of contagion have evolved around Kaminsky et al. (2003)’s “leveraged
common lender” effect. However, at the debtor’s end, Forbes (2012) finds a clear as-
sociation between leverage9 and contagion. Bae et al. (2003), on the other hand, find
that exchange rate changes, interest rate levels, and return volatility are good predictors
of contagion. These variables are already factored into bilateral linkages such as trade,
investment and lending, albeit with a certain lag. This justifies our use of the bilateral
factors alongside capital and leverage ratios in order to explain contagion in line with
Devereux and Yetman (2010).
3 Methodology
i Data
Our dataset contains nine EU member countries10: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. In 2012, these countries ac-
counted for around 75% of EU GDP. On the other hand, the world’s two largest economic
areas, the US and EU (aggregate), each stood at 19% of World GDP; we label them as
partners.
As in Ammer and Mei (1996) and Chan-Lau et al. (2012b), we use each country’s
Morgan Stanley Capital International daily price bank index (BKMSCI) between 2003
and 2012 to compute the simple return level using logarithmic price difference. All prices
are taken in local currency to abstract from currency movements as suggested in Savva
et al. (2009).
We also keep with the MSCI series when choosing the world and regional stock index
for the US and EU series, denoted respectively as MSCI US and MSCI EU. This makes
9Leverage is defined as “the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to bank deposits, including demand, time and saving deposits in nonbanks”.
10Ireland had to be removed as its country index became obsolete at one point in time according
to MSCI. Likewise, the Netherlands data series was discontinued in 2007 and Finland had no Banks
Industry Group. Aside from these three countries, the rest cover all countries in the IMF (2011) report
and EU-countries in Chan-Lau et al. (2012a).
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the data more homogeneous unlike the use of specific country indices (such as S&P) as
in Baele (2005) and Dungey and Martin (2007). Note that an alternative would have
been to run a PCA on the World stock index. However, the reason we opt for these two
indices instead of picking the latter is because we want to compute the bilateral linkages
between each individual country and its partners. Choosing the World as a “partner”
would not only make the task more difficult and prone to measurement error, but it
also prevents us from directly identifying any causal factor related to a specific partner
as was the case in Poirson and Schmittman (2012). For these reasons, we selected the
US as an identifier of global shocks because of its size (Dungey and Martin (2007) and
Devereux and Yetman (2010)) and the EU aggregate as an identifier of regional shocks.
In this case, linkages with the US or EU are readily available for each country.
According to Poirson and Schmittman (2012), the fact that the MSCI US and
MSCI EU indices are the most highly correlated with the World index would suggest
that it would be difficult to isolate the individual effect of each partner. This problem
was stressed by Forbes and Chinn (2004) and admittedly biased the results in Brooks
and DelNegro (2006). To remedy the problem we regress the EU index on the US in-
dex in similar fashion to Fratzscher (2012) to create orthogonal indices. The residuals
become the new EU index for our study11. As can be seen in Table 16 the correlation
between the two indices is now almost zero.
Furthermore, in order to measure the influence of bilateral push factors we obtain
foreign direct investment (FDI) data from the OECD, (yearly aggregated) bank foreign
claims (FC) from the BIS consolidated banking statistics and imports (IMP) from the
IMF DOTS database. Consistently with Forbes and Chinn (2004) all flows are measured
from partner to country to estimate the effect of a reduction of either factor on the re-
cipient country12. All variables are weighted relative to the country’s GDP to eliminate
11We do not perform the reverse procedure because based on Ehrmann et al. (2004)’s result, between
1999 and 2004, the US accounted for 26% of the variance in three different EA assets while the EA only
accounted for 8%. This makes the spillover effect much stronger from the US to the EU.
12Depending on the direction of trade, other authors choose exports instead; however, in our setting,
107
stationarity concerns. Finally, capital (leverage) ratios TCERWA (TCETA), defined
as Total Common Equity divided by Total Risk-Weighted Assets (Tangible Assets) are
obtained from Bankscope. Correlation between all variables is provided in Table 17.
Our positive correlation estimates between bilateral linkages are in line with those of
Balakrishnan et al. (2009) and Fratzscher (2012). It is also important to point out that
bilateral linkages and capital ratios are uncorrelated.
Table 16: Correlation matrix for MSCI bank indices (2003-2012)
The data below shows the correlation between the Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) daily price indices of various countries in our sample.
US EU AUS BEL DEU FRA GRE ITA POR SPA UK
US 1.00
EU 0.07 1.00
AUS 0.40 0.56 1.00
BEL 0.43 0.55 0.62 1.00
DEU 0.47 0.54 0.60 0.63 1.00
FRA 0.47 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.69 1.00
GRE 0.23 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.43 1.00
ITA 0.49 0.62 0.62 0.67 0.69 0.81 0.41 1.00
POR 0.28 0.42 0.45 0.52 0.44 0.55 0.39 0.54 1.00
SPA 0.52 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.66 0.81 0.44 0.80 0.56 1.00
UK 0.50 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.77 0.39 0.68 0.47 0.73 1.00
Table 17: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables (2003-2012)
The data below show the correlation between the different explanatory variables in our model. Bilateral
Variables are shown with respect to the US and EU partner countries. Capital and leverage ratios are
computed for the FullSample (see Table 18) but results do not differ dramatically for other bank samples.
FC USA FDI USA IMP USA FC EUR FDI EUR IMP EUR TCERWA TCETA
FC USA 1.00
FDI USA 0.52 1.00
IMP USA 0.48 0.40 1.00
FC EUR 0.46 0.41 0.36 1.00
FDI EUR 0.19 0.26 0.43 0.37 1.00
IMP EUR 0.10 0.15 0.62 0.32 0.65 1.00
TCERWA 0.08 0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.03 1.00
TCETA 0.06 0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 0.53 1.00
exports from a given country are the imports of the partner which constitute the risk factor.
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Table 18: Bank Numbers based on Sample Size
The data shows the number of banks that form each of our samples.
SIFI IMF Top200 Top10 Top30 FullRank FullSample
AUS 0 3 2 10 30 261 402
BEL 0 2 2 10 30 48 174
DEU 1 7 13 10 30 1587 2796
SPA 2 5 9 10 30 128 316
FRA 4 5 16 10 30 249 779
UK 4 6 17 10 30 269 714
GRE 0 1 1 10 18 18 42
ITA 1 5 8 10 30 576 1055
POR 0 3 2 10 30 33 78
Total 12 37 70 90 258 3169 6356
We assume that the effect on the banking sector is captured by the country bank
index. Hence, the choice of what sample of banks to include in order to compute the
country-specific variables becomes crucial. Bruno and Shin (2013) compute a global
index based on the summation of a specified variable across the Top10 banks ranked
according to asset size. However, this unweighted method along with averaging across
a given sample, is subject to a bank size bias. In order to circumvent this problem in
the same manner used by the World Bank to calculate international debt statistics, we
compute country aggregate measures for the abovementioned ratios based on the median
values of a specific sample. Note that in order to remove any sample bias we do so for
seven sub-categories of banks (Table 18). In principal, each sub-category encompasses
the previous and so on. The first, SIFIs, is based on a set of criteria in addition to
size, defined in BCBS (2011)13. The second is a list of the most important banks per
country as established by the IMF. For the next samples, instead of imposing heuristic
thresholds as in Berger and Bouwman (2013), we rely on country rankings by Bankscope
based on asset size. This creates a more reflective sample of each country’s top banks,
albeit creating wider dispersion in sample sizes. Hence, the third sample includes banks
that figure amongst the world top 200. The fourth and fifth are top 10 and top 30 banks
13The full list is given in FSB (2012).
109
per country. The sixth sample includes all banks that were ranked by Bankscope for a
given country. The seventh category includes all banks in the database.
Note that, based on the fact that more open economies are more exposed to larger
trade shocks (VanRijckeghem and Weder (2003), Blanchard et al. (2010) and Claessens
et al. (2011)) other measures could have been used instead of imports such as trade
openness (Exports plus Imports divided by GDP) and financial or capital account open-
ness (Foreign Assets plus Liabilities divided by GDP). While these variables could be
expected to be influential, Balakrishnan et al. (2009) show that this is not the case which
supports their exclusion from our model. As an alternative, the Chinn-Ito measure for
capital account restrictions could have been used as in Fratzscher (2012)14; however, the
measure is obsolete in our case as it is identical across our selected countries due to the
removal of trade barriers between EU countries. Other variables have similarly been
excluded mainly for reasons of collinearity and inconsistency between various authors.
For a full list of variable exclusions see Appendix D15.
ii Model
a Returns
The return model is setup using an adapted version of the CAPM16. In other words,
country i ’s market index BKMSCI now becomes the LHS variable which is explained
by the contemporaneous global and regional indices MSCI US and MSCI EU, where j ∈
[US, EU]. We also add the matrices of Bilateral Variables (BV = [FC, FDI, IMP]) and
Capital Variables (CV = [TCERWA, TCETA]) which are lagged to eliminate endogeneity
concerns.
BKMSCIit,j = αj + β0,jMSCIj,t + β1,jBVit−1 + β2,jCVit−1 + it,j (V.1)
14These authors found no significance in this factor both during and after the crisis.
15Size is already factored into the definition of our samples as per Table 18.
16There have also been models who use Fama-French like factors instead as in Bekaert et al. (2009)
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All models are estimated using fixed-effects and Newey-White robust estimators.
Note that, in this context, robust estimation is done based on the country dimension
(i), which, in other words, leads to the same results as clustering by country. Indeed,
Poirson and Schmittman (2012) detected the presence of country clusters for individual
banks while Claessens et al. (2011) found similar behavior for stocks clustered by SIC.
However, as this study takes place at a more macro level (country banking industry),
we can only cluster by country.
b Spillover
The standard single-factor spillover model of Frankel and Rose (1998) has been extended
in the literature, leading to multi-factor models as in Forbes and Chinn (2004). As
mentioned earlier, the time-varying nature of this model is due to a relaxation of the
constant constraint on the coefficients of MSCI US and MSCI EU in equation (V.1).
We use a window period of 6 months (180 days) as in ECB (2011) to concentrate on
short-term fluctuations as opposed to longer windows such as Aharony and Swary (1983)
and Bunda et al. (2009). The first stage model is captured by equation (V.2) below:
BKMSCIit,j = αi,j +
∑
j=US,EU
βit,jMSCIj,t + it,j (V.2)
The “beta” coefficients now measure the time-varying sensitivity of the bank indices
to shocks coming from the US or EU. Yearly aggregated betas then constitute the de-
pendent variable for the next stage regression which incorporates BVs and CVs as the
main set of explanatory variables.
βit,j = β0,j + β1,jBVit−1 + β2,jCVit−1 + µit,j (V.3)
In Figure 10, we plot the individual country betas at daily frequency based on equa-
tion (V.2). Increases in beta reflect periods of greater economic and financial integration
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across countries which is accompanied by increased sensitivity between them17. Bearing
in mind the six month window used, in most graphs, one can see two peaks occurring
respectively around the dates of the subprime and Euro crises, preceded by a period of
relative calm. This suggests that a more interesting approach would be to divide the
sample period into a tranquil (2003-2007) versus a crisis period (2007-2011)18. This can
also be interpreted as a pre/post-Basel setting which would account for any differential
role played by the exogenous implementation of the capital regulation in the second
period.
c Contagion
Despite the possibility of misspecification in the case of contagion as highlighted in
Bekaert et al. (2005), we model contagion as the portion of interdependence which is not
accounted for by the spillover effect in accordance with Masson (1999).
ˆit = BKMSCIit −
∑
j=US,EU
βˆit,jMSCIj,t (V.4)
Residuals ˆit are derived by re-arranging the terms in equation (V.2) using the yearly
estimated spillover effect obtained from equation (V.3) as shown in (V.4). Figure 11
displays the yearly residuals stemming from (V.4) and thus reflects the contagion effect.
As expected this effect is arbitrary for every country and hence we cannot capture any
similarities at this stage as we did in the case of the spillover effect.
17This notion is underlined in Brooks and DelNegro (2004) using an aggregate developed market stock
index during the period 1986-2001.
18Note the effect of the lag in shifting the end date of the crisis.
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Figure 10: Country Betas (daily)
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Figure 11: Country Residuals (yearly) - Horizontal line denotes the 0 inter-
cept
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4 Results
i Background Analysis
In this following, we measure to what extent any EU country is likely to be affected by
its partnerships with the US and EU. We compute the betas for the whole period by re-
gressing each individual country’s BKMSCI index on that of MSCI US and MSCI EU19.
The difference in beta between both partners is shown in Figure 12. In line with Bekaert
et al. (2005), country betas with respect to the EU are all higher than those of the US
by around 0.6, with France having almost double that of Portugal.
Next, we plot the individual country betas in Figure 13. We observe a linear beta
trend between EU countries with regard to both the EU and US. We notice that the
slopes of the linear fittings are almost the same across both groups with the R2s being
equal up to three significant figures. This is due to the orthogonalization we performed
earlier on the MSCI indices.
Moreover, Figure 13 shows a clear separation between countries according to the
magnitude of their respective betas. The ranking of countries by beta seems to be
the same with respect to the EU and US in particular for countries with the lowest
rankings. Aside from the UK whose beta could be affected by the fact that it is a non-
EA member, the nations on the left-hand side are the peripheral countries which were
subject to rescue programs during the euro crisis. Hence, these countries are referred to
hereafter as “program” countries. In contrast, with the exception of Italy20, the “non-
program” countries at the right-hand side are the strongest powers within the EU. Also,
the fact that France and Germany have the highest beta for the EU and US respectively
reinforces the opinion of the IMF (2011) that spillovers within the EA will be mainly
channeled by these two countries.
19All results are highly significant (p-value ≈ 0).
20Besides being a program country, Italy’s position in the ranking is clearly a reflection of the size of
its GDP: third (EA), fourth(EU).
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Figure 12: Difference Between EU and US Betas (2003-2012)
Figure 13: Beta Coefficients against US and EU (2003-2012)
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In addition, lending to EA countries played a prominent role during the euro crisis.
In the spirit of Waysand et al. (2010) and Shin (2012), we present some figures describing
the overall situation of these countries. In Figure 14, we plot the amount of lending of US
banks to their EU counterparties based on BIS estimates. We observe that the negative
impact on lending from the US to EU countries was short-lived during the subprime
crisis but increased considerably afterwards compared to pre-crisis levels. Note however,
that with the exception of the UK, the bulk of lending went to the core countries (N-
PRGM) as they were perceived as safe borrowers. In turn, this left the task of lending
to peripheral countries (PRGM) to the core countries, specifically France and Germany,
in addition to the UK. This is showcased in Figure 15 which illustrates the amount of
lending from core countries to the periphery.
It is worthwhile pointing out that France who did not participate in funding Portugal
and Spain held nonetheless the greatest debt proportion of the largest indebted country,
Italy (130% of GDP according to IMF estimates). This raised spillover concerns between
both countries during the EA-crisis. This is in contrast to Germany who drastically cut
down lending to the Iberic peninsula and was therefore less at risk from a negative
spillover emanating from Europe’s periphery. Finally, note that the UK, which took
part in lending to the periphery, is also the largest borrower from the US (almost equal
to the total of EA countries). This points to the particular role held by this country,
and numerous attempts to renegotiate its position, within the EU.
ii Preliminary ECB regression
Before running our model, we compute a country’s banking sector capital variables by
creating a hypothetical national representative bank for each of the samples in Table 18.
The latter is constructed by computing the national median for each of the samples. To
check that this method mimicks similar findings at the bank-level, we run the simple
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Figure 14: Foreign Claims (in Trillions) of US banks on EU counterparties
(Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics)
Figure 15: Lending by Core to Peripheral EA Countries
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fixed-effect21 regression in equation (V.5), which is a reduced version of equation (V.3),
and compare the results with those of the analysis conducted by the ECB (2011). Our
setting is fairly similar except that their period runs from 1995-2011 with a sample
consisting of 54 large international banks headquartered in 18 different countries which
includes non-European ones.
βit = β0 + β1TCETAit−1 + it (V.5)
The result they find is that higher capital requirements reflected in a higher leverage
ratio (TCETA) is significantly associated with lower bank spillover risk. We depict a
similar result in Table 19, notwithstanding a possible size effect. Indeed, we observe
that the sign on the leverage coefficient goes from slightly positively significant (SIFIs)
to insignificant (IMF and Top200) before becoming negatively significant throughout in
Table 19: Preliminary ECB Regression
The data below show the results from the ECB Regression described
in model V.5. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
Sample Beta Coef t-stat Adj R2 Num Obs
SIFI US 0.089* 2.19 0.06 40
EU 0.139 1.25 0.04 40
IMF US 0.021 0.36 -0.01 75
EU -0.007 -0.05 -0.01 75
Top200 US 0.046 1.06 0.01 75
EU 0.123 1.51 0.05 75
Top10 US -0.023 -1.76 0.02 77
EU -0.052* -2.00 0.03 77
Top30 US -0.020** -3.15 0.03 79
EU -0.048** -3.20 0.05 79
FullRank US -0.019*** -3.99 0.02 81
EU -0.042*** -3.75 0.03 81
FullSample US -0.025** -2.99 0.02 81
EU -0.045** -2.86 0.02 81
21As in the report itself, our results are qualitatively unchanged by running a random-effect model.
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line with the result of the ECB. The cutoff point lies between the samples that encompass
the number of banks used (54) in the ECB report as shown in Table 18. Nonetheless,
while our representative banks still reflect the overall composition of the banks in a
given country, our aggregation method inevitably results in a much smaller number of
observations for any given sample. We therefore managed to reproduce the ECB result
using only a tiny fraction of their observations (3% - 6%) with only one sixth reduction
in R2.
iii Core Results
In the following we present the results of our models for returns, spillovers and contagion
using all nine EU countries in our sample.
First, we highlight only the results which are found to be consistently significant
across all banking samples using the order prescribed in Table 18. We were forced to
drop the SIFI sample due to an insufficient number of observations as Austria, Belgium,
Greece and Portugal are not on the FSB list (see Table 18); nevertheless, these banks
are included in the IMF sample.
Second, we run the analysis for the pre and post crisis sub-periods, with emphasis
on the latter as it is usually more deserving of policy attention. Note that we choose to
emphasize the crisis rather than the regulatory effect as there seems to be no consistently
significant regulatory change between pre and post 2007.
In this setup, we encountered a multi-collinearity issue. This is highlighted in Table
20 where the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for the TCERWA and TCETA are larger
then 10 and the Conditioning Index (CI) is above 3022. We attribute this to the property
of the capital ratio of tending towards the leverage ratio when the proportion of highly
risk-weighted assets increases. As shown in Chapter 4, this allows for the correlation
between the two ratios to change. Hence, the 53% correlation between the two ratios in
22The VIF relates to an R2 greater than 90% in the auxiliary regressions while the CI is the threshold
for multi-collinearity as established by Belsley et al. (1980).
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Table 17 is reasonable in a period that combines variations from a tranquil (pre-2007)
and crisis (post-2007) periods.
Nonetheless, as can be seen by comparing the full sample and pre/post-2007 parti-
tions, this problem is not due to high correlations between variables in our sample (as
shown in Table 17); but to the smaller number of observations obtained by splitting the
sample population across time partitions. To remediate the problem we use the ratio of
risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWATA) instead of the capital and leverage ratios
as shown in our Updated model in Table 20. Indeed, this modification removes the
multi-collinearity problem as shown by the low CIs 23. Note that according to Chapter
4, the RWATA ratio is reflective of the credit risk undertaken by a bank and is actually
equal to the ratio of the leverage and capital ratios. Hence if this interaction between
both ratios gives a significant result, we relate our findings to the capital (leverage) ratio
on the basis that it is inversely correlated with risk-weighted assets (total assets).
Table 20: Multicolinearity Tests
This table shows the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for our Return model variables and Conditioning
Index (CI) of the overall regression. Results relate to the IMF Sample with the US partner. VIF is
defined as 1
1−R2 where R
2 is the explanatory power of the auxiliary regression where each variable is
regressed on the remainig ones. Typically a V IF > 10 or CI > 30 signals that multi-colinearity is
present.
Original Full Sample Post-2007 Pre-2007 Updated Full Sample Post-2007 Pre-2007
MSCI 1.19 1.36 3.60 MSCI 1.12 1.30 3.21
FC 3.80 5.59 9.36 FC 3.17 3.45 8.24
FDI 2.11 3.08 1.75 FDI 2.09 2.44 1.82
IMP 5.65 10.07 9.07 IMP 4.05 4.01 8.62
TCERWA 21.31 38.70 22.69 RWATA 2.58 2.62 3.78
TCETA 10.47 13.16 13.02 - - - -
CI 29.41 37.73 42.48 CI 15.84 18.37 17.87
23Effectively, this brings down our t-stats to the same magnitude as those in Poirson and Schmittman
(2012). Also, to ensure that the problem does not arise again we display the CI in all upcoming regressions
noting that all factors have a VIF less then 10.
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A nice feature of our model is that it allows us to determine the significant variables for
each scenario of returns, spillovers and contagion in a consistent manner. In fact, our
small number of variables provide an easier tool for policy-makers to handle than huge
multi-variate models. However, the fact that we are unable to go beyond the stated
number of regressors to keep clear of multi-collinearity creates another problem, namely
omitted variable bias. We resolve it by using fixed effects estimations in order to capture
missing bank-specific effects as in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) who suffer from similar
small sample problems.
a Returns
The MSCI index is a significant factor in our return model (Table 21). We find that
the EU coefficient is twice as high as that of the US during crisis periods. This can
be explained intuitively by the fact that each EU country is primarily affected by its
regional context even before the effects of the subprime crisis were felt. Note that the
Return model exhibits on average the highest explanatory power (R2 = 45%) compared
to the Spillover (R2 = 15%) and Contagion (R2 = 7%) models, notably because of the
MSCI component which does not feature in the latter two by construction. Indeed,
running the Return model with either of the MSCI indices as a regressor can explain
at least 30% of the changes in country returns. This is a characteristic of our country-
level CAPM model where systematic components play a more important role than in
the conventional bank-level model24. A similar finding was reported by Balakrishnan
et al. (2009) who obtained an R2 of 40% by regressing an emerging market index on an
advanced market index.
In contrast, IMP is a consistent push factor affecting returns negatively during the
pre-crisis periods and with respect to both US and EU partners. One reason could be
that if a country’s economy receives a boost in exports due to an exchange rate depreci-,
24For instance, Chan-Lau et al. (2012a) obtain R2 = 18% using the regular CAPM framework.
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Table 21: Returns
The results below are from running equation (V.1) for the six samples of banks using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells are factors
mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given between brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
MSCI 2.277*** 0.690 4.579*** 1.423* 2.459*** 0.769 4.633*** 1.772** 2.609*** 0.742 5.020*** 1.763**
(7.23) (1.25) (7.22) (1.98) (5.25) (1.40) (7.15) (3.33) (5.40) (1.28) (5.47) (3.19)
L.FC -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-1.41) (0.31) (1.41) (-0.46) (0.31) (0.08) (0.69) (-1.04) (0.18) (0.26) (0.53) (-1.01)
L.FDI 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.01) (0.04) (1.27) (0.80) (1.00) (-0.25) (1.18) (1.16) (0.25) (-0.37) (1.36) (1.14)
L.IMP -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* 0.001 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000
(-0.25) (-3.49) (-1.01) (-1.89) (0.00) (-5.35) (-0.92) (-2.01) (0.55) (-6.68) (-1.10) (-1.73)
L.RWATA 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000* -0.000
(1.28) (-1.70) (-1.07) (-0.93) (2.17) (-0.44) (0.48) (0.01) (2.17) (-0.97) (1.88) (-0.38)
CONS -0.004 0.008** 0.007 0.007 -0.016* 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.019** 0.006** -0.003 0.004
(-1.02) (3.05) (0.90) (1.81) (-2.08) (1.70) (0.31) (1.23) (-2.34) (2.62) (-0.86) (1.55)
R2 0.32 0.54 0.43 0.52 0.35 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.37 0.49 0.45 0.49
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 33.39 38.47 45.75 4.37 26.09 61.55 67.24 3.60 58.84 77.75 26.31 3.42
CI 18.38 17.88 12.78 17.00 15.96 23.29 10.50 15.60 19.91 23.31 11.98 14.57
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
MSCI 2.704*** 0.887 5.079*** 1.843*** 2.329*** 0.887 4.509*** 1.761*** 2.514*** 0.887 4.507*** 2.037***
(4.83) (1.49) (5.39) (3.56) (8.91) (1.51) (8.25) (3.44) (8.33) (1.57) (8.75) (4.69)
L.FC -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-0.45) (-0.30) (0.43) (-1.34) (-1.31) (-0.30) (1.17) (-1.09) (-0.93) (-0.33) (1.03) (-1.37)
L.FDI 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000**
(0.19) (-0.22) (1.04) (1.12) (0.31) (-0.24) (1.17) (1.11) (1.33) (-0.22) (1.10) (2.44)
L.IMP -0.001 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000***
(-0.26) (-5.66) (-1.04) (-2.47) (-0.26) (-5.88) (-0.98) (-2.39) (-0.13) (-6.43) (-0.94) (-3.73)
L.RWATA 0.000** -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000**
(2.57) (-0.02) (1.89) (1.36) (1.38) (-0.01) (-0.45) (0.43) (2.90) (0.19) (-0.39) (3.11)
CONS -0.020*** 0.004** -0.004 0.002 -0.008 0.004*** 0.006 0.003 -0.011 0.003*** 0.007 0.000
(-3.74) (3.09) (-0.82) (1.15) (-1.04) (4.33) (0.62) (1.03) (-1.67) (3.46) (0.55) (0.02)
R2 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.33 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.34 0.45 0.43 0.57
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 77.76 60.69 76.70 5.24 56.26 80.16 43.27 3.92 81.63 104.69 40.12 7.15
CI 20.11 20.51 12.78 15.94 23.06 20.30 14.79 16.45 25.25 22.03 15.96 16.92
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-iation the adjusted return on the banking sector will decrease as expected from uncov-
ered interest rate parity.
Finally, the RWATA ratio provides a significant pull mechanism for returns. Its
positive sign suggests that banks with lower risk-weighted assets were obtaining lower
returns during the crisis. This agrees with the standard risk-return relationship as
shareholders expect lower returns from safer banks. The latter claim should always hold
under the efficient market hypothesis according to Berger (1995), Admati et al. (2011)
and Baker and Wurgler (2013).
However, the link between capital and returns is not straighforward when the latter
assumption is relaxed. As pointed out in Osborne et al. (2013), the relationship between
the two is governed by two competing hypotheses, the cost of capital and banking sector
distress. The former hypothesis indicates that when the cost of capital is high, as
is normally the case in boom periods, bank lending is subsequently reduced to meet
regulatory requirements (Bernanke and Lown (1991), Baer and McElravey (1993) and
Peek and Rosengren (1995b)). This curtails returns unless there is a markup in lending
spreads which is not rejected by the demand side (Saunders and Schumacher (2000)).
The alternative hypothesis prevails normally during crisis periods as safer banks which
are more able to avert bankruptcy obtain lower funding costs which boosts their returns
as highlighted by the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Carbo-Valverde
and Fernandez (2007) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010).
On the basis that for the same amount of capital, safer banks with lower risk-weighted
assets exhibit higher capital ratios, our result that these banks were generating lower
returns goes against the alternative hypothesis. This also contradicts the findings of
Berger and Bouwman (2013) who explored the relationship between capital ratios and
profitability in various crises. One justification could be made on the grounds of moral
hazard (Berger et al. (1995) and Fischer et al. (2012)) in that maintaining higher capital
cushions is costly for banks which are forced to, or willingly, compensate by investing
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in riskier projects. The negative repercussions of such behavior arise during crisis times
and would seem to outweigh the pecuniary benefits achieved from lowering funding costs
especially with regard to large banks which were excluded from Berger and Bouwman
(2013)’s sample. However, our result can also be observed for the entire banking sector
(FullSample) which includes smaller banks as well. Hence, an alternative explanation
would relate to the failing of capital ratios, and in particular risk-weighted assets, to
account for the true riskiness of mortgage securities (subprime crisis) and sovereign
debt (European crisis). As such, the inflated amount of capital did not reflect the risk
inherent in these instruments whose yields widened during the respective crises thus
lowering returns.
Note that our result could also stem from the leverage effect meaning that banks
with larger asset bases generated lower returns during the crisis. This has widely been
reported as one of primary causes of the global financial crisis as excessive risk-taking
endangers the whole financial system and leads to a breakdown in the risk-return rela-
tionship alluded to earlier.
b Spillover and Contagion
On one hand, based on Table 22, aside from the FC effect for the US during the pre-crisis
period, no factor appears to have played a role in explaining spillovers in the EU. Taking
into consideration the lag in this variable, this means that any increase in lending to
these countries would result in an ex-post increase in their sensitivity to crises in the US.
On the other hand, it appears that the only factor increasing the potential for contagion
from the US is FDI according to Table 23.
In contrast to our earlier implications for returns, this implies that financial linkages
play a much more vital role in shock transmission. As a matter of fact, the RWATA
variable has no impact in both transmission models which implies that EU countries
would not be be able to offset these shocks through the protective layers of capital. The
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Table 22: Spillover
The results below are from running equations (V.2) and (V.3) for the six bank samples using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells
are factors mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given in brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.008 0.067*** 0.007 0.011 -0.004 0.058** 0.008 0.010 -0.005 0.056** 0.008 0.010
(-0.67) (3.58) (1.00) (1.22) (-0.26) (2.42) (1.22) (1.06) (-0.44) (3.11) (1.26) (1.15)
L.FDI -0.011 0.002 -0.020 0.052 0.004 0.006 -0.021 0.052* 0.006 0.013 -0.018 0.050
(-0.34) (0.06) (-1.09) (1.77) (0.15) (0.21) (-1.04) (2.02) (0.17) (0.62) (-0.90) (1.83)
L.IMP 0.085 -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 0.081 0.031 -0.010 -0.007 0.077 0.016 -0.006 -0.009
(1.10) (-0.01) (-0.61) (-0.53) (0.95) (0.20) (-0.62) (-0.50) (0.88) (0.12) (-0.35) (-0.62)
L.RWATA -0.006 0.002 -0.011 -0.006 -0.000 0.007 -0.011 0.008 -0.001 0.011** -0.019 0.005
(-0.91) (0.20) (-0.75) (-1.53) (-0.00) (0.86) (-0.90) (1.43) (-0.24) (2.44) (-1.58) (0.77)
CONS 0.918* 0.309 2.041** 0.978** 0.593 -0.011 1.974** 0.353 0.661 -0.182 2.309*** 0.501
(1.92) (0.62) (2.35) (3.22) (0.83) (-0.02) (2.75) (1.28) (1.50) (-0.65) (5.00) (1.81)
R2 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.29 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.30 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.29
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 0.89 13.17 0.82 1.77 0.56 12.87 0.89 1.61 0.56 17.15 1.63 1.45
CI 18.07 16.69 12.68 15.10 15.55 20.92 10.30 14.21 19.49 21.22 11.80 13.36
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.005 0.063** 0.009* 0.011 -0.004 0.067*** 0.007 0.010 -0.006 0.065*** 0.007 0.010
(-0.47) (3.31) (2.03) (1.43) (-0.48) (3.63) (1.25) (1.17) (-0.59) (3.74) (1.48) (1.16)
L.FDI 0.008 -0.020 -0.003 0.059* -0.005 0.001 -0.009 0.055* 0.002 0.018 -0.004 0.053
(0.20) (-0.64) (-0.14) (1.91) (-0.15) (0.05) (-0.47) (1.86) (0.07) (0.75) (-0.22) (1.84)
L.IMP 0.084 -0.019 -0.003 -0.007 0.077 -0.015 -0.003 -0.007 0.082 -0.017 -0.017 -0.007
(1.21) (-0.10) (-0.17) (-0.48) (0.92) (-0.08) (-0.17) (-0.45) (1.16) (-0.08) (-0.97) (-0.36)
L.RWATA -0.003 0.008 -0.035** -0.006 0.005 0.006 -0.027 -0.002 -0.006 0.009 -0.028** -0.001
(-0.26) (1.20) (-2.55) (-1.52) (0.59) (0.55) (-1.27) (-0.30) (-0.81) (0.87) (-2.49) (-0.09)
CONS 0.721 0.051 2.996*** 0.980*** 0.341 0.088 2.721** 0.806*** 0.907* -0.046 3.048*** 0.751*
(1.13) (0.17) (4.03) (4.46) (0.56) (0.39) (2.70) (3.38) (1.87) (-0.14) (3.54) (2.25)
R2 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.28 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.28
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 0.70 26.02 4.24 1.80 1.67 22.09 1.74 1.24 0.88 8.40 4.79 1.23
CI 19.77 19.10 12.65 14.39 22.68 18.72 14.63 15.22 24.73 20.32 15.72 15.49
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Table 23: Contagion
The results below are from running equation (V.4) for the six samples of banks using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells are
factors mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given between brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.016 -0.058 0.011 0.006 0.001 -0.034 0.008 0.008 -0.007 -0.043 0.005 0.007
(-0.31) (-0.83) (0.81) (0.34) (0.02) (-0.49) (0.45) (0.57) (-0.13) (-0.60) (0.60) (0.48)
L.FDI 0.389** 0.106 0.015 0.036 0.405*** 0.102 0.009 0.037 0.367*** 0.100 0.002 0.045
(2.61) (1.08) (0.26) (0.66) (3.76) (1.22) (0.14) (0.74) (4.26) (1.14) (0.02) (0.80)
L.IMP -0.312 0.116 -0.004 -0.022 -0.296 0.077 0.003 -0.023 -0.271 0.119 -0.000 -0.019
(-1.07) (0.51) (-0.11) (-0.85) (-1.02) (0.54) (0.08) (-1.05) (-0.99) (0.69) (-0.01) (-0.78)
L.RWATA -0.000 0.009 -0.020 0.009 0.017 -0.013 0.003 -0.017 0.013 -0.009 0.030 -0.014
(-0.01) (0.26) (-0.58) (0.28) (0.35) (-0.78) (0.05) (-1.18) (0.38) (-0.83) (0.70) (-1.03)
CONS 0.713 -0.520 0.513 -0.271 -0.278 0.547 -0.561 0.911 -0.067 0.301 -1.699 0.738
(0.34) (-0.45) (0.36) (-0.24) (-0.10) (0.63) (-0.28) (1.24) (-0.03) (0.45) (-0.89) (0.95)
R2 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.07
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 59.71 11.40 1.63 0.90 28.24 1.43 1.59 0.91 14.27 1.73 1.55 0.86
CI 18.07 16.69 12.68 15.10 15.55 20.92 10.30 14.21 19.49 21.22 11.80 13.36
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.019 -0.045 0.010 0.009 -0.016 -0.048 0.006 0.007 -0.007 -0.049 0.005 0.006
(-0.41) (-0.64) (1.12) (0.63) (-0.35) (-0.74) (0.65) (0.54) (-0.13) (-0.67) (0.60) (0.43)
L.FDI 0.417*** 0.141 0.015 0.044 0.374*** 0.113 -0.007 0.053 0.401*** 0.093 -0.016 0.036
(8.28) (1.35) (0.20) (0.78) (5.66) (1.71) (-0.11) (1.04) (5.23) (1.20) (-0.24) (0.67)
L.IMP -0.289 0.159 0.004 -0.020 -0.318 0.183 -0.003 -0.014 -0.322 0.149 0.015 -0.011
(-0.92) (0.84) (0.09) (-0.94) (-1.05) (1.08) (-0.07) (-0.64) (-1.05) (0.76) (0.47) (-0.47)
L.RWATA -0.017 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 0.008 -0.020 0.031 -0.023** 0.038 -0.009 0.037 -0.012
(-0.62) (-0.66) (-0.19) (-0.64) (0.17) (-1.66) (0.43) (-2.46) (0.88) (-0.61) (0.75) (-0.74)
CONS 1.550 0.301 -0.035 0.509 0.272 0.775 -1.865 1.141** -1.409 0.257 -2.530 0.580
(1.08) (0.44) (-0.02) (0.75) (0.11) (1.57) (-0.60) (3.27) (-0.59) (0.45) (-0.91) (0.90)
R2 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.05
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 35.60 1.46 1.55 0.95 32.23 1.28 2.23 3.98 13.70 2.42 1.92 1.27
CI 19.77 19.10 12.65 14.39 22.68 18.72 14.63 15.22 24.73 20.32 15.72 15.49
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Table 24: Non Program - Spillover
The results below are from running equations (V.2) and (V.3) for the six bank samples using non-program countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted
cells are factors mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given in brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC 0.008 0.059** 0.001 0.008 0.033 0.039* -0.001 0.009 0.017 0.052* 0.007 0.011
(0.51) (3.30) (0.23) (0.76) (1.85) (2.19) (-0.18) (0.68) (1.08) (2.32) (0.98) (0.90)
L.FDI 0.008 -0.024 -0.051** 0.066 0.015 0.009 -0.036* 0.043 -0.039 0.016 -0.025 0.045
(0.18) (-0.81) (-2.96) (1.12) (0.85) (0.32) (-2.26) (1.13) (-0.98) (0.78) (-0.72) (0.93)
L.IMP 0.198** -0.131 0.030*** -0.011 0.243*** 0.056 0.017 -0.001 0.272*** 0.005 0.019 -0.011
(3.54) (-0.45) (5.68) (-0.44) (6.09) (0.36) (0.97) (-0.04) (4.88) (0.03) (1.10) (-0.48)
L.RWATA 0.008 0.051** 0.025 0.009 0.025 0.023* 0.016 0.022* 0.016 0.018** -0.027 0.013
(0.95) (3.49) (1.50) (0.34) (1.53) (2.70) (1.45) (2.23) (1.16) (4.10) (-1.43) (2.07)
CONS -0.174 -1.062* 0.110 0.576 -1.210 -0.537 0.809 -0.076 -0.769 -0.234 2.074* 0.352
(-0.29) (-2.42) (0.18) (0.44) (-1.46) (-0.76) (1.88) (-0.13) (-1.09) (-0.54) (2.69) (0.95)
R2 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.31 0.17 0.07 0.36 0.25 0.18 0.16 0.29
Num Obs 20 22 20 22 20 22 20 22 20 22 20 22
F-stat 99.68 102.11 116.69 10.67 19.43 32.05 1.74 96.03 61.29 82.73 2.46 35.25
CI 15.81 18.67 11.13 18.79 13.65 23.91 8.09 19.18 17.41 21.30 10.37 16.62
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC 0.014 0.059** 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.068** 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.067** 0.005 0.011
(1.49) (3.32) (0.76) (0.77) (0.88) (3.56) (0.45) (0.77) (0.33) (4.60) (0.68) (0.93)
L.FDI -0.073 -0.055 -0.019 0.067 -0.057 -0.007 -0.024 0.062 -0.008 0.031 -0.011 0.054
(-1.78) (-1.69) (-0.70) (1.07) (-2.02) (-0.29) (-0.92) (1.09) (-0.32) (1.05) (-0.38) (1.22)
L.IMP 0.238*** -0.073 0.021 -0.009 0.230** -0.061 0.014 -0.010 0.192** -0.079 0.001 -0.014
(4.92) (-0.37) (1.48) (-0.35) (4.05) (-0.27) (0.89) (-0.35) (4.35) (-0.33) (0.04) (-0.39)
L.RWATA 0.031* 0.016* -0.028 -0.004 0.022* 0.009 -0.009 0.000 0.003 0.020* -0.023 0.006
(2.14) (2.30) (-0.67) (-0.44) (2.27) (0.63) (-0.28) (0.02) (0.27) (2.37) (-0.86) (0.31)
CONS -1.275 0.058 2.168 0.972** -0.877 0.211 1.663 0.863** 0.074 -0.175 2.505 0.646
(-2.01) (0.13) (1.42) (3.30) (-1.72) (1.38) (1.26) (3.93) (0.20) (-0.36) (1.44) (1.38)
R2 0.33 0.18 0.10 0.24 0.33 0.15 0.05 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.09 0.24
Num Obs 20 22 20 22 20 22 20 22 20 22 20 22
F-stat 88.84 11.23 1.31 9.26 12.06 59.66 0.66 1.85 79.92 40.12 16.07 0.67
CI 15.56 20.27 12.48 19.26 21.65 19.85 18.40 20.48 24.75 24.23 17.50 23.87
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relevant question thus becomes what factors could potentially prevent this transmission.
Before exploring other factors, we check first if our results are related to our sample
choice. Building on the distinctions found in Figure 13, we split our sample into two
partitions - non-program and program countries - for a more thorough analysis. This
entails an unavoidable decrease in the number of observations, which, in the case of the
program sample was too small to avoid excessive multi-collinearity and hence had to be
discarded25. The size of the other two samples are in line with the existing literature
(Poirson and Schmittman (2012)).
The contagion model using the NonProgram country sample reveals no new results
in comparison to our original sample. For the spillover run (Table 24), we first confirm
our previously obtained finding that FC is the key mechanism for this type of shock
transmission. This could be explained by the fact that, according to Figure 14, overall
lending to the EU’s NonProgram countries (mainly Germany and France) increased
towards the end of the subprime crisis. We can also speculate that this effect could also
be present for the Program countries, since accounting as well for the six month (window)
delay in Figure 10, the increase in sensitivity in all countries occurred mostly around
the same time, arguably due to the same determinants. This confirms the statement by
the IMF (2011) which described these countries as “exhibiting the greatest potential for
spillover effects in times of stress”.
Second, we observe a consistent IMP component from the US affecting non-program
countries during the crisis period. This implies that if the US increased its imports from
these countries, this would make them more reliant on the overall economic status of the
US, as mentioned in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012). We would normally expect the same,
if not higher, significance for the EU partner. However, this is not the case. In fact,
none of the factors in our model can explain shock transmission vis-a-vis the EU. This
could likely be because of the stronger partnership between the member countries which
25We can potentially, however, infer the behavior of banks in this sample from the full and non-program
country runs
129
provides a reassurance to the EU partner not to withdraw from crisis-stricken countries
in order to maintain the stability of the EU as was seen in the recent EU crisis.
Third, for the NonProgram countries we find that higher RWATA lead to a higher
potential for spillover effects (Table 24). This result is in agreement with those found
previously in ECB (2011) and Poirson and Schmittman (2012)26 using TCETA. Hence,
core countries with higher capitalized banks are better able to cope with financial stress
and are therefore more likely to avoid spillovers. This indicates that the banking sector
distress hypothesis, alluded to in our earlier results on returns, prevails in a spillover
setting where cost of capital is irrelevant.
As such, it would appear surprising that the same effect was not observed as well in
our original sample. This could be due to asymmetric implications across EU countries
with regard to risk assessment. Indeed, while the credit rating of France dropped a
notch during the sovereign crisis, the spread on its debt narrowly budged. This is not
the case for peripheral countries. Hence, if NonProgram countries lent to their Program
country counterparties, the former’s internal models could have reflected the change in
credit-worthiness and built up sufficient capital. In contrast, spillovers from NonProgram
countries are considered as highly unlikely, especially during the pre-crisis, which could
deter other countries from protecting themselves from such risks.
Another reason why the RWATA effect is weakened during the crisis could be driven
by the leverage ratio (TCETA) effect as there were no regulatory changes affecting the
capital ratio (TCERWA) thresholds under Basel II. Indeed, Poirson and Schmittman
(2012) note that leverage can in some cases have a positive effect on spillovers in contrast
to the ECB (2011) results. They assume this peculiarity is due to a possible non-linear
relation between bank size and vulnerability. However, we show here that our result
occur irrespective of size (Table 24). We are inclined therefore to conclude that this
26Note that the explanatory power of our model coincides to a large extent with the 22-28% range of
R2 in Poirson and Schmittman (2012). However, the advantage of our model is in achieving the same
power with a much smaller set of factors.
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could be due to an offsetting effect introduced by voluntary changes to the leverage
ratio (TCETA) between pre-crisis (build-up) and crisis (deleveraging) periods. In any
case, this supports the introduction by Basel III of a stable leverage ratio as a backstop
measure in order to maintain the beneficial aspect of risk-based capital ratios.
5 Robustness
In order to strengthen the validity of our results we run a series of robustness tests
covering all three models presented above. Tables are listed in Appendix E.
First, we would like to assert whether the results obtained are driven by the UK as a
non-EA country in our sample. Therefore, we remove the UK from our EU sample and
check if the Returns results in Table 21 change. In Table II, we see that this is not the
case except for a weakening of the trade relationship with the EU. This was expected
given that the UK is one of the largest trading partners with the EU.
Second, in Table III, we introduce the credit-to-gdp gap (CRGDP), a cyclical macro-
economic variable which the Basel committee on Basel III views as the determinant of
the new counter-cyclical capital cushions. We choose this variable for both its macroe-
conomic (control) and regulatory (new capital buffers) content. As described in BCBS
(2010), we construct this variable by taking the CRGDP deviation from the long-term
trend using a Hodrick-Prescott filter27. The variable introduces no additional explana-
tory power with regards to contagion28. The FDI factor remains significant as highlighted
in Table 23. This implies that contagion is as likely to occur in any stage of the credit
cycle.
Third, Poirson and Schmittman (2012) find that wholesale funding is a leading pull
factor in spillovers despite that Tressel (2011) find no such evidence. We use the same
27Using a smoothness parameter of 400,000 as suggested by the BCBS.
28Except in the last regression for each sample where multi-collinearity occurs. We discard the results
from these regressions.
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indicator, loans-to-deposits, to gauge the effect of wholesale funding. In Table IV, we find
that this ratio increases in significance (0.005-0.008) as the number of banks increases
from the Top 10 to the whole of the banking sector. This brings together both findings
regarding the impact of wholesale funding and confirms the necessity of our contribution
in avoiding any sample effects. Moreover, this opens an interesting research question to
explain why smaller banks are more sensitive to spillovers via wholesale funding. This
could be due to the fact that larger banks are the main contributors to wholesale funding
while smaller banks are more reliant and less capable of replacing these funding sources
by other resources in the same way that larger banks are able to.
Finally, despite the fact that our checks revealed that including liquidity as an ad-
ditional variable in our model might induce multi-collinearity for some runs, we include
it only for illustrative purposes29. We find that liquidity is the only factor which is
able to minimize the impacts of spillovers (Table V) and contagion (Table VI) simul-
taneously, noticeably in our sample of larger banks that do not suffer as much from
multi-collinearity. This implies that liquidity is the best protection against transmission
shocks especially when solvency constraints play no meaningful role. The latter agrees
with the importance attributed by Fratzscher (2012) to country-specific characteristics30,
thus reinforcing the introduction of liquidity standards in Basel III.
6 Conclusion
Boosting a country’s economy through higher returns while safeguarding it from ex-
ternalities have always been main targets of policy-makers. With the creation of the
EU, this objective became even more central as the targets shifted to a regional scale
with the added concern of protecting the EU, not only from the rest of the world, but
from itself. Indeed, the recent Euro crisis brought to light the internal vulnerabilities of
29Liquidity is defined as total liquid assets to total deposits and short term funding.
30Albeit not to bank-specific factors such as leverage and liquidity per se
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Europe which threatened to break up the union just over a decade after its creation.
Through relaxing constraints on bilateral linkages between countries such as trade
and investment, the EU’s economic target was achieved in 1999. However, EU leaders
witnessed during the recent crises that more was needed with regards to the safety
mechanism to maintain financial stability. With EU regulatory bodies questioned for not
achieving enough oversight, the EU Commission has favored extending the supervisory
powers of the Central Bank (ECB) and calling for a full banking union.
In light of the diversity of country-specific vulnerabilities, the problem faced by EU
regulators would be to choose uniform safety targets which so far have been outside
their jurisdiction. One European regulation which would escape such difficulty is the
Basel regulation due to its homogeneous enforcement across member countries under the
capital requirement directive (CRDIII). Nonetheless, the regulation still got its share of
criticsm for not having done enough to safeguard the sanctity of the banking sector.
This has propelled efforts towards increased capital measures and a backstop leverage
requirement under Basel III (CRDIV).
The main purpose of this research is to shed light on factors affecting the EU’s
banking sector in order to provide policy-makers with an adequate monitoring toolkit
for achieving their targets. Our model encompasses both linkages between countries
and a country-specific component linked to the Basel regulation which enables us to
detect which factors are more prevalent in increasing returns and preventing spillovers
and contagion.
We find that each element of the bilateral factors has a dominant effect in each of these
scenarios. While trade contributes negatively to banking returns, lending and foreign
direct investment increase the risk of spillovers and contagion respectively. With regard
to country-specific factors, we find that while high capital ratios (low risk-weighted
assets) decrease returns during crisis periods they emerge however, as the primary safety
mechanism against spillovers especially for non-program countries.
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The latter result has become a subject of concern for the banking industry as it
reveals a tradeoff between profitability and safety. Hence, banks could have the incentive
to reduce their capital ratios, thereby disregarding their protection against spillovers, in
order to achieve higher returns. It is therefore important to maintain these capital ratios
at sensible levels as they can act as a counterweight to the sometimes aggravating effects
of bilateral linkages. This agrees with Cheung et al. (2010)’s recommendation for policy-
makers to balance between the various tradeoffs that can affect the dynamics of global
interdependence. It also accentuates the importance attributed to higher capital buffers
despite the cautioning against a possible credit crunch arising from the newly-established
capital increments under Basel III. Note that our results indicate that capital ratios are
ineffective against contagion; however, they highlight liquidity as a contender to stave
off both spillovers and contagion.
Moreover, some banks, particularly the SIFIs, have attracted a lot of criticism in
both the US and EU crises. While we do not uncover any aspect particularly related
to this sample of banks, one of our contributions has been in finding consistent results
across a diversity of samples ranging from the largest banks (including the SIFIs) to the
whole of the banking sector. Despite data limitations similar to those encountered in the
literature, this makes our results more robust than those of authors who focus only on
one particular sample. In addition, the literature has focused on explaining individual
bank behavior whereas our method addresses the overall banking sector. This should
prove more useful for regulators as it points the axis towards macroprudential policy
which has become one of the central pillars of the Basel III regulation.
In light of the slow recovery the US faced due to the Euro crisis, we foresee that a
similar study based on the effects of the EU on the US would be an interesting comple-
ment to our work in uncovering the common grounds for crisis prevention between the
two strongest economic powers.
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Chapter VI:
Conclusion
In this research, we studied the impact of the Basel capital requirements regulation on
crises that hit the U.S. and E.U. With regard to the U.S., the lending contraction which
occured during the 1990-1991 recession could be considered as the unavoidable cost of
strengthening the financial sector, in some way an insurance premium. In contrast, the
story for the 2007-2009 crunch was quite different as most banks met the regulatory
requirements prior to the downturn. Hence, the story related to the second “capital”
crunch had more to do with the lowering of the risk-weight on residential mortgages
under Basel II.
As Chapter 3 reveals, this change had a beneficial impact prior to the crisis as it pro-
moted mortgage lending and boosted the economy. However, this trend was short-lived
as banks, despite being overcapitalized at the onset of the crisis, suffered severe losses.
Moreover, leverage and liquidity seem to have exploited difficiencies in capital ratios
related to moral hazard incentives and shortcomings of solvency constraints. Together,
these two factors combined to coerce banks into cutting down on their lending during the
subprime crisis. As such, the risk-based capital credit crunch hypothesis (RBC CCH)
highlighted by many authors as a viable explanation for the first U.S. crisis is not the
main culprit for the second crisis. It would make sense for us in the future to check
whether the same conclusion holds for countries which effectively implemented Basel II
ahead of the crisis, in particular the E.U.
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, changes in risk weights can lead to drastic changes
in the behavior of banks with regard to setting capital and leverage ratios. Indeed,
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from a mathematical standpoint, we establish that the leverage ratio cannot be changed
without affecting the sensitivity of the capital ratio to a change in one or more of its
risk-weights. We show that such modifications are also behind changes across crises in
the correlation patterns between the two ratios. However, the repercussions of this were
not felt at the level of the binding capital constraint on banks.
Having explored the microeconomic impact of the Basel regulation in the U.S., we
turn our attention in Chapter 5 to the macroeconomic impact of capital requirements in
the E.U. Our setting is based on exploring the impact of the Basel regulation on countries
having uniform bank capital requirements, which are bound together by monetary policy
but not in terms of their risk credentials. Indeed this issue has come back to the forefront
of policymaking with the advent of the euro crisis. In order to assess which factors matter
the most for returns, spillovers and contagion, our model encompasses both the linkages
between countries and country-specific components. We include a diversity of samples
ranging from the largest banks (including the SIFIs) to the whole of the banking sector;
the former having attracted a lot of criticism in both the US and EU crises. We find that
while EU countries which have the highest capital ratios achieve the lowest returns, they
are also better able to cope with spillover effects. Moreover, liquidity seems to be the
only safety mechanism with regard to contagion. This study would benefit from testing
whether the same factors which were deemed meaningful from the perspective of the EU
also hold for the US and if not why. We hope to pursue this further in future research.
The policy implications with regard to Basel III are as follows. With regard to our
findings in Chapter 3, the most recent change with respect to previous regulations was
the decision to increase core Tier 1 capital despite lending concerns reminiscent of the
first U.S. crisis. The justification for that seems to be that holding insufficient capital has
had much more severe consequences than increasing capital levels. The second change
was the inclusion of the leverage ratio as a “backstop” measure despite the hindsight of
a proven-to-be-faulty tandem of both risk-based and leverage ratios particularly for the
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U.S. The third change was the introduction of new liquidity measures, both short and
long-term, to complement solvency guidelines at a much needed time. Unfortunately,
the process of safeguarding against securitization has proven more difficult as the related
entities such as SPVs are outside the reach of regulators. Nonetheless, efforts have been
directed towards minimizing the risks of gaming the risk-weighting scheme via capital
adjustments.
Our analysis in Chapter 4 complements previous findings with regard to the effect
of capital during the first crisis by depicting the erosion in capital ratios caused by
the subprime crisis. This re-affirms the impact that shortages in capital can have on
survival rates while pointing the finger this time towards a different requirement, the
leverage ratio, in terms of binding constraint. Hence, our study allows us to gauge the
efforts by Basel III in quantifying the necessary increments to the capital ratio. But
before adding those, our mathematical derivation showed that this process has to go
through an adequate selection of the leverage ratio. Together with the credit risk ratio
and “asset proportion”, these three variables combine to influence the sensitivity of the
capital ratio to changes in its risk-weight. Our formulae also reveal a simple closed-form
way of establishing capital ratio thresholds taking into account the counterpart leverage
ratio. This avoids heuristic methods for selecting capital targets for both requirements
and could ultimately resolve the lack of synergy apparent from previous crises regarding
the interaction between both ratios.
Finally, the purpose of Chapter 5 was to shed light on the vulnerabilities of the EU
in order to help policy-makers in addressing them. This caters to the views of the Basel
committee on the necessity of exploring micro and macro-prudential policy implications
of new regulations such as Basel III. Hence, our main finding is that while high capital
ratios can curb returns the benefits outweigh the cost. The reasons are that, on one
hand, these ratios are helpful in mitigating the effects of spillovers. On the other hand,
increasing capital buffers could actually reduce the moral hazard which the crisis showed
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is not linked to the level of capital per se but to the surplus of capital (overcapitalization).
Hence, the Basel III recommendation to increase capital adequacy could make it more
difficult for banks to partake in similar wrongdoing.
In light of all the controversy surrounding the impact of capital requirements, the
Basel framework is still a work in progress as the question remains whether the BIS
was able to deliver on its promise of safeguarding the banking sector. Our research has
shown that while capital requirements certainly did not completely insulate the global
banking system from financial crises, banks with better capital levels did benefit from
higher levels of protection. As such, our analysis of the Basel regulation shortcomings
was directed in an effort to substantiate the changes brought by Basel III and incorporate
new ones before the time expires on the phase-in period of the new regulation. However,
with as many Basel accords having been implemented as the number of crises cited in
this research, the more important question becomes how many more “Basels” will be
needed before the regulators converge to a stable draft that has proven capabilities to
withstand crises? While Basel regulators seek to capitalize on their capital adequacy,
talk about a Basel III.5 is already in the making...
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Appendix A: The RBC CCH Theoreti-
cal Basis
B&U argued that movements into or out of risk-weighted categories should be uniform
for the RBC CCH to hold. However, as per Keely and Furlong (1990), banks make
decisions on the basis of an investment, rather than a risk-weight, opportunity set.
Therefore, it is inaccurate to consider that a bank derives the same utility, in terms
of capital requirements, from all assets in a certain risk-weight category; as one can
assume that the banks’ utility function depends on other variables than capital such as
profitability (Kamada and Nasu (2000)).
This point can be more easily understood if one chooses mean-variance rather than
utility maximization decision-making1. Indeed, according to Rochet (1992), competitive
portfolio managers, who are responsible for setting the investment course for a bank,
require a certain level of granularity that cannot be met by simply considering assets
as being part of a risk-weight bucket, for reasons such as diversification gains. In other
words, the uniformity assumption is only expected to hold from a regulators’ point of
view (utility); whereas banks’ behavior should be explained from a portfolio manager’s
perspective (mean-variance) which cancels out B&U’s assumption. This is the reason
Merton (1995) was opposed to the regulators’ idea of asset categorization instead of
estimating the underlying instruments’ contribution towards portfolio risk.
To justify this claim, we compute the average change in percentage portfolio com-
position between crunch and pre-crunch periods for different loan categories available
in the Call Reports. This is done for each period following Basel I (1988-1992) and
1The two approaches can be mapped into each other in modern portfolio theory (Efficient-Market
Hypothesis).
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Figure 16: Change in loan portfolio composition from managers’ perspective
II (2004-2009). The results shown in Figure 16 showcase how managers changed their
perception of risk inherent in some loan types through changes to their overall portfolio
composition. This is reflected in the opposite change in lending behavior between the two
periods for commercial and industrial loans2 (LNCIUSD) which belongs to the highest
risk-weight class (100%). Residential real-estate mortgages (LNRE) and OTHER loans
belonging to different classes also exhibit reversals. Note that the impact on LNRE and
LNCIUSD is far more pronounced during the second period compared to the first in
contrast to consumer loans (LNCONOTH) and OTHER loans.
In sum, were the uniformity assumption to hold, the managers’ response would have
been expected to be at least consistent for a particular loan category between the two
crunches. This is not the case, however, due to the obvious pattern reversal which takes
place at loan level rather than at the risk-weight class.
Hence, one must differentiate between a certain category of loans’ growth rate and
its change in percentage allocation within the portfolio. As a result, the perception that
2Variable names are different than in the main text to differentiate between individual growth and
portfolio percentage growth.
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under the RBC CCH, the reaction by banks to capital regulations will be uniform in
each risk-weight category is flawed according to the assumptions of our research3. In
other words, the RBC CCH can hold regardless of uniformity.
3This could also potentially allow for reconciling B&U’s results with contemporaneous work. Unfortu-
nately we cannot reproduce their results as the authors admit to having conducted hand approximations
of the necessary components due to lack of data availability prior to 1990.
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Appendix B: Geographic Factor
In order to establish that the South-West region was indeed the worse affected, our start-
ing point is the survey conducted by Realtytrac (2009) which indicates that the number
of foreclosures was the highest (5-9%) in the mentioned region along with Florida1 (F).
However, foreclosure by itself is not a direct measure of losses in dollar terms2. In con-
trast, our three NPL variables (Panel C) in Figure 17 - NPFRAT1 (Black), NPFRAT2
(Gray) and NPFRAT3 (Striped) - determine which geographic states incurred the heav-
iest losses. We restrict the ranking of each of the three variables to the top 15 states.
As can be seen from Figure 17, Arizona (A) and Nevada (N) did not figure amongst
the worse affected states prior to 2008Q1; whereas, towards the end of the crunch, both
were in the top five with Arizona taking first place in two of the three rankings.
Note that these measures are computed in relative terms with respect to each state’s
total asset base. However, banks in some states had such large balance sheets that these
measures were diluted and did not showcase the true severity of the crisis, for example
in the case of California. Indeed, computing the measures in absolute terms, our results3
show that Nevada headed all states while California ranked around tenth on an average
basis during the crunch.
Hence California cannot be discounted as a subset of the SW states that suffered
the most during the subprime crisis. We therefore include a SW dummy variable which,
while showing contrasting results with the NE variable in Table 24, highlights the shift
1Since we are only interested in accounting for an area-specific geographic component, although
Florida did lead the group in terms of losses, it does not fit into the wider geographic setting of our
variable. Results are not changed by incorporating Florida alongside the South-West states.
2Foreclosure does not reflect the value of the property itself or the size of the write-off. Also, fore-
closures entail a legal factor which may be postponed depending on the type of default and mortgage
renegotiation (forbearance).
3Not reported here, but available upon request from the authors.
4We find that the increase in SW banks almost offsets the decrease in the number of those in NE
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Figure 17: Variation in South West worse affected states (2007-2009)
in regional focus between the 1990-1991 and 2007-2009 crunches.
between control and crunch periods. This is merely an artifact of non-monotonicity in our sample period
as the SW banks decreased by twice as much during the crunch than they did in the control period
which is also almost twice as long by construction. Yet, during the first four quarters of the crunch,
there was a strong increase in SW banks to levels surpassing even those at the beginning of the control
period which is responsible for the upward push in the estimates.
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Appendix C: Solution to the CR equa-
tion
Assuming the CR is a function defined on ]0, 1]N with N possible risk-weights (wi),
the solution to the partial differential equation (PDE) in equation (IV.7) is solved in
the exponential form Ae
∑N
i=1 ciwi where ci are arbitrary constants to be found. Let
g(w1, ..., wN ) be another function defined on the same support as CR and representing
the product term in the equation (
∏N
i=1APi). Substituting into (IV.7) we get:
N∏
i=1
ci = (−1)N ×N !× g(w1...wN ) (C.1)
As stated earlier, the only boundary condition we have is regarding the sensible
approximation that CR(1,...,1) = Ae
∑N
i=1 ci = LR. Denoting by n the subset of N asset
categories with respect to which we are calculating the sensitivity of the CR, this yields
a system of two equations with n+1 unknowns. We solve for the cases of n=1, n=2 and
n=N.
i Solution with n=1
The system of equations for the case of a single risk-weight change becomes:
{
ci = −g(wi)
LR = Ae
∑N
i=1 ci
(C.2)
(C.3)
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By substitution:
LR = Ae
∑N
i=1 ci → A = LR× e−
∑N
i=1 ci (C.4)
CR = LR× e−
∑N
i=1 ci × e
∑N
i=1 ciwi = LR× e−
∑N
k 6=i ck+APi × e
∑N
k 6=i ckwk−APiwi (C.5)
= LR× e−
∑N
k 6=i[ck(1−wk)]+APi(1−wi) (C.6)
By symmetry, the same form applies for a change in asset j which gives:
CR = LR× e−
∑N
k 6=j [ck(1−wk)]+APj(1−wj) (C.7)
By the ratio of the two changes in assets we get the following identity:
1 = e−
∑N=1
k 6=i [ck(1−wk)]+APi(1−wi)+
∑N
k 6=j [ck(1−wk)]−APj(1−wj) (C.8)
Taking logarithms at both ends and applying the principle of linearity we get: ck = −APk
for all asset classes. This gives the final version of the CR equation given below. Note
how the riskiest risk-weight class has no bearing on the differential between CR and LR
in the same way that the safest risk-weight category has no impact on total RWA.
CR = LR× e
∑N
i=1[APi(1−wi)] (C.9)
ii Solution with n=2
The boundary condition remains the same. Hence, using symmetry to overcome the
underspecification in the case of 3 risk-weight categories, the system of equations for the
case of any two risk-weight changes becomes:
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
cicj = 2× g(wi, wj) = 2×APiAPj
cjck = 2× g(wj , wk) = 2×APjAPk
ckci = 2× g(wk, wi) = 2×APkAPi
(C.10)
(C.11)
(C.12)
Combining these equations together we get: c2i = 2AP
2
i , c
2
j = 2AP
2
j , c
2
k = 2AP
2
k .
This gives two possible solutions; however the first solution (C.13), is discarded as the
CR is increasing in wi which is counter-intuitive.
CR = LR× e−
∑N
i=1[
√
2APi(1−wi)] (C.13)
CR = LR× e
∑N
i=1[
√
2APi(1−wi)] (C.14)
iii Solution with n=N
Similarly, using symmetry and discarding the erroneous cases for n even, we obtain the
general solution as below.
CR = LR× e−
∑N
i=1[
N√
N !APi(1−wi)] (C.15)
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Appendix D: Excluded Variables
Table I: List of Excluded variables
Variable Source Reason
VIX Chan-Lau et al. (2012a) Marginal contribution
Euribor-OIS Chan-Lau et al. (2012a) Insignificant (High Collinearity)
BtM Brooks and DelNegro (2006) No substantial addition
Size Berger and Bouwman (2013) No impact on capital effect
IP/LIBOR Balakrishnan et al. (2009) Not significant
Commodity Price Growth Balakrishnan et al. (2009) & Forbes (2012) Opposite results
Interest Rates/TED Forbes (2012) Significant depending on sample
Current account/fiscal deficits Balakrishnan et al. (2009) Reflected in bilateral linkages
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Table II: Returns - noUK
The results below are from running equation (V.1) for the six samples of banks using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells are factors
mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given between brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
MSCI 2.303*** 0.363 4.595*** 1.389 2.539*** 0.579 4.632*** 1.767** 2.838*** 0.509 5.182*** 1.766**
(6.66) (0.64) (7.85) (1.84) (5.52) (1.13) (8.75) (3.01) (4.44) (0.87) (5.77) (2.84)
L.FC -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-0.32) (1.59) (0.98) (-0.51) (-0.06) (0.75) (0.77) (-0.88) (0.24) (0.93) (0.31) (-0.85)
L.FDI 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.55) (-1.13) (1.30) (0.56) (0.57) (-0.76) (1.13) (0.96) (-0.17) (-1.00) (1.33) (0.90)
L.IMP -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000
(-0.20) (-5.90) (-1.04) (-1.22) (0.06) (-6.45) (-0.97) (-1.56) (0.94) (-5.15) (-1.03) (-1.25)
L.RWATA 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(1.11) (1.21) (-0.84) (-1.01) (3.68) (-0.46) (0.06) (0.12) (2.01) (-1.15) (1.79) (-0.31)
CONS -0.004 0.010*** 0.008 0.007* -0.017** 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.024* 0.007** -0.002 0.004
(-1.29) (4.44) (0.84) (1.93) (-2.86) (1.60) (0.37) (1.03) (-1.92) (2.78) (-0.39) (1.43)
R2 0.31 0.62 0.45 0.53 0.34 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.38 0.54 0.46 0.49
Num Obs 32 34 32 34 32 34 32 34 32 34 32 34
F-stat 67.62 70.93 34.48 3.89 45.87 108.99 37.42 3.22 39.78 102.37 27.21 2.88
CI 23.19 25.75 21.86 23.46 19.06 26.53 16.41 22.05 25.05 24.63 16.67 20.89
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
MSCI 2.738*** 0.717 5.076*** 1.836** 2.359*** 0.756 4.406*** 1.759** 2.530*** 0.681 4.437*** 2.122***
(4.42) (1.04) (5.21) (3.23) (7.84) (1.09) (8.34) (3.03) (6.89) (1.11) (8.35) (3.89)
L.FC -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-0.03) (0.70) (0.28) (-0.83) (-0.35) (0.66) (0.97) (-0.80) (-0.15) (0.72) (0.80) (-0.74)
L.FDI 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000*
(0.08) (-0.77) (1.16) (1.15) (0.08) (-0.72) (1.27) (0.97) (0.76) (-0.77) (1.22) (2.06)
L.IMP -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001 -0.000**
(-0.20) (-4.87) (-1.05) (-1.86) (-0.20) (-5.01) (-1.04) (-1.67) (-0.08) (-5.62) (-1.02) (-3.22)
L.RWATA 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000**
(2.31) (-0.60) (1.51) (0.75) (1.26) (-0.47) (-0.83) (0.28) (2.54) (-0.57) (-0.54) (2.87)
CONS -0.022** 0.005*** -0.001 0.002 -0.009 0.004*** 0.010 0.003 -0.012 0.004*** 0.011 0.000
(-2.43) (3.95) (-0.23) (0.83) (-1.06) (4.50) (0.81) (1.03) (-1.78) (5.91) (0.69) (0.05)
R2 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.32 0.48 0.45 0.49 0.33 0.48 0.45 0.58
Num Obs 32 34 32 34 32 34 32 34 32 34 32 34
F-stat 56.23 90.86 49.75 4.33 87.61 104.42 29.73 3.25 58.06 84.05 23.57 6.12
CI 22.34 24.93 17.81 19.23 24.87 25.79 17.72 18.13 28.41 28.44 19.58 19.98
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Table III: Contagion - CRGDP
The results below are from running equation (V.4) for the six samples of banks using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells are
factors mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given between brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC 0.004 0.034 0.013 0.034 0.018 0.043 0.008 0.035* 0.007 0.038 0.006 0.035*
(0.05) (0.28) (0.78) (1.80) (0.20) (0.39) (0.44) (2.09) (0.11) (0.33) (0.54) (2.03)
L.FDI 0.436** 0.177 0.015 0.123** 0.439** 0.169 0.008 0.116** 0.400*** 0.171 0.001 0.119**
(2.82) (1.47) (0.26) (2.41) (3.02) (1.56) (0.14) (2.39) (3.38) (1.42) (0.02) (2.55)
L.IMP -0.303 0.096 -0.006 -0.072** -0.284 0.083 0.002 -0.069** -0.264 0.112 -0.002 -0.068**
(-1.02) (0.47) (-0.16) (-2.78) (-0.97) (0.60) (0.05) (-3.13) (-0.94) (0.69) (-0.04) (-3.08)
L.RWATA 0.004 0.011 -0.021 0.015 0.017 -0.009 0.003 -0.004 0.012 -0.004 0.031 -0.005
(0.09) (0.35) (-0.58) (0.61) (0.35) (-0.49) (0.07) (-0.36) (0.34) (-0.39) (0.70) (-0.47)
L.CRGDP 0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.018** 0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.017** 0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.017**
(0.55) (-1.43) (-0.43) (-2.90) (0.93) (-1.39) (-0.23) (-2.91) (1.00) (-1.31) (-0.34) (-3.17)
CONS 0.292 -0.912 0.591 -0.928 -0.474 0.027 -0.591 -0.073 -0.167 -0.231 -1.719 -0.042
(0.10) (-0.85) (0.38) (-0.89) (-0.15) (0.03) (-0.31) (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.29) (-0.90) (-0.06)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.26
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 73.58 33.45 1.73 9.99 26.89 7.63 1.32 10.96 9.47 21.60 1.31 14.68
CI 19.44 17.29 16.31 36.34 17.00 21.71 11.93 35.53 21.63 22.11 13.39 34.30
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.006 0.034 0.012 0.040* 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.031* 0.022 0.036 0.005 0.035*
(-0.09) (0.28) (1.06) (2.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.47) (2.06) (0.30) (0.30) (0.42) (2.08)
L.FDI 0.439*** 0.181 0.017 0.127** 0.407*** 0.152 -0.007 0.116** 0.461*** 0.168 -0.017 0.118**
(5.05) (1.56) (0.21) (2.69) (4.91) (1.81) (-0.11) (2.32) (3.45) (1.57) (-0.23) (2.53)
L.IMP -0.284 0.123 0.003 -0.084** -0.308 0.165 -0.003 -0.058* -0.303 0.127 0.016 -0.069**
(-0.90) (0.62) (0.06) (-3.33) (-1.02) (0.94) (-0.06) (-2.26) (-1.00) (0.68) (0.42) (-2.72)
L.RWATA -0.015 -0.002 -0.014 0.013 0.011 -0.017 0.032 -0.013 0.044 -0.005 0.038 -0.001
(-0.45) (-0.11) (-0.24) (1.36) (0.20) (-1.29) (0.39) (-1.14) (0.88) (-0.35) (0.72) (-0.12)
L.CRGDP 0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.021*** 0.009 -0.005 0.001 -0.014** 0.014 -0.009 0.001 -0.017**
(0.58) (-1.13) (-0.34) (-3.78) (0.78) (-1.11) (0.07) (-2.62) (1.06) (-1.42) (0.10) (-3.12)
CONS 1.279 -0.350 0.140 -0.945 -0.058 0.434 -1.907 0.364 -2.009 -0.215 -2.568 -0.248
(0.66) (-0.39) (0.06) (-1.80) (-0.02) (0.73) (-0.54) (0.63) (-0.65) (-0.39) (-0.85) (-0.44)
R2 0.13 0.12 0.02 0.28 0.13 0.18 0.03 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.26
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 34.54 41.46 1.14 11.58 35.89 15.02 1.88 26.40 8.40 61.97 1.48 10.09
CI 21.27 19.60 15.12 35.34 25.16 19.28 16.00 35.80 28.41 21.14 17.19 36.00
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Table IV: Spillover - LTD
The results below are from running equations (V.2) and (V.3) for the six bank samples using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells
are factors mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given in brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.007 0.067*** 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.056* 0.008 0.010 -0.003 0.046** 0.008 0.009
(-0.56) (3.59) (1.85) (1.18) (0.03) (2.05) (1.10) (1.03) (-0.29) (2.47) (1.42) (0.99)
L.FDI 0.011 0.001 -0.042 0.050 0.008 0.002 -0.026 0.052* 0.011 0.021 -0.022 0.047
(0.22) (0.03) (-1.79) (1.72) (0.34) (0.11) (-1.50) (2.00) (0.36) (1.32) (-1.22) (1.82)
L.IMP 0.074 -0.004 0.001 -0.009 0.107 0.043 -0.008 -0.007 0.086 -0.044 -0.005 -0.011
(0.92) (-0.02) (0.06) (-0.56) (1.31) (0.25) (-0.49) (-0.49) (1.14) (-0.25) (-0.32) (-0.87)
L.RWATA -0.006 0.002 -0.013 -0.006 -0.002 0.002 -0.013 0.007 -0.006 0.006* -0.024* 0.003
(-1.11) (0.24) (-1.33) (-1.24) (-0.17) (0.16) (-0.92) (1.25) (-1.05) (1.94) (-2.00) (0.61)
L.LTD 0.002 -0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.005* 0.008 0.006 0.003
(1.24) (-0.21) (1.48) (-0.49) (1.83) (1.00) (0.81) (0.03) (2.15) (1.48) (1.10) (1.46)
CONS 0.660 0.338 1.009 1.025** -0.111 -0.549 1.429* 0.348 0.147 -0.781 1.755** 0.219
(1.58) (0.63) (0.91) (3.15) (-0.14) (-0.64) (1.89) (1.26) (0.31) (-1.50) (2.77) (0.57)
R2 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.29 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.30 0.16 0.28 0.17 0.31
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 0.83 10.68 2.49 1.30 1.50 6.41 1.13 1.38 2.88 4.67 2.88 2.39
CI 20.89 18.64 18.10 17.33 21.30 23.31 19.79 17.45 23.99 25.54 21.75 19.76
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC 0.005 0.070** 0.007 0.010 -0.003 0.065*** 0.006 0.010 -0.005 0.060*** 0.007 0.009
(0.42) (3.18) (1.22) (1.66) (-0.38) (3.76) (1.19) (1.14) (-0.59) (3.72) (1.55) (1.08)
L.FDI 0.025 -0.027 -0.003 0.063* -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 0.054 -0.012 0.010 0.002 0.052
(0.76) (-1.00) (-0.15) (2.04) (-0.31) (-0.12) (-0.48) (1.77) (-0.43) (0.40) (0.11) (1.56)
L.IMP 0.096 -0.057 -0.003 -0.010 0.093 -0.029 -0.002 -0.007 0.103 -0.047 -0.020 -0.007
(1.81) (-0.31) (-0.19) (-0.75) (1.26) (-0.15) (-0.12) (-0.45) (1.68) (-0.22) (-1.03) (-0.36)
L.RWATA -0.004 0.011 -0.034** -0.004 0.008 0.007 -0.020 -0.002 -0.009 0.009 -0.034*** -0.001
(-0.45) (1.55) (-2.84) (-0.97) (1.17) (0.60) (-1.02) (-0.26) (-1.84) (1.00) (-3.65) (-0.05)
L.LTD 0.005* 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.007** 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.008*** 0.003 0.015 0.001
(2.23) (1.29) (1.53) (1.21) (2.51) (0.86) (1.36) (0.07) (2.53) (1.81) (1.59) (0.17)
CONS 0.063 -0.336 2.211** 0.745*** -0.601 -0.058 1.116 0.795** 0.205 -0.305 1.874* 0.697
(0.10) (-0.85) (2.57) (4.17) (-0.84) (-0.16) (0.68) (2.60) (0.33) (-0.94) (1.92) (1.44)
R2 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.34 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.28
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 6.37 5.92 36.10 1.79 49.97 33.15 7.35 1.57 4.60 10.59 15.66 1.72
CI 20.48 21.84 27.68 19.18 27.75 21.96 17.18 17.46 28.58 23.50 18.16 19.11
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Table V: Spillover - LIQR
The results below are from running equation (V.4) for the six samples of banks using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells are
factors mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given between brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.008 0.069** 0.010 0.011 -0.001 0.041** 0.011* 0.017* -0.002 0.043** 0.010* 0.017*
(-0.78) (3.35) (1.70) (1.13) (-0.07) (2.66) (2.16) (1.94) (-0.25) (3.06) (2.04) (1.98)
L.FDI 0.009 -0.009 -0.012 0.052 0.052 -0.025 -0.013 0.073** 0.008 -0.009 -0.009 0.074**
(0.23) (-0.22) (-0.74) (1.72) (1.41) (-0.62) (-0.69) (2.98) (0.25) (-0.28) (-0.44) (2.48)
L.IMP 0.096 -0.036 -0.015 -0.008 0.083 0.026 -0.011 -0.020* 0.098 0.002 -0.018 -0.020*
(1.39) (-0.17) (-0.92) (-0.52) (1.08) (0.18) (-0.79) (-2.27) (1.14) (0.01) (-0.87) (-1.97)
L.RWATA -0.006 0.004 -0.014 -0.006 0.003 0.007 -0.012 0.008 0.005 0.010* -0.011 0.007
(-0.85) (0.47) (-1.07) (-1.52) (0.37) (0.97) (-1.10) (1.35) (0.92) (2.27) (-0.78) (1.16)
L.LIQR -0.008 0.011 -0.020*** 0.000 -0.015** 0.007 -0.026*** -0.013* -0.015* 0.005 -0.025* -0.013*
(-1.40) (1.02) (-4.71) (0.02) (-2.37) (0.98) (-3.70) (-1.99) (-2.01) (0.76) (-2.10) (-2.30)
CONS 1.017* 0.002 2.457** 0.972** 0.674 -0.119 2.383*** 0.582* 0.591 -0.138 2.496*** 0.568*
(2.29) (0.00) (3.21) (3.25) (1.05) (-0.28) (3.80) (2.07) (1.39) (-0.43) (5.50) (2.12)
R2 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.38 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.38
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 1.78 8.66 7.47 1.67 2.41 7.85 7.13 3.65 4.81 12.83 5.92 2.47
CI 33.99 30.07 22.13 44.54 26.23 40.64 24.69 24.52 25.25 36.37 24.34 27.33
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.002 0.082*** 0.009* 0.012** 0.000 0.066*** 0.007 0.011 -0.002 0.064*** 0.006 0.011
(-0.18) (3.68) (2.10) (2.34) (0.04) (3.70) (1.19) (1.10) (-0.14) (3.63) (0.93) (1.19)
L.FDI 0.005 -0.018 -0.004 0.058 -0.015 0.002 -0.011 0.055 0.012 0.015 -0.011 0.054
(0.13) (-0.65) (-0.20) (1.65) (-0.45) (0.09) (-0.51) (1.84) (0.29) (0.64) (-0.56) (1.83)
L.IMP 0.089 -0.074 -0.004 -0.009 0.103 -0.032 -0.002 -0.008 0.096 -0.023 -0.005 -0.009
(1.20) (-0.43) (-0.22) (-0.76) (1.17) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.46) (1.26) (-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.42)
L.RWATA 0.002 0.008 -0.032* -0.006 0.009 0.007 -0.025 -0.002 -0.005 0.009 -0.024** -0.000
(0.17) (1.43) (-2.14) (-1.12) (1.22) (0.59) (-1.02) (-0.32) (-0.79) (0.85) (-2.56) (-0.04)
L.LIQR -0.012 -0.010** -0.007 -0.008 -0.018* -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.013 -0.003 -0.024* 0.005
(-0.92) (-2.48) (-0.50) (-1.36) (-2.04) (-1.42) (-0.24) (0.76) (-1.69) (-1.64) (-2.03) (1.60)
CONS 0.652 0.308 2.968*** 1.110** 0.343 0.177 2.721** 0.773** 0.993* 0.043 3.095*** 0.630
(0.97) (0.94) (4.03) (3.12) (0.64) (0.85) (2.68) (2.87) (2.21) (0.12) (3.71) (1.65)
R2 0.10 0.21 0.21 0.36 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.29
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 1.54 20.26 3.33 1.85 48.34 87.76 1.84 1.66 2.14 7.40 9.10 1.23
CI 26.91 30.47 20.81 22.71 28.55 21.66 33.94 18.24 29.13 24.24 30.10 19.31
152
Table VI: Contagion - LIQR
The results below are from running equation (V.4) for the six samples of banks using all EU countries in our dataset. L. denotes lagged values. Highlighted cells are
factors mostly consistent across bank samples. t-stats are given between brackets below the coefficients. * p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
SAMPLE IMF Top200 Top10
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.017 -0.060 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.023 -0.006 -0.021 0.005 0.015
(-0.30) (-0.88) (0.73) (0.42) (0.10) (0.15) (0.46) (1.69) (-0.12) (-0.27) (0.65) (1.00)
L.FDI 0.418** 0.121 0.014 0.035 0.498** 0.184 0.008 0.082 0.368*** 0.137 0.004 0.072
(3.00) (1.07) (0.24) (0.64) (3.15) (1.66) (0.12) (1.84) (4.01) (1.26) (0.05) (1.44)
L.IMP -0.296 0.163 -0.004 -0.021 -0.292 0.090 0.003 -0.052** -0.265 0.144 -0.003 -0.031
(-0.89) (0.73) (-0.10) (-0.79) (-0.90) (0.64) (0.09) (-2.55) (-0.84) (0.88) (-0.08) (-1.41)
L.RWATA 0.000 0.005 -0.019 0.006 0.024 -0.013 0.003 -0.016 0.015 -0.007 0.032 -0.012
(0.01) (0.16) (-0.53) (0.18) (0.50) (-0.70) (0.06) (-1.32) (0.45) (-0.56) (0.75) (-0.84)
L.LIQR -0.012 -0.015 0.002 -0.012 -0.029 -0.020 0.003 -0.028** -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.014**
(-0.37) (-0.83) (0.04) (-0.68) (-1.02) (-1.27) (0.06) (-2.80) (-0.11) (-0.81) (-0.14) (-2.47)
CONS 0.860 -0.085 0.480 0.085 -0.121 0.836 -0.600 1.414** -0.090 0.224 -1.654 0.812
(0.38) (-0.07) (0.27) (0.07) (-0.04) (1.02) (-0.29) (2.34) (-0.04) (0.34) (-0.82) (1.04)
R2 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.11
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 57.71 4.23 2.43 0.60 30.10 1.25 2.05 7.76 11.18 1.15 1.47 4.23
CI 33.99 30.07 32.13 44.54 26.23 40.64 25.69 24.52 25.25 36.37 24.34 27.33
SAMPLE Top30 FullRank FullSample
PARTNER US EU US EU US EU
PERIOD Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007 Post-2007 Pre-2007
L.FC -0.010 -0.004 0.010 0.012 0.007 -0.049 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.052 0.004 0.004
(-0.18) (-0.06) (0.97) (1.70) (0.11) (-0.88) (0.20) (0.06) (0.06) (-0.70) (0.26) (0.25)
L.FDI 0.408*** 0.146 0.005 0.042 0.324*** 0.115 -0.055 0.050 0.426*** 0.086 -0.023 0.035
(6.40) (1.79) (0.06) (1.06) (3.58) (1.82) (-0.62) (1.10) (5.27) (1.13) (-0.36) (0.63)
L.IMP -0.274 0.045 -0.006 -0.026** -0.184 0.122 0.003 -0.008 -0.287 0.130 0.027 -0.008
(-0.78) (0.24) (-0.13) (-2.61) (-0.58) (0.97) (0.07) (-0.46) (-0.89) (0.68) (0.62) (-0.31)
L.RWATA -0.001 -0.010 0.015 -0.009 0.029 -0.019* 0.073 -0.021** 0.041 -0.009 0.041 -0.013
(-0.04) (-1.17) (0.24) (-1.22) (0.55) (-1.90) (0.91) (-2.77) (0.89) (-0.66) (0.83) (-0.80)
L.LIQR -0.041 -0.020** -0.052 -0.020*** -0.093 -0.012*** -0.130 -0.011** -0.032 -0.010** -0.023 -0.009**
(-0.56) (-3.06) (-0.78) (-6.37) (-1.51) (-6.12) (-1.57) (-2.87) (-1.39) (-3.26) (-0.40) (-2.82)
CONS 1.316 0.828* -0.239 0.856*** 0.280 1.106** -1.871 1.446*** -1.189 0.514 -2.485 0.829
(0.80) (1.92) (-0.11) (3.49) (0.11) (2.54) (-0.67) (4.88) (-0.47) (0.87) (-0.83) (1.21)
R2 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.07
Num Obs 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38 36 38
F-stat 23.20 34.19 1.80 48.10 25.12 12.70 3.43 13.60 14.21 4.57 2.36 4.20
CI 29.91 27.47 20.81 22.71 28.55 21.66 33.94 18.24 29.13 24.24 30.10 19.31
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